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Thomas Aquinas is one of the foremost thinkers in Western philosophy and Christian
scholarship, recognized as a significant voice in both theological discussions and
secular philosophical debates. Alongside a revival of interest in Thomism in
philosophy, scholars have realized its relevance when addressing certain contemporary
issues in bioethics.This book offers a rigorous interpretation of Aquinas’s metaphysical
and ethical thought, and highlights their significance to questions in bioethics.
Jason T. Eberl applies Aquinas’s views on the seminal topics of human nature and
morality to key questions in bioethics at the margins of human life – questions
which are currently contested in academia, politics, and the media, such as:
● When does a human person’s life begin? How should we define and clinically
determine a person’s death?
● Is abortion ever morally permissible? How should we resolve the conflict
between the potential benefits of embryonic stem cell research and the lives
of human embryos?
● Does cloning involve a misuse of human ingenuity and technology?
● What forms of treatment are appropriate for irreversibly comatose patients?
How should we care for patients who experience unbearable suffering as they
approach the end of life?
● What ethical mandates and concerns underlie the practice of organ donation?
Thomistic Principles and Bioethics presents a significant philosophical viewpoint
which should motivate further dialogue amongst religious and secular arenas of
inquiry concerning such complex issues of both individual and public concern. It
will be illuminating reading for scholars, postgraduate and research students of
philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, bioethics, and moral theology.
Jason T. Eberl is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University-Purdue
University Indianapolis (IUPUI). He is an affiliate faculty member of the Indiana
University Center for Bioethics, and co-director of IUPUI’s Master of Arts in
philosophy program. He has published articles in the journals: Bioethics, Journal of
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xii List of Aquinas’s works and abbreviations
This volume presents an application of the philosophical views of the medieval
philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas to contemporary issues in bioethics.
Though Aquinas lived and wrote in the thirteenth century, scholars continue to
find merit and relevance in his ideas. Several distinct movements of “Thomism”
throughout the twentieth century bear witness to Aquinas’s enduring influence in
both philosophy and theology. For Aquinas, these disciplines are not in fundamental
conflict with one another, as some scholars in both Aquinas’s time and even today
contend. Aquinas was open to the results of pure rational inquiry and did not
perceive such inquiry to be a threat to his Christian faith.
Due to Aquinas’s trust in human beings’ rational capacity, it is appropriate, for
certain purposes, to set aside Aquinas’s theological views and concentrate solely on
his philosophy. I do so in this volume in order to introduce the Thomistic
perspective into the realm of secular bioethics. Bioethics, of course, has a strong
historical foundation in what is called “moral theology,” as Albert Jonsen recognizes
in his history of the discipline (Jonsen, 1998). Nevertheless, contemporary
bioethicists and others involved in public policy debate often dismiss those views
which are founded upon a set of theological tenets; not because such views are
necessarily mistaken or incoherent, but due to the fact that their appeal is limited
to those who hold certain “faith” beliefs. It is difficult to either affirm or argue
against such views unless one shares the religious beliefs upon which they are
based.The most one can do, unless the religious beliefs in question are rationally
incoherent, is simply to assert that one does not share the relevant beliefs and thus
cannot accept any argument based on them.This generally precludes theologically
based views from having a significant voice in secular bioethics; or, if they are given
such a voice, it is not without criticism. Geneticist Richard Lewontin and
bioethicist Ronald Green both criticize President Clinton’s National Bioethics
Advisory Commission for hearing testimony from representatives of various religious
traditions on the controversial subject of cloning. Green quotes Lewontin as saying:
By giving a separate and identifiable voice to explicitly religious views the
commission has legitimated religious conviction as a front on which the issues
of sex, reproduction, the definition of the family, and the status of fertilized
eggs and fetuses are to be fought.
(Green, 2001, p. 116)
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Green himself contends, “Specific religious or moral beliefs not grounded in
publicly defensible values cannot be allowed to dominate this process” (Green,
2001, p. 169) – the process being one of  “objective assessment and peer review”
to determine public policy.While Green is correct that religious views should not
“dominate” the process of determining public policy, the question remains
whether such views can offer a “legitimate” voice in public policy debate.
Philosophical views, on the other hand, require only a shared capacity for reason
among those who would debate them; which, of course, does not mean that
everyone will agree with the philosophical premises that form the basis of various
arguments and conclusions. But such premises can be subjected to rational scrutiny
and thereby demonstrated to be more-or-less true, or more-or-less reasonable;
theological premises cannot be subjected to such scrutiny if they are ultimately
based on faith.Therefore, in order to introduce Aquinas’s views into contemporary
bioethical debates, his theologically based positions and arguments must be set
aside despite being a key component of his overall thought. In saying this, I am by
no means asserting that Aquinas’s theological views are not worthy of discussion.
In fact, a great deal of significant scholarship attests to the value of Aquinas’s
theological insights to Roman Catholic and other Christian philosophers,
theologians, and bioethicists.
Certain Thomistic scholars, who have offered contributions to bioethical debates,
have associated Aquinas’s views with the magisterial teachings of the Roman
Catholic Church (McCormick, 1991;Vacek, 1992;Ashley and Moraczewski, 2001;
Haldane and Lee, 2003a).This is quite understandable because Aquinas was a Roman
Catholic priest – a friar in the Dominican Order to be precise – and the Catholic
Church has long taught the value of Aquinas’s thought as a primary foundation for
its teachings (Leo XIII, 1879; John Paul II, 1998). Nor is it fallacious for scholars to
associate Aquinas’s views with Roman Catholic teachings as there is sure to be a
great deal of agreement. Nevertheless, it is not given that everything Aquinas wrote
is reflected in what the Church teaches today, and Aquinas himself recognized that
there is a difference between what can be rationally demonstrated and what can be
known by faith alone. For example, Aquinas argued, in agreement with his
intellectual ancestor,Aristotle, that it is not rationally demonstrable that the universe
had a beginning “in time.” In other words, it may be the case that the universe is
without a temporal beginning or end – as some contemporary physicists and
cosmologists argue as well (Hawking, 1996, ch. 8). Aquinas, however, also argued
that it is not rationally demonstrable that the universe did not have a beginning in
time. He thus concluded that what Christians believe regarding the origin of the
universe – that it was created at the beginning of time by God – is rationally
consistent even if it is not rationally demonstrable (DAM; Torrell, 1996, p. 114).
Despite this conclusion in favor of Christian belief, the bishop of Paris, Stephen
Tempier, condemned this argument and several of Aquinas’s other “heterodox”
arguments on December 10, 1270 (Torrell, 1996, p. 185).1
Hence, Aquinas was able to distinguish when one of the Church’s teachings or
his own religious beliefs was knowable as a matter of faith alone, and when it was
rationally demonstrable and thus arguable to those outside of the Christian faith.
2 Introduction
It is solely the rationally demonstrable aspects of Aquinas’s thought that I will
concern myself with in this volume. My goal is to present an arguable Thomistic
perspective to contemporary bioethicists – both religious and secular. In doing so,
I do not make it my task here to argue for the conclusion that Aquinas’s views are
superior to the alternatives; although I endeavor to point out important contrasts
between his views and certain contemporary positions on various issues.
What I do argue for in this volume are particular interpretations of Aquinas with
respect to the bioethical issues that will be discussed.Thomistic scholars, as will be
seen, differ in their interpretations and applications of Aquinas’s philosophy to
issues of the day; an obvious reason for this being that many such issues are not
even touched upon in Aquinas’s writings. Aquinas, for example, clearly could not
have even imagined the issues of embryonic stem cell research, cloning, withdrawal
of artificial life support, or organ donation. He did, however, write about the
inherent value of human life, the individual nature of human persons, the complex
nature of human intentionality, and the moral imperative to be charitable; each of
which, respectively, bears on the ethical evaluation of these issues.
Therefore, it is possible to identify certain relevant principles – that is, general
philosophical conclusions – that Aquinas espouses and which are applicable to
various bioethical issues. Such principles are both metaphysical and moral in
nature. As will be elucidated in the following chapters, certain principles are
fundamental to Aquinas’s account of human nature and moral action and are thus
quite general, such as, “Human beings are composite entities constituted by a
rational soul informing a material human body”; “The morality of human action
is judged with respect to what fulfills humanity’s proper natural inclinations”;
“Human life has a fundamental intrinsic, but not absolute, value”; “Some actions
may be morally permissible even if they result in a negative consequence.” Other
principles are more specific metaphysical and ethical conclusions derived from
these general principles, such as,“A human being comes into existence when there
exists a body with an active potentiality for rational thought”; “A human being’s
death occurs when their2 body is no longer an integrated living organism”;“Not
every means that prolongs a human being’s biological existence must be utilized.”
My intention is not to present definitive conclusions to the difficult bioethical
issues that will be discussed, but to offer an interpretation of one significant
philosopher’s viewpoint for the purpose of engaging bioethical debate in the
secular arena.The particular issues that I address in Chapters 4 and 5 relate to the
margins of human life: abortion and the use of abortifacient contraceptives,
embryonic stem cell research, cloning, care of patients in a persistent vegetative
state, euthanasia, and organ donation. Before treating these issues, I offer a
metaphysical analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 of when a human being’s life begins and
ends. First, though, I elucidate Aquinas’s metaphysical view of human nature, his
systematic moral philosophy, and his account of intentional action.
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Introduction
The past century has witnessed a revival of interest in the thought of Thomas
Aquinas across various schools in philosophy. In the latter half of the twentieth
century,Aquinas’s metaphysics, ethical theory, and philosophy of religion have been
introduced into contemporary debates in analytic philosophy. Concurrently,
scholars have utilized Thomism as a basis for addressing certain issues in bioethics.
Some, for example, have appealed to Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human
nature and human embryogenesis to argue for distinct points at which a develop-
ing human embryo may be considered to have a rational soul, and thus to be a
person (Donceel, 1970;Ashley, 1976; Ford, 1988; Grisez, 1989; McCormick, 1991;
Heaney, 1992; Eberl, 2000a). Others have appealed to Thomistic natural law theory
to evaluate issues such as abortion and euthanasia (Grisez and Boyle, 1979;
Gómez-Lobo, 2002; Eberl, 2003).
In this chapter, I will outline the fundamental principles of Aquinas’s
thought regarding the metaphysical nature of human persons and the natural law
which governs human moral behavior. These principles are well-known to
Thomistic scholars and have served as a foundation for the Roman Catholic
Church’s approach to addressing various issues in bioethics. Nevertheless, to the
wider community, Thomistic philosophical principles are generally either
unknown or misunderstood. I thus endeavor, in the chapters that follow, to
address certain bioethical issues using the Thomistic philosophical principles
elucidated here.
Aquinas’s account of human nature1
Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human nature includes, though it is not limited to,
three interrelated theses: a human person is a substance composed of an immaterial
soul informing a material body; a human person is not identical to an immaterial,
spiritual substance; and “animality” is fundamental to human nature. I will further
elucidate each of these theses.
According to Aquinas, a human being is a person. He adopts the definition of
personhood developed by Boethius:“An individual substance of a rational nature”
1 Aquinas’s account of human
nature and natural law theory
(ST, Ia.29.1; cf. Boethius, 1918). Being of a rational nature – that is, having an
intellective mind2 – distinguishes human beings from other material substances
(QDA, III; SCG, II.60; In NE, I.10, X.10). A human being, though, is not only
rational, but is also a sensitive, animate, and corporeal substance; human beings have
a material nature (In BDT, V.3). Aquinas thus distinguishes human beings from
other types of persons3 as “rational animals” (In M,VII.3.1326).
Aquinas refers to human beings as essentially animal, because we share certain
essential qualities with other members of the animal genus.The primary exempli-
fication of such similarity is the capacity for sense-perception. A human body,
though, is unique among various kinds of animal bodies in that it is organized not
only to support the capacity for sense-perception, but also the capacity for rational
thought. The disposition of a human body is determined by its having a rational
soul as its “substantial form.”4 As a substantial form, a rational soul is responsible for
the existence of a human being, the actualization of the matter that composes
a human being, and the unity of existence and activity in a human being
(SCG, II.68; In DA, II.2). One way to understand the notion of a rational soul as
a substantial form, in contemporary terms, is to think of it as a “principle of
organization” for a human body.A human body is an “organic” construct. It has a
variety of parts that both operate independently and function collectively to
support the existence and activity of a living, sensing, and thinking being. Both
the independent operation of one of a body’s organs, and its functional unity with
the body’s other organs, are governed by the formal, or functional, unity of the
organism itself.
A rational soul and the material body of which it is the substantial form are not
two separately existing substances. A substantial form is the actualization of a
material body.Aquinas asserts:
Body and soul are not two actually existing substances, but from these two is
made one actually existing substance. For the body of a human being is not
actually the same in the soul’s presence and absence; but the soul makes it to
be actually.
(SCG, II.69)
The intrinsic unity of matter and substantial form – body and soul – is responsi-
ble for a human being’s unified existence. Aquinas contends, “If you say that
Socrates is not one simply, but one due to the aggregate of mover and moved,many
incoherencies follow” (DUI, III).The primary incoherency is that Socrates would
not be one being unqualifiedly [unum simpliciter] (ST, Ia.76.1). If Socrates is not
unum simpliciter, then he cannot count as a substance.5 The idea that Socrates is an
aggregate of a mover and that which it moves is analogous to the aggregate of
sailors and the ships they pilot. One would not say that sailors and their ships
compose one being; analogously, one would not say that Socrates’s soul – the
mover – and his body – the moved – compose one being.6
A human being is not merely an aggregate of body and soul, for neither alone
counts as a substance.A human being does not naturally exist without being composed
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of both a material body and a rational soul.As Armand Maurer describes it:
The human person, according to Aquinas, contains a dualism of body (matter)
and soul (form): two incomplete components of the person’s essence, unified
by the person’s one complete esse [“being” or “existence”] . . . there is but one
esse of the whole composite. Accordingly the soul is not united to the body
as one being to another. If it were, the person would not have a substantial but
an accidental unity. Nor is the whole human personality present in the soul.
(1993, p. 511)
Typically, when matter is informed by a rational soul, a new ontological entity
comes into existence: a human being.7
An analogous example is salt. The elements sodium and chloride, which are
substances in themselves, come together to form a new substance: salt. When salt
comes into existence, the sodium and the chloride each ceases to exist as a distinct
substance, though both persist “virtually” as parts of the new substance (DME;SCG,
IV.35; In M VII.17.1680). Salt has a set of properties that is not merely the result of
combining the sets of properties had by sodium and chloride, respectively.The com-
position of a human being by soul and body is not exactly the same as the case of
salt, for soul and body do not exist as distinct substances prior to composing a
human being. Soul and body, however, like sodium and chloride, do not exist as dis-
tinct ontological kinds in a composite human being. Neither is it the case that the
set of properties had by a human being is merely the result of combining the sets of
properties had by their soul and body, respectively. Once again, a human being is an
individual entity composed of a rational soul informing a material body.
Aquinas rejects the Platonic “substance dualist” account of human nature, in
which a rational soul is understood as akin to a sailor guiding a material vessel
(QDSC, II; Pegis, 1978, pp. 147–68; Pasnau, 2002, pp. 73–9). Aquinas’s basic
complaint against Platonism is based on his contention that humans beings cannot
be identified with their souls alone, because such identification would deny them
ownership of those activities of their souls that depend upon bodily organs to
operate (ST, Ia.75.4). If human beings live, sense, and act through physical behavior,
then, since such activities are identified with capacities of the soul that depend upon
bodily organs for their operation, human beings cannot be identified with their
souls alone. Rather, human beings are composed of both their souls and bodies:
There cannot be one operation of things that are different in being . . .Now,
although there is some operation belonging to the soul in which the body
does not share – such as understanding – nevertheless, there are some opera-
tions common to it and the body – such as fear and anger and sensation and
the like; for these occur according to some transmutation in a determinate part
of the body, from which it is clear that they are operations of the soul and
body together. Therefore, it must be that one thing is made from soul and
body, and that they are not diverse according to being.
(SCG, II.57)
6 Human nature and natural law theory
Therefore, Aquinas’s account is not representative of substance dualism, as it is
sometimes mischaracterized (Moreland and Rae, 2000, pp. 201–6).The fundamental
difference between Aquinas’s account and substance dualism concerns the questions
of whether a rational soul is a complete substance and whether human beings are
identical with their souls. According to substance dualism, a human being is their
soul, which is a complete substance on its own, and their body is merely something
to which they are joined between birth and death (Swinburne, 1997; Foster, 2001).
This is not Aquinas’s position.
Aquinas does argue that a rational soul has a mode of being that distinguishes it
from all other substantial forms of material substances (In Sent, I.8.v.2.ad 1) owing
to its rational capacities, which are not dependent upon any material body for their
operation (Klima, 2001).A rational soul’s special mode of being, however, does not
entail its complete independence from its material body. Some capacities of a
rational soul – namely, its vegetative and sensitive capacities that nonhuman animals
also have – act through material organs. A rational soul thus requires a material
body to function completely – that is, for all of its capacities to be actualizable.
Aquinas further argues that a rational soul communicates its being to a material
body such that there is one being of the composite substance: a human being.
Hence, a soul must be immediately joined to such a body (QDA, I.ad 1; White,
1995).Additionally, while a soul’s rational operation does not itself require a bodily
organ (QDV, X.5; ST, Ia.78.4), the objects of rational operation – what the mind
thinks about – are universal, intelligible forms abstracted from phantasms.8 The
mind has such phantasms through sense-perception of particular material
substances. Since the activity of sense-perception requires proper material organs –
eyes, ears, nose, etc. – a human mind does have need of a material human body
(QDA, II; ST, Ia.101.2; SCG, II.83).
Furthermore, a rational soul is naturally united to a particular material body as
its substantial form (In DA, II.2; SCG, II.68; ST, Ia.76.1).Aquinas contends that it
is not a mind itself that understands, nor the soul which is the foundation for the
mind’s rational capacities. Rather, human beings understand by means of the rational
capacities they have by virtue of their souls; just as they see by means of the capac-
ity for sight they have by virtue of their eyes and visual cortex (SCG, II.76; In DA,
III.7; DUI, II, IV). Hence, because a human being naturally exists as composed of
both soul and body, a rational soul’s existence and operation are most properly in
union with a particular material body.
By virtue of its rational capacities, which do not intrinsically depend upon any
physical organ to operate, Aquinas argues that a rational soul can subsist without
need of a physical body (QDA, II; ST, Ia.75.2; Eberl, 2000b).Although it is capable
of subsisting apart from its body, a human rational soul does not subsist in such a
state as a complete substance (QDP, III.10; ST, Ia.90.4). For one thing, a rational
soul’s other capacities – vegetative and sensitive – depend upon bodily organs for
their operation (ST, Ia.77.5). Furthermore, a human mind, according to Aquinas, is
designed to operate by abstracting universal, intelligible forms from phantasms
generated through sense-perception of particular concrete objects (ST, Ia.85.1);
the mind thus depends on well-functioning sense organs for its rational operation
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(ST, Ia.84.6–8). As Etienne Gilson asserts, “Human intelligence simply must be a
soul and must profit from the advantages which union with a body can bring it”
(Gilson, 1956, p. 191). Aquinas could be labeled a “dualist” of sorts, because he
argues that a rational soul is immaterial (ST, Ia.75.5), incorruptible (ST, Ia.75.6),
and capable of subsistence apart from a material body. Nonetheless, this character-
ization does not equate Aquinas’s account with what is today known as “substance
dualism” (Stump, 1995).
Since Aquinas is not a substance dualist and contends that a rational soul is the
substantial form of a material human body, it appears that he would define a
human being as fundamentally a biological organism. In fact, Aquinas explicitly
asserts that a human being is an “animal”:
“Animal” is predicated of a human being essentially, not accidentally, and
“human” is not placed in the definition of an animal, but conversely.There-
fore it must be the same form by which something is animal and by which it
is human. Otherwise, a human being would not truly be that which is animal,
such that “animal” would be essentially predicated of a human being . . . so
neither is Socrates human by one soul and animal by another, but by one and
the same.
(ST, Ia.76.3)
Aquinas, however, does not agree with the reduction of a human being to their
“animality.”9 While a well-functioning cerebral cortex is required for a human
mind’s operation, due to the mind’s dependence upon phantasms generated
through sense-perception, it is not essential for the mind’s operation of cognizing
the universal, intelligible forms abstracted from phantasms (SCG, II.62; QDA, II).10
Aquinas argues that a human mind is not reducible to the functioning of a human
brain.A mind is not identical to a brain, nor is rational operation merely the firing
of neurons in a cerebral cortex; a human being’s rational capacity cannot be wholly
explained in merely neurophysical terms.
This does not entail, however, that there is no relationship between a human
being’s mind and their brain. In fact,Aquinas describes a very intimate relationship
between the two. First, Aquinas recognizes that certain cognitive functions are
localized in the brain.These are the cognitive functions that human beings share
with nonhuman animals and include what Aquinas terms the “estimative” capac-
ity, by which animals are able to determine what is good versus what is harmful to
them (ST, Ia.78.4).
Second, a mind depends on sense-perception for gaining knowledge. Unlike
Plato,Aquinas contends that a mind is a tabula rasa at its creation; it has no innate
knowledge.A human being’s natural source of knowledge is sensory experience of
their surrounding environment (ST, Ia.84.3). Sense-perception is a mental capac-
ity humans share with all other animals, and is a function of the brain along with
the sense organs that are connected to it. When damage occurs to the brain or
sense organs, rational operation is affected (ST, Ia.76.5, Ia.84.7).
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Finally, given current discoveries in neurobiology, it is reasonable to conclude
that a correlation exists between rational activity and neural activity. Asserting such
a correlation is not antithetical to Aquinas’s account so long as the correlation is
not explained in terms of rational activity being identical with, or reducible to,
neural activity (LaRock, 2001).
To summarize, a rational soul, while separable from its body by virtue of one of
its essential capacities, is naturally united to a human body for the sake of its other
capacities because it is the body’s substantial form. Because of this natural unity, a
human body’s organic structure is disposed toward subserving the rational soul’s
capacities, including the mind (In DA, II.1, II.19; QDA, X.ad 1–2; ST, Ia.91.3).
Although a rational soul is capable of existing on its own, because it is the
substantial form of a material body, it does not subsist with a complete specific
nature; a soul alone is not completely “human” (QDSC, II.ad 5; QDP,V.10; ST,
Supp.93.1). Since a rational soul alone does not have a complete human nature, it
cannot be identical to a human being (ST, Ia.29.1.ad 5; ST, Ia.75.4.ad 2).
Neither a rational soul nor the matter it informs is a complete substance on its
own. Rather, the two together compose a complete substance: a human being who
is not identical to either their soul or their informed material body. Rather, a
human being is composed of their informed material body. Aquinas concludes,
“A human being is said to be from soul and body just as from two things a third
is constituted that is neither of the two, hence a human being is neither soul nor
body” (DEE, II; cf. ST, Ia.75.4). Having described the basic theses of Aquinas’s
metaphysical account of human nature, I will now elucidate the natural law
principles that,Aquinas argues, follow from this account.
Aquinas’s natural law theory
Aquinas’s ethical theory involves two components: the Aristotelian concept of
“virtue” and the concept of “natural law.” Although Aquinas devotes much more
attention to the discussion of virtue in his Summa theologiae – 170 questions versus
the 19 questions that comprise his “Treatise on Law” – contemporary ethicists
typically classify Aquinas as a natural law theorist.Without stipulating that Aquinas
is either primarily a virtue theorist or a natural law theorist, I have elected to focus
on his natural law ethic because it provides a set of formal principles that have clear
bioethical implications.11 As a preliminary, though, it is important to note the
close relationship between Aquinas’s understandings of virtue, natural law, and
human nature.
Virtues, according to Aristotle, whom Aquinas closely followed, are habits
cultivated in order to define a moral agent’s “character.” If, for example, a
human being develops the virtue of courage, then they will be considered a
courageous person. On a virtue theory construal of human morality, the goal is not
necessarily to do virtuous actions, but rather to become a virtuous person. A
human being, however, becomes a virtuous person only by cultivating specific
virtues, which is accomplished by doing virtuous actions. A human being thus
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becomes courageous by performing acts of courage, generous by performing acts
of generosity, etc.
Since a human being’s moral development depends upon doing virtuous
actions, it is necessary to understand what counts as a “virtuous” action in order to
know whether it should be done. According to Aristotle and Aquinas, a virtuous
action is whatever action that, if done, will promote a human being’s “flourishing” –
that is, the fulfillment of their “nature” (ST, Ia-IIae.18.5, Ia-IIae.49.2, Ia-IIae.71.1).
A human being’s nature, as described above, is determined by their substantial
form, which provides the set of capacities – vegetative, sensitive, and rational – that
define them as a “rational animal.” Human flourishing involves actualizing these
definitive capacities such that a virtuous human being is the most “perfect” – that
is, most complete or fully actualized – human being there can be.
Natural law enters the picture when considering what a human being’s definitive
capacities are.Aquinas argues that everything has goodness to the degree that it has
being (ST, Ia.5.1); the convertibility of being and goodness is the primary metaeth-
ical foundation for Aquinas’s moral theory (MacDonald, 1991; Stump, 2003, p. 62).
Aquinas’s concept of goodness includes the notion of “desirability”: the more good-
ness something has, the more it is objectively desirable. Based on this premise,
Aquinas argues that all substances have a set of “natural inclinations” to pursue what-
ever they perceive to be good – that is, what is desirable to them. In particular, all
substances are naturally inclined toward whatever they perceive that can increase
their own goodness – that is, whatever will help actualize their definitive capacities.
Natural law, as will be explained in detail later, includes a set of principles which, if
followed, will satisfy a human being’s natural inclinations and thus lead to their
perfection as a human being. By acting in accordance with the principles of natural
law, a human being will perform virtuous actions and thereby become a virtuous
person.Aquinas thus refers to natural law principles as “nurseries” of virtue:
Virtue is natural to a human being as it is inchoate. Such is the case with
respect to the specific nature, insofar as in human reason there are by nature
certain naturally known principles of knowledge and action, which are the
nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues.
(ST, Ia-IIae.63.1; cf. ST, Ia-IIae.27.3.ad 4,
Ia-IIae.51.1, Ia-IIae.63.2.ad 3)
The relationship between natural law and virtue can be understood, in a simple
and direct fashion, in terms of the natural law principles providing the formal
guidance – that is, the rule or measure (ST, Ia-IIae.63.2) – for a human being to
choose what actions to perform which will lead to their perfection as a human
being. For example, if I desire to be a virtuous person, I must understand that, as a
rational being, I need to actualize my capacity for rational thought. I thus choose
to do those actions which involve actualizing that capacity, such as getting an edu-
cation, reading intellectually stimulating books, conversing with intelligent and
wise people, etc. By developing a habit of doing those actions and other actions
that involve applying what I learn in beneficial ways, I thereby become an
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intellectually virtuous person. Having briefly outlined the relationship between
natural law and the cultivation of virtue in Aquinas’s overall ethical theory, I will
now focus on the natural law itself in order to illuminate how Aquinas formulates
certain normative principles based on his metaphysical understanding of human
nature, and exactly what these principles are.
Aquinas defines “law” as “nothing other than a certain ordinance of reason for
the common good, made by whoever has care of the community, and that is
promulgated” (ST, Ia-IIae.90.4). In order for some principle to count as a law, it
must fulfill all four of these criteria. For example, a law against driving while
intoxicated is a valid law because it is made by a legitimate legislative government,
the members of which used their collective reasoning capacity to determine that
it would promote the common good if people were not allowed to drive while
their judgment is impaired by alcohol consumption, and is announced to the
citizenry so that they are aware that this law is binding upon them.
This example represents one type of law Aquinas recognizes: human law, also
known as civil or positive law (ST, Ia-IIae.91.3, Ia-IIae.95–96). Aquinas defines
three other types of law: eternal law (ST, Ia-IIae, 91.1, Ia-IIae.93), natural law
(ST, Ia-IIae.91.2, Ia-IIae.94), and divine law (ST, Ia-IIae.91.4–5, Ia-IIae.98–108).
Eternal law is the ultimate foundation for all other types of law. It is formulated in
the mind of God, who has care of everything that exists, for the good of the entire
created universe. It is the inherent order of the universe created by God and
governed by God’s providence. According to Aquinas, God creates the universe
with a specific order that is manifested in the laws of nature – for example, the laws
of physics, such as gravity – and the natural inclinations of the various species that
populate the universe – for example, a plant’s natural inclination to take in
nourishment and grow in the direction of sunlight. Aquinas thus asserts, “It is
evident that all things participate to some extent in eternal law; namely, insofar as
from its impression on them they are inclined toward their proper acts and ends”
(ST, Ia-IIae.91.2).
Aquinas describes human beings as able to participate in eternal law more fully
than other material beings by virtue of having the capacity for rational thought.
Human beings are able to understand, albeit imperfectly, the eternal law;
nonrational beings are unable to do so. It is the human understanding of eternal
law which Aquinas terms “natural law.” Natural law is one of two ways in which
eternal law is promulgated to rational creatures.The second way is through direct
revelation, which Aquinas terms “divine law” and which he considers, due to his
Christian heritage, to consist of the so-called “Old” and “New” Laws found in the
Hebrew and Christian Scriptures.
Natural law principles, as will be shown below, are quite general so as to be
universally applicable to all human beings, no matter what their cultural back-
ground or station in life. Aquinas thus recognizes the need for what he terms
“human law,” which is the particular determination of general natural law princi-
ples made by human legislators using prudent practical judgment. Human laws are
crafted with respect to particular communities to help train each community’s
members in becoming virtuous; in this sense such laws can be considered culturally
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relative because the same human laws would not be appropriate for every
community.“The general principles of natural law cannot be applied in the same way
to all, because of the great variety of human affairs.And accordingly there appears a
diversity of positive [human] laws among diverse people” (ST, Ia-IIae.95.2.ad 3).
Aquinas further notes the important role that “custom,” relative to different com-
munities, plays in specifying and applying natural law principles (ST, Ia-IIae.97.3).
Nevertheless, human laws must be crafted in accordance with the general
principles of natural law that are universal and thus binding upon all human beings
regardless of culture or circumstance.Any valid human law,Aquinas contends, must
be somehow derived from the natural law; otherwise, it would be a “perversion of
law” (ST, Ia-IIae.95.2). For example, a law permitting racial segregation is not a
valid human law because it violates the natural law mandate to treat all human
beings justly and maintain social harmony. Racial segregation does not treat all
human beings justly and leads to a fundamentally disharmonious social state. Even
if such a practice has the force of “custom” supporting it, Aquinas maintains that
the customs of human communities, useful as they may be in specifying and apply-
ing the natural law, cannot change the universally binding principles of natural law
and must yield when they conflict (ST, Ia-IIae.97.3.ad 1). In what follows, I will
focus on Aquinas’s concept of natural law, its metaethical foundation, and the
general principles of which it consists to guide moral behavior and the formulation
of valid human laws.12
Aquinas defines natural law as “nothing other than the participation in eternal
law by rational creatures” (ST, Ia-IIae.91.2). By virtue of our capacity for rational
thought, human beings are able to understand the general principles which under-
lie the existence of particular beings, actions, and events. For example, everything
that exists is governed by the principle of noncontradiction, which states that the
same thing – whether it is a substance, action, or event – cannot both be and not be
at the same time, in the same place, in the same respect. Hence, it cannot be
both raining in this very spot at this very moment and not raining in this very spot
at this very moment. As another example, I can be both tall with respect to my 
7-year-old daughter and not tall with respect to an NBA basketball center; but
I cannot be both tall and not tall with respect to my daughter at this very moment.
Just as there are general principles that underlie what Aquinas terms “specula-
tive”matters, such as the nature of reality, mathematics, geometry, etc., there are also
general principles that underlie what Aquinas terms “practical” matters, such as
what a moral agent ought to do in a particular situation (ST, Ia-IIae.94.2; QDV,
XVI.1). Some of these general principles are “self-evident” because they are imme-
diately knowable by the human mind without any empirical investigation
required. Everyone acts, for example, on the principle of noncontradiction, even if
they had never seen it formulated before reading the earlier paragraph. No one in
their right mind would think that, if Vladimir Putin is the current president of
Russia, that it is true that Vladimir Putin is not the current president of Russia.
By the same token, Aquinas thinks that certain general practical principles are
self-evident to any rational mind.
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This leads Aquinas to formulate the first, fundamental principle of natural law
that is understood by the human mind:“Good is to be done and pursued, and evil
avoided” (ST, Ia-IIae.94.2).He then contends,“And upon this are founded all other
principles of natural law; such that everything which practical reason naturally
apprehends to be good [or evil] for human beings belongs to the natural law
principles to be done or avoided” (ST, Ia-IIae.94.2). Hence, natural law mandates
us to use our reasoning capacity to determine what is “good” in accordance with
our nature as rational animals and go after it, and avoid whatever we determine to
be “evil” because it is opposed to our flourishing as human beings.While Aquinas
provides one of the most determinate formulations of natural law, he certainly did
not invent the concept, nor was he the first to exhort that laws made by human
legislators were subject to immutable, universal moral principles founded upon a
metaphysical conception of human nature and the universe as a whole. The
pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus argued that there is a fundamental order in
nature to which human reason conforms in making laws – both descriptive laws
about nature and prescriptive laws guiding human behavior – and that such
laws derive their authority from the unchanging and eternal law of nature
(Rommen, 1948, pp. 5–6).This basic concept of natural law persisted throughout
the Greek philosophical tradition, coming to fruition in the Stoic school that most
prominently influenced the great thinkers of the Roman Empire, such as Cicero
and the emperor Marcus Aurelius. Due to the influence of Cicero and other
Roman jurists that followed him, the relationship between human law and natural
law became more refined as it was enacted in Roman jurisprudence and adopted
by notable figures in early Christian thought (Rommen, 1948, pp. 21–45).
The refinement of the natural law theory culminated in Aquinas’s account as
described earlier.13
This basic understanding of Aquinas’s natural law ethic prompts the considera-
tion of its metaethical foundation.What is required in order for Aquinas’s theory
of natural law to be coherent and sound? As noted above, the most fundamental
metaethical foundation is the convertibility of being and goodness. More must be
said, however, to allow for a fully developed and sound theory of human morality
based on human natural inclinations.
Anthony Lisska (1996, p. 120) highlights five concepts that Aquinas requires as
necessary conditions for a coherent account of natural law:
1 the possibility of essences or natural kinds;
2 a dispositional view of essential properties determining the content of a
natural kind;
3 a metaphysics of finality determining the obligatory ends central to human
well-being;
4 an adequate epistemological apparatus providing an awareness of essences or
natural kinds in the individual;
5 a theory of practical reason undertaking the ends to be pursued in terms of
human nature.
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These concepts, in addition to the convertibility of being and goodness, provide a
foundation for Aquinas’s natural law theory. If the concepts are themselves sound,
then there are definable specific natures of things in the world; each nature is
defined by a set of essential properties that incline each individual of that nature to
pursue certain fulfilling ends; and, for rational natures at least, it is possible for
individuals to understand their own nature and that of other things in the world
such that they can choose which ends to pursue in order to satisfy their natural
inclinations.Aquinas concludes:
Therefore, natural law is nothing other than a concept naturally instilled in a
human being by which he is directed toward acting in accord with his proper
actions; whether they are suitable to him from his generic nature, such as to
procreate, to eat, and the like, or from his specific nature, such as to reason and
the like.
(ST, Supp.65.1)
If these concepts form the metaethical foundation of Aquinas’s natural law theory,
then what remains for a human moral agent to reason about are the ends they
should pursue that are fulfilling to their nature as a rational animal.To discover the
relevant ends, they must consider first their specific nature as a rational animal,
which I elucidated in the first half of this chapter, and then what natural inclinations
they have as a rational animal.
After conducting such a reflection, Aquinas cites the following “goods” with
respect to human nature toward which human beings are naturally inclined: life,
sexual intercourse, education of offspring, knowing the truth about God, and living
in society (ST, Ia-IIae.94.2; Armstrong, 1966, pp. 47–50). Aquinas acknowledges
that this list is not complete and exhorts the prudent use of practical reason to
determine the set of goods and evils relative to human nature, and then to define
the principles of natural law which promote the goods while avoiding the evils.14
For example, since human beings are “social” by nature (In NE, I.9), it is good
for us to live in community; fulfilling this good requires that we be honest
with one another and keep our promises (ST, IIa-IIae.88.3.ad 1), avoid deception
(ST, IIa-IIae.110.3), as well as respect others’ property and not injure one another
(SCG, III.129;Armstrong, 1966, p. 77).As a general natural law principle to guide
human beings in our relationships with each other for the sake of forming a stable
society, Aquinas cites the Golden Rule: “Do not have done to another what
you do not wish to be done to you” (ST, Supp.65.1.ad 7). R. A. Armstrong notes
several more specific natural law principles that can be derived from this general
principle:
But from this general precept, we see that we have the duty not only to refrain
from murder, but also to avoid injuring one another. More positively we have
the duty of aiding the preservation of health, of preventing avoidable unhap-
piness and pain . . .Contemplation of this principle shows us the wrongness of
slavery and the wrongness of using other people for medical experimentation.
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Likewise we see the wrongness of masochism, sadism, the inflicting of bodily
harm, torture and suicide.
(1966, p. 111)
As mentioned above, it also follows from our social nature to treat each other justly
and not segregate different racial groups from one another.
Aquinas cites further specific natural law principles that follow from the natural
inclination to educate one’s offspring. Such education is not simply the imparting
of knowledge, but the more general sense of “upbringing” that includes moral
education and everything else a child needs to learn in order to pass successfully
into adulthood (SCG, III.122–3; ST, IIa-IIae.57.4).Thus, for example, one ought
not to engage in “simple fornication” – that is, casual sex – that may result in a
pregnancy for which one does not intend to take responsibility. Lack of parental
responsibility, on the part of both fathers and mothers, hinders the fulfillment of a
child’s upbringing (ST, IIa-IIae.154.2).
Aquinas contends that various natural law principles can be known by the
human mind either immediately, with little reflection, or only with a great deal of
reasoning (ST, Ia-IIae.100.1). Nevertheless, it is expedient, on Aquinas’s view, for
God sometimes to reveal directly certain general natural law principles.As a prime
example, the Decalogue, or “Ten Commandments,” contain a number of natural
law principles which, though divinely revealed, are discoverable by human reason
alone (ST, Ia-IIae.100.3; CDP).As Heinrich Rommen explains:
The Decalogue contains the most essential conclusions [from the first principle
of natural law] for the simple reason that its precepts do not result from an
arbitrary arrangement made by God, but from the fundamental distinction of
good and evil.The first table of the Decalogue (first three Commandments)
embraces the moral norms that relate to the worship of God; these required
a special promulgation, in the view of St. Thomas, because they are not so
evident as the laws found in the second table. The latter (the last seven
Commandments), which are derived from the mutual relations among men
and from the essence and goal of human nature, are, on the other hand, known
more readily and with greater evidence.
(1948, pp. 51–2)
The natural law thus includes prohibitions against murder, theft, adultery,
covetousness, lying, and dishonoring one’s parents.15
In addition to the human goods and correlative natural law principles Aquinas
himself enumerates, contemporary natural law theorists have cited other goods and
principles that arguably follow from the Thomistic understanding of human natural
inclinations. Gerard Hughes lists food, shelter, proper medical treatment, affection,
support, and “a fairly clear role in society” as necessary for a human being to 
fulfill their proper “function” as a rational, social animal (Hughes, 1976, p. 35).
John Finnis identifies seven “basic forms of good for us”: life, knowledge, play,
aesthetic experience, sociability/friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion
Human nature and natural law theory 15
(Finnis, 1980, pp. 86–94).While only some of these items are found explicitly in
Aquinas’s writings, a case can be made for all of them being in the “spirit” of
Aquinas’s natural law ethic.
An important issue that I can address here only briefly concerns the relationship
of Aquinas’s concept of natural law and the existence of God. Is God’s existence
necessary for a coherent and sound Thomistic account of natural law? Does
the nature of God’s relationship to human morality, if there is a relationship, entail
a “divine command ethic”? Lisska answers the first question negatively when he
argues, “The existence of God is, in a structural sense, neither a relevant concept
nor a necessary condition for Aquinas’s account of natural law” (Lisska, 1996,
p. 120; see Finnis, 1998, pp. 304–12). This is an important consideration because
Aquinas’s moral theory is often taken to be theologically defined due to his
description of natural law as rational beings’ participation in God’s eternal law.
It thus seems that we must add eternal law as a necessary metaethical foundation
for Aquinas’s natural law theory. But the fact that Aquinas cites God as a metaeth-
ical foundation of human morality, just as he cites God as the metaphysical
foundation of human existence, does not entail that the nature of human existence
or morality requires divine determination. It is the consideration of human natural
inclinations that grounds our understanding of natural law principles, and not
an arbitrary set of revealed divine commands (ST, Ia-IIae.94.2). Even the
commandments of the Decalogue reflect what is in accordance with the natural
law as opposed to defining morality.16 Despite Aquinas’s appeal to God as a
metaethical foundation for human morality, actual belief in God and divinely
revealed law is not required for moral knowledge or the validity of natural law
principles.
For Aquinas, God is the creative source by which beings in the universe have a
specific essence or belong to a natural kind, have certain dispositional properties
relative to their essence, and have obligatory ends that promote their well-being
relative to their essence. God also provides rational beings with the epistemologi-
cal apparatus and practical reasoning capacity required to be aware of their essence
and the ends to be pursued that promote their well-being.Aquinas, however, argues
that the human mind cannot apprehend the eternal law itself, because we are
not God (ST, Ia-IIae.19.4.ad 3, Ia-IIae.93.2). Therefore, apprehension of natural
law principles must be based upon something knowable by the human mind –
namely, human natural inclinations. One could respond that the revealed divine
law provides a better epistemological foundation for moral awareness, and that
morality is thus best understood as theologically defined. Aquinas, though,
contends that divine law is something distinct from natural law that is added to it,
and in fact presupposes natural law (ST, Ia-IIae.99.2.ad 1).Therefore, the existence
of natural law principles knowable by the human mind is logically prior
to the principles of divine law, which serves to define more clearly and enforce
natural law.
This completes my brief elucidation of Aquinas’s natural law ethic. My goal here
has been simply to show how Aquinas grounds his moral theory and systematically
formulates certain foundational moral principles. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will apply
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some of the natural law principles described above, and additional relevant
secondary principles, to bioethical issues at the margins of human life. In the
remainder of this chapter, I address an additional issue regarding Aquinas’s moral
theory: whether he holds the Principle of Double Effect (PDE), which is often
appealed to in order to justify certain forms of medical treatment that will be
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
Aquinas and the principle of double effect17
I will begin by offering a simple formulation of PDE, which states that an action
taken to produce some consequence, that is a “good” per se, may be permissible
even if the action produces a foreseen negative consequence, that is per se morally
impermissible.This principle holds provided that the relative value of the negative
consequence does not outweigh that of the good consequence, and the nega-
tive consequence is not directly intended as an end or the means by which the good
consequence is brought about.
I argue that Aquinas’s account of intentional action allows one to hold this
formulation of PDE. As Gareth Matthews and Thomas Cavanaugh both indicate,
it is not evident that Aquinas would assent to many contemporary formulations of
PDE (Cavanaugh, 1997; Matthews, 1999). Cavanaugh contends that the oft-quoted
passage in which Aquinas appears to express PDE is limited to only certain
restricted types of cases involving self-defense. I will begin by examining what
Aquinas says in the key passage from ST, IIa-IIae.64.7, which concerns the
permissibility of killing an aggressor in defense of one’s own life. I will highlight a
general principle expressed in this passage that allows one, together with other
principles of Aquinas’s account of intentional action, to derive the formulation of
PDE given above.
Many contemporary scholars claim that Aquinas holds PDE based on this
passage:
Nothing prohibits one act from having two effects, only one of which is in
the intention, while the other is outside the intention. Now moral acts receive
their species according to that which is intended, but not from that which is
outside the intention.
(ST, IIa-IIae.64.7)
Aquinas is addressing the question of “Whether it is permitted for someone to kill
someone else in defending themselves?” In the type of case in question, by per-
forming an act of preserving one’s own life, one brings about the aggressor’s death.
Stephen Brock summarizes Aquinas’s position regarding this type of case:
It is never licit for a private person to aim to kill someone, i.e. to act precisely
in order to bring about a person’s death, even as a way of defending himself
against an attack. But in defending himself, it may be licit to use means which,
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in addition to having the effect of conserving one’s life by putting a stop to
the attack, also have the effect of the aggressor’s death.This is licit when the
use of such means is “proportionate,” or not more violent than is necessary to
stop the attack.
(1998, p. 221; cf. Montaldi, 1986)
An added stricture is that death is unavoidably necessary in order to achieve the
good of preserving one’s life. Furthermore, Aquinas is referring to causing the
death of an “aggressor” – that is, one from whom the threat to life directly comes.
Cavanaugh and Matthews are correct in cautioning that Aquinas does not appear
to offer an unqualified assertion of PDE, which can be immediately applied to
cases outside of defending one’s life against an aggressor.
Nevertheless, in addressing the specific case of self-preservation, Aquinas makes
what seems to be a fairly generalizable assertion:“Nothing prohibits one act from
having two effects, only one of which is in the intention, while the other is outside
the intention” (ST, IIa-IIae.64.7). I will explore whether this assertion is indeed
generalizable across other types of cases besides self-defense in a way that allows for
such “double-effect” cases to be morally permissible.
Aquinas states that every human action can be considered as good or evil with
respect to four different categories:
In a human action a fourfold goodness can be considered. First, according to
genus – viz., insofar as it is an act – because to the extent that it has being as
an act, it has goodness . . . In another way according to species, which is
received according to the appropriate object.Third, according to the circum-
stances, as if in accordance with certain accidents. Finally, fourth, according
to the end, as if in accordance with the condition toward the cause of its
goodness.
(ST, Ia-IIae.18.4)
An action’s genus is merely the action as such. Its species is the particular kind of
action it is – the “form” or “object” of the action:“what is done.” Circumstances,
as Aquinas says, are the accidents attendant upon an action – for example, the place
and time the action occurs, and any other quality that is not part of the action’s
definition as the kind of action it is.An action’s end is its intended goal.
Two questions need to be answered. First, under which of the four categories
does a foreseen negative consequence fall in double-effect cases? It is not the action
as such or the object of the action. It is also not what is directly intended.The two
remaining options are that it is either part of the end or an accidental circumstance
attendant upon the action. The second question concerns how the fact that the
negative consequence is somehow part of the action affects the action’s goodness
and moral permissibility.
An agent in a bona fide double-effect case does not directly intend the negative
consequence of their action. It is a foreseen concomitant consequence of their
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directly intended action. Joseph Boyle claims that foreseen consequences of a
directly intended action,
which follow always or for the most part [i.e., are concomitant] . . . are not
per se intended and thus can be called praeter intentionem [outside the agent’s
intention] . . .This is not to deny that in some sense it cannot be separated from
the agent’s intention, or that it is per accidens intended, or that it is in some sense
willed by him.
(Boyle, 1978, p. 660; cf. Boyle and Sullivan, 1977;
Boyle, 1980, 1989; Boyle et al., 2001)
Foreseen concomitant consequences are separated from an agent’s intention, but not
completely separated; they are still willed in some respect.Aquinas states,“What always
or frequently is joined to an effect falls under the same intention. It is foolish to say
that someone intends something and does not will that which is frequently or always
joined to it” (In Ph, II.8; trans. Boyle);“If the evil is joined always or for the most part
to the good which is intended per se, one is not excused from sin although he does
not per se intend this evil” (QDM, I.3.ad 15; trans. Boyle). I will return to the issue of
an agent’s responsibility for consequences that they do not directly intend.The key
point here is that the foreseen concomitant consequences of an agent’s directly
intended action are praeter intentionem – outside the agent’s intention – and are thus
per accidens – that is, they are “accidental” features of the directly intended action.
If an action’s foreseen concomitant consequences are accidental circumstances,
how do such circumstances affect the action’s goodness, its moral permissibility, and
the agent’s culpability? Aquinas asserts,“The primary goodness of a moral action is
considered from its suitable object” (ST, Ia-IIae.18.2). He also asserts that an action
must be good not only in its object, but in all four of the above-named respects:
“Yet an action is not good simply, unless all goods concur” (ST, Ia-IIae.18.4.ad 3) –
that is, the action is good in its genus (of which the goodness is given), object,
circumstances, and end. Aquinas specifically refers to the circumstances: “The
plenitude of [an action’s] goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but to
some extent is added from what comes to it as certain accidents. And such are its
due circumstances” (ST, Ia-IIae.18.3);“The circumstances of actions are considered
in moral doctrine” (ST, Ia-IIae.18.3.ad 2). In double-effect cases, there is a defect
in the goodness of the circumstances, due to the negative consequence. Hence, the
action is not good “simply” (simpliciter); but this defect need not entail that the
action is morally impermissible or that the agent has “sinned.”
In ST, Ia-IIae.18.5,Aquinas argues that whether an action is good or evil is part
of its species. For one considers an action’s object as either good or evil – for
example, if the object is to steal something, it is evil, whereas if the object is to help
someone, it is good. In ST, Ia-IIae.18.10–11,Aquinas addresses the issue of whether
an action’s circumstances can change its species from good to evil. He answers that
circumstances do not change an action’s species, but they can make a good action
better or an evil action worse (ST, Ia-IIae.18.11).
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There is a caveat, though. Whenever a circumstance that “is considered as a
principle condition of the object . . . is specially ordered to reason, either for or
against, the circumstances must specify the moral act as either good or bad”
(ST, Ia-IIae.18.10). By “principal condition of the object,”Aquinas means that the
circumstance is part of the object’s definition. His example is stealing from a holy
place as opposed to stealing merely someone else’s possession.The circumstance of
“place,” in this case, defines the act as one of “sacrilege” and not merely “theft.” It
is thus a different kind of action. This example is one in which an already evil
action – theft – is changed into another worse kind of evil action – sacrilege.
Aquinas also states that the appropriation of property, which is per se morally
permissible, becomes evil if the action includes the defining circumstance of the
appropriated property being “another’s” (ST, Ia-IIae.18.10). Here, a good action is
changed to an evil action due to one of its circumstances.
In ST, Ia-IIae.20.5,Aquinas speaks directly about an action’s consequences:“An
event following [i.e., a consequence] does not make an act bad which was good or
good which was bad” (ST, Ia-IIae.20.5). On the specific issue of an action’s
foreseen consequences,Aquinas states,“If it is foreseen, it is clear that it adds to the
goodness or malice” (ST, Ia-IIae.20.5). Aquinas does not assert that foreseen
consequences can change an action’s specific nature from good to evil; but they can
make a good action better or an evil action worse.18
One cannot ignore, however, the fact that such a defect in an action’s attendant
circumstances prevents the action from being good “simply” or having the
“plenitude of goodness.” Does this entail that the action is morally impermissible?
Aquinas states:
It must be said that evil is broader than sin, just as good is broader than right.
For every privation of good in anything whatsoever designates the idea of evil;
but sin properly consists of an act that is done for a certain end, where it does
not have due order toward that end.
(ST, Ia-IIae.21.1)
Although an action in a double-effect case lacks goodness in some respect, this lack
does not entail that the agent has “sinned.” In fact, it would seem that they have
not sinned because their action was rightly ordered to a good end.
I now return to Boyle’s contention that a particular concomitant consequence,
which follows from a directly intended action, may be per accidens and thus praeter
intentionem, but not completely separated from an agent’s volition:“The unintended
evil effect . . . is clearly imputable to the agent: he knowingly and willingly brings it
about” (Boyle, 1980, p. 529); “What one intends and what one permits are both
voluntarily brought about, and thus both are imputable” (Boyle, 1980, p. 530).
Stephen Brock agrees that “Foreseen side-effects cannot be outside the agent’s
intention in such a way as to remove his responsibility for them or their imput-
ability to him” (1998, p. 213). “Responsibility,” here, refers to an agent being
“answerable for [an action], able to be called to account, fit to be asked why he did
it” (Brock 1998, p. 213).
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An agent is not immediately morally culpable for the foreseen concomitant
consequences of their intentional action. Rather, the agent is merely “responsible”
as the one who brought about such consequences when they could have avoided
them by not performing the directly intended action with which the consequences
were concomitant. This requires the agent to give a justifying explanation
for bringing about such consequences: “Thus if the agent is certain that he will
bring about such an effect, he cannot reject the question ‘Why?’ as irrelevant.A con-
travening reason is required” (Sullivan, 2000, p. 447). The appropriate “contravening
reason” by which an agent can exonerate themselves is the goodness of the directly
intended object and end of their action.
Consider, for example, a case in which a pregnant woman discovers she has
a form of cancer which, if left untreated by aggressive means, will be terminal.
By undergoing radiation and chemotherapy, her unborn child may be harmed or
aborted.Assuming that the values of both the mother’s and the unborn child’s lives
are of equal value, it is morally permissible for her to undergo the aggressive treat-
ment in order to preserve her life, even though it is foreseen to produce what
would, under normal circumstances, be an impermissible consequence.19
By respectively administering and consenting to receive the aggressive treatment,
both the physician and the mother cannot avoid being accused of performing an
action that resulted in the harm or abortion.This action, however, may be justified
by explaining that the child’s deformation or death was not directly intended.
Rather, the preservation of the mother’s life was directly intended and the harm or
abortion was a foreseen accidental consequence, which was unavoidably concomitant
with the act of providing the treatment necessary to preserve the mother’s life.
I thus conclude that Aquinas’s account of intentional action and moral appraisal
allows an agent to be morally justified in directly intending a good end while at the
same time being responsible for any foreseen concomitant negative consequences.
I will apply this conclusion to certain types of cases in Chapters 4 and 5.
Conclusion
Aquinas’s accounts of human nature and morality have been foundational for the
Roman Catholic and broader Christian approach to medical practice.
Nevertheless, the wider community remains largely influenced by antithetical
postmodern conceptions of human nature and morality. These include the
metaphysical views that human beings are nothing but biological organisms, are
simply brains in bodies, or are “persons” only insofar as they have a sufficiently rich
mental life, as well as ethical theories such as utilitarianism, emotivism, relativism,
or subjectivism. Advancing the Thomistic viewpoint in pluralistic, secular
discussions of bioethical issues is a valuable and feasible pursuit because Aquinas’s
conception of human nature and his natural law ethic can be coherently formu-
lated and understood without theological appeal.The former is grounded foremost
in Aristotelian philosophy and human beings’ phenomenological experience of
their psychosomatic nature.The latter is founded upon a teleological understanding
of human nature and not an arbitrary set of revealed divine commands
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(Lisska, 1996, pp. 116–38).While Aquinas often refers to Judeo-Christian theological
tenets and revealed Scripture in his philosophical writings, his purpose for such
references is in many cases, as Norman Kretzmann points out in reference to
Aquinas’s Summa contra gentiles, to show “that what has just been achieved by
unaided reason agrees with what he takes to be revealed truth” (Kretzmann,
1997, p. 7).Therefore, one does not have to be a Roman Catholic, a Christian, or
even a theist to consider Aquinas’s philosophical accounts of human nature and
morality, and their relevance to certain bioethical issues at the margins of human life.
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Introduction
Bioethicists sometimes neglect or outright reject metaphysics as useless for offering
conclusive arguments about the beginning and end of human life. Nevertheless,
various positions regarding issues related to the limits of human life often
presuppose some metaphysical understanding of human nature. Hence, there is at
least a tacit need to adopt a metaphysical account of human nature for the sake
of addressing certain types of bioethical issues. In this chapter and the following,
I will provide Thomistic metaphysical conclusions to the questions of when a
human person’s life begins and ends. These conclusions provide a foundation for
responding to issues such as embryonic stem cell research, abortion and the use of
abortifacient contraceptives, cloning, care for patients who are in a persistent
vegetative state or who are terminally ill, and organ procurement. Complete
responses to these issues, though, require combining such metaphysical conclusions
with a particular ethical theory and taking various values into account. I will
accomplish this task in Chapters 4 and 5.
In addressing issues at the beginning of human life, one primary concern is to
establish when a developing human embryo or fetus can be considered a “person”;
for it is typically held that only persons are the subjects of rights, such as a “right to
life.”Aquinas argues that all human beings are persons (ST, IIIa.16.12.ad 1), but that
an embryo or fetus is not a human being until its body is informed by a “rational
soul.” Aquinas’s explicit account of human embryogenesis has been generally
rejected by contemporary scholars due to its dependence upon medieval biological
information, which has been far surpassed by current scientific research.A number
of scholars, however, have attempted to combine Aquinas’s basic metaphysical
account of human nature with current embryological data to develop a contempo-
rary Thomistic account of a human being’s beginning.1 The issue at hand in
developing such an account is whether “hominization” is “immediate” – occurs
when fertilization of an ovum by a sperm cell is complete2 – or “delayed” – occurs
sometime after fertilization. The term hominization refers to when a developing
embryo first has a specifically “human” rational soul as its substantial form, or organ-
izing principle. Scholars who argue for either immediate or delayed hominization
debate the proper application of Aquinas’s metaphysical principle that only an
“appropriate” body may be informed by a rational soul to compose a human being.
2 The beginning of a human
person’s life
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Scholars who favor delayed hominization, such as Joseph Donceel (Donceel,
1970), Robert Pasnau (Pasnau, 2002), and Norman Ford (Ford, 1988), argue that
an early embryo has certain intrinsic qualities which indicate that it is not “an
individual substance of a rational nature”3 until it reaches a certain point in its
biological development. Those who favor immediate hominization, such as
Benedict Ashley (Ashley, 1976), claim that there is nothing about a human
embryo’s biological nature, from the moment the process of fertilization is
complete, that disallows its being informed by a rational soul.The question to be
considered here regards the proper understanding of Aquinas’s metaphysical
principles and whether current embryological data support the interpretation
offered by Donceel, Pasnau, Ford, or Ashley. First, though, I will elucidate Aquinas’s
explicit account of human embryogenesis.
Aquinas’s account of human embryogenesis4
Aquinas understands a human being to be composed of a rational soul informing
a material body.5 In defining the necessary and sufficient conditions for something
to be informed by a soul – which may be vegetative, sensitive, or rational6 –
Aquinas first notes Aristotle’s definition of “soul” as “the actuality of a physical
organic body having life potentially” (ST, Ia.76.4.ad 1; cf. Aristotle, 1984,
412a20–1).Aquinas explains this definition as follows:
It is said that the soul is the actuality of a body, etc., because through the soul
it is a body, is organic, and has life potentially. But the first actuality is said to
be in potentiality with respect to the second actuality, which is the operation.
For such a potentiality does not reject, that is, does not exclude the soul.
(ST, Ia.76.4.ad 1; cf. In DA, II.2)
Aquinas holds that a soul’s potentiality to perform its definitive operations –
whether life, sensation, or rational thought – is necessary for it to exist (QDA,
XII.ad 7).The actualization of such potentiality, however, is accidental to the soul’s
existence:“To be actually thinking or sensing is not substantial being, but accidental”
(QDA, XII).
Of course, a developing human embryo or fetus, and even a newborn infant,
does not actually exercise all the operations proper to a human being, including
rational activity. Nonetheless, Aquinas denies that this lack implies that a rational
soul does not inform a developing human embryo, fetus, or newborn infant. All
that is required for a rational soul to be present, and thus for a human being to
exist, is a human body with the potentiality for a rational soul’s proper operations:
If a human being derives his species by being rational and having an intellect,
whoever is within the human species is rational and has an intellect. But a
child, even before leaving the womb, is within the human species; although
there are yet no phantasms in it which are actually intelligible.
(SCG, II.59)
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Concerning the question of when the potentiality for a rational soul’s proper
operations is first present in a developing human body,Aquinas asserts that a body
must have the appropriate organic structure if it is to have a rational soul as its
substantial form (QDP, III.12).The appropriate organs for a rational soul are those
associated with sensation, because it is through sense-perceptions of particular
things that the mind comes to possess intelligible forms, which are the natures of
things understood as abstracted from any particular material conditions.7 The
abstraction of intelligible forms from the products of sensation – the “phantasms”
referred to in the earlier passage from SCG – is the essence of rational thought as
Aquinas defines it: “Therefore, the rational soul ought to be united to a body
which may be a suitable organ of sensation” (ST, Ia.76.5; cf. ST, Ia.55.2). This
understanding leads Aquinas to develop an account of successive ensoulment in a
human embryo’s formation. After conception occurs,8 a material body exists that
has a vegetative soul as its substantial form – that is, an entity that has life at its most
basic level. As the early embryo develops and its organic structure increases in
complexity to the point where it can support sensitive operations, the embryo’s
vegetative soul is annihilated and its matter is informed by a sensitive soul. Since,
according to Aquinas, a thing’s identity is determined by its having the same
substantial form (Eberl, 2004, pp. 353–9), the early vegetative embryo has ceased to
exist and a new embryo has come into existence that is an animal life form with
the capacity for sensation.
The final stage of embryonic development occurs when the embryo has
developed a sufficiently complex organic structure to allow for rational operations.9
At this point, the sensitive soul is annihilated and the animal embryo ceases to exist
as its matter becomes informed by a rational soul:
And thus it must be said that the vegetative soul is first in the seed, but it is
discarded in the generative process and another succeeds it that is not only
vegetative but also sensitive, which, having been discarded, again another is
added that at the same time is vegetative, sensitive, and rational.
(QDA, XI.ad 1; cf. QDP, III.9.ad 9; ST, Ia.76.3.ad 3,
Ia.118.2.ad 2; SCG, II.89; CT, 92;
QDSC, III.ad 13)
Since Aquinas adopts Boethius’s definition of a person as “an individual substance
of a rational nature” and all human beings are persons, a developing embryo is
neither a person nor a human being until its matter is informed by a rational soul.
At this point, one may consider the possibility that a developing embryo, prior to
rational ensoulment, is an individual human being, though it is not yet a person.
In other words, perhaps you existed as the embryos informed by vegetative and
sensitive souls prior to your matter being informed by a rational soul.This view,
however, conflicts with Aquinas’s understanding of what is essential to human
nature. First,Aquinas asserts that every human being is a person (ST, IIIa.16.12.ad 1):
personhood is essential to human nature. Furthermore, Aquinas’s interpretation of
the Boethian definition of personhood requires, at minimum, that a rational soul
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exists as the substantial form of an appropriate physical body. As Brian Leftow
points out (Leftow, 2001, p. 129), Aquinas does not consider something “human”
unless it is, or has been, “part of a whole, ensouled human body.” A developing
embryo with human DNA is not necessarily, just for that reason, a human being
or part of a human being. Only matter informed by a rational soul fulfills the
definition of a human being. Hence, Aquinas’s explicit view of human embryo-
genesis entails that a human being does not exist prior to a rational soul informing
a developing embryo.
The basic metaphysical principle Aquinas employs in his account of embryo-
genesis is that a rational soul does not inform a physical body unless the body is
properly disposed for that type of soul. The requisite disposition is the body’s
having sense organs and a brain capable of imagination such that phantasms of
sensible objects may be generated for the mind to abstract intelligible forms, which
is the nature of rational thought.A body disposed in such a way does not seem to
exist immediately after fertilization, but only after a vegetative embryo first, and
then an animal embryo, have existed.Aquinas thus concludes that a living, sensitive,
and rational human being does not begin to exist until some point well after
conception:10 “Therefore, it must be said that a rational soul, which at the same
time is sensitive and nutritive, is created by God11 at the end of human generation;
the pre-existing forms having been corrupted” (ST, Ia.118.2.ad 2).12
Recent interpretations
As mentioned above, Aquinas’s explicit account of human embryogenesis has
been generally rejected because it is based on outdated biological information.
Nevertheless, the basic metaphysical principles Aquinas employs remain sound and
have inspired scholars to combine these principles with up-to-date biological data
to develop a contemporary Thomistic account of human embryogenesis.
Donceel and Pasnau13
Joseph Donceel and Robert Pasnau both contend that a sufficiently organized
body, capable of receiving a rational soul as its substantial form, does not exist
until the cerebral cortex of the embryonic brain is formed. This conclusion is
purported to follow from the fact that a functioning cerebral cortex is required for
rational thought to occur because (1) it is the organ of a human being’s sensitive
and imaginative capacities, and (2) cerebral neural activity is correlated with
rational activity.14 Donceel thus argues:
Man’s higher, spiritual [i.e., rational] faculties have no organs of their own,
since they are immaterial, intrinsically independent of matter. But they need,
as necessary conditions of their activity, the cooperation of the highest sense
powers, imagination, memory, what the Scholastics called the “cogitative
power.” Its activity presupposes that the brain be fully developed, that the
cortex be ready. Only then is the stage set for another ontological shift; matter
now is highly enough organized to receive the highest substantial form, the
spiritual, human soul, created by God.
(1970, p. 83)
Donceel refers in this passage to the necessity of neural development for the sake
of rational “activity.” It is important to recall here that Aquinas, in his account of
embryogenesis, never asserts that a fetus must actually think rationally in order for
it to be a human being. He contends that only the potentiality for rational thought
must be present. Such potentiality is sufficient for a fetus to be informed by a
rational soul. Donceel agrees and yet contends that the potentiality for rational
thought is present only when a fetus has developed a functioning cerebral cortex:
“The least we may ask before admitting the presence of a human soul is the
availability of these organs: the senses, the nervous system, the brain, and especially
the cortex” (Donceel, 1970, p. 101). Hence, we must consider carefully Aquinas’s
notion of “potentiality” and how it should be applied to determine when a human
embryo or fetus first has the potentiality for rational thought.
In the passage quoted earlier in this chapter from ST, Ia.76.4.ad 1 and elsewhere,
Aquinas distinguishes between a “first” and “second” actuality: “The first act is a
thing’s form and integrity, and the second act is its operation” (ST, Ia.48.5; cf. In
DA, II.2; QDP, I.1). A first actuality is the “active potentiality” to perform some
operation.The locus of a substance’s set of first actualities, or active potentialities,
is its substantial form, which, for a human being, is a rational soul. A second
actuality is the operation of a first actuality brought about through some additional
cause (QDV, V.8.ad 10). In contrast to an active potentiality, something has a
“passive potentiality” if it can be the subject of externally directed change such that
it can become what it is not already.
In addition to the difference between a first and a second actuality, it must be
noted that the first actuality comes in two varieties.The first is what Pasnau refers
to as a “capacity in hand” to perform an operation, which means that no further
development or significant change is required for the potentiality to be actualized
(Pasnau, 2002, p. 115). For example, I have, as a first actuality, the capacity to
speak Spanish – having majored in it in college along with philosophy. It just
happens to be the case at this moment that I am not using this capacity and so it
is not in a state of second actuality, which it would be if I were actually speaking
Spanish right now. It is apparent that Donceel has this construal of first actuality
in mind when he asserts that the potentiality for rational thought is present
only after cerebral development. The second is what Norman Kretzmann refers
to as a substance’s “natural potentiality” to develop a capacity to perform an
operation (Kretzmann, 1999, p. 39). For example, before I learned to speak
Spanish and thus developed a capacity to do so, I had a natural potentiality to
develop this capacity. I have numerous other natural potentialities, some of which
I have developed into capacities in hand, such as my capacity to play chess, and oth-
ers which I have left undeveloped, such as my potentiality to learn to read Sanskrit.
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In applying the concepts of first and second actuality to the presence of a
rational soul, Aquinas contends that all that is required for a rational soul to
inform a particular body is that the body has an active potentiality to perform the
operations proper to a rational soul – vegetative, sensitive, and rational.The actual
performance of these operations is accidental to the soul’s existence (QDA, XII).
Thus, since a rational soul is a human body’s substantial form, the existence of a
human body with active potentialities for life, sensation, and rational thought
entails that it is informed by a rational soul. It is inconsequential whether such
operations are actually exercised in a body for a rational soul to inform it:“A soul
in first actuality is a soul: a sleeping animal continues to have an actual sensory soul,
just not an actually operating sensory soul” (Kretzmann, 1999, p. 379, note 27; see ST,
Ia.118.1.ad 4).
With respect to a human embryo, Aquinas asserts, “Just as the soul in an
embryo is in act, but imperfectly, so also it operates, but imperfect operations”
(QDA, XI.ad 9). By the soul being “in act,”Aquinas refers to a soul being present
in a human embryo as its first actuality.The soul being “imperfectly” in act refers
to the fact that a human embryo does not yet exhibit all the soul’s powers as second
actualities.Aquinas concludes that a soul thus “operates” in a human embryo as its
substantial form and in the actual exercise of at least vegetative, and possibly also
sensitive, operations; but the soul performs “imperfect operations” in that it does
not fully exercise all its proper operations until later in the embryo’s development.
In contrast to a sleeping animal that is sensitive, because it has an active
potentiality for sensation, sperm and ova do not have such an active potentiality.
Rather, sperm and ova are best understood as having a passive potentiality to
become a living, sensitive, and rational human being:
[Things] are always in potentiality to actuality when they can be reduced to
actuality by their proper active principle with nothing external hindering
them. However, seed is not yet such. For it must be by many changes that an
animal comes from it. But when by its proper active principle, namely,
something actually existing, it can already become such, it is then already in
potentiality.
(In M, IX.6.1837)
The “seed” of a living animal – that is, a sperm cell or ovum – cannot be said to
be a living animal, because it has merely a passive potentiality to become such.
The seed must first undergo a change brought about by an extrinsic principle:
sperm must be changed through union with an ovum and vice versa, which
transforms them into a substance with active potentialities for a living animal’s
definitive operations. Once this “substantial change” occurs, a living animal exists
even if it is not actually exercising all its definitive operations.
The change required for something to actualize an active or passive potentiality
is brought about by its “proper active principle.” An active principle is required
because a potentiality can be actualized only by something that is already in a state
of actuality. Something can be moved from a state of potentiality to a state of
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actuality only by some active principle that is either internal or external to it.
A sufficient condition for something’s having an active potentiality is if it can actu-
alize the potentiality by some active principle internal to it. In his explicit account
of embryogenesis, Aquinas does not recognize the presence of an active internal
principle in a zygote – a fertilized ovum – or early embryo which indicates that it
has an active potentiality to develop the proper organs required for rational
thought. This lack of recognition, though, is due to Aquinas not being aware of
how DNA functions in a zygote or early embryo to guide its natural development
such that it comes to have the requisite organs. Aquinas postulates a “formative
power” (virtus formativa), which is transmitted by the male semen and thereby is
extrinsic to a zygote or early embryo, that guides its development (SCG, II.89).15
The contemporary understanding of DNA, however, places the formative power
in a zygote or early embryo itself.This fact would arguably motivate Aquinas to
define a zygote or early embryo as having an active potentiality for rational
operations, since it has an active internal principle guiding it to develop the requisite
organs for such operations to occur (Wade, 1975; Reichlin, 1997).16
Donceel contends that only a functioning cerebral cortex provides the proper
material organization for rational thought and thus is the only sufficient evidence
that a fetus has of an active potentiality for such operations. But this contention
overlooks the distinction between a natural potentiality and a capacity in hand. It
must be noted that, from the moment the fertilization process is complete, a zygote
has a complete human genome and other material factors that are sufficient – given
a nutritive uterine environment – for it to develop a functioning cerebral cortex.
From this fact, one can infer that a zygote or early embryo, before it forms a
functioning cerebral cortex, has an active potentiality for rational thought insofar
as it has a natural potentiality to develop a capacity in hand for such operations.
Pasnau argues that a zygote or early embryo does not have an active potentiality
for rational thought by asserting that Aquinas defines an active potentiality as
having a capacity in hand to perform some operation (Pasnau, 2002, p. 115). He
thereby denies that a natural potentiality, as defined above by Kretzmann, is a type
of active potentiality. Pasnau uses the distinction between an assembled hammer,
which has a capacity in hand to drive nails, and unassembled pieces of metal and
wood, which lack a capacity in hand to drive nails. In the first case, no further
change is required to the hammer’s constitution in order for it to drive nails;
whereas, in the second case, an external agent must assemble the metal and wood
pieces for them to have a capacity in hand to drive nails, and so they have merely
a passive potentiality. Pasnau concludes that a zygote or early embryo is akin to the
unassembled parts of a hammer. It has only a passive potentiality to develop into
an organism with a capacity in hand for rational thought.
Pasnau is correct in holding that if the development of a zygote or early embryo
depends upon the assembling powers of some external agent, then it does not have
an active internal principle for developing into a being that actually thinks rationally.
It thus would have merely a passive potentiality for rational thought, and would
not be informed by a rational soul.Contemporary genetic understanding, however,
indicates that a zygote or early embryo has an active internal principle guiding its
development into a being that actually thinks rationally; it has an active potentiality
for rational thought in the sense of a natural potentiality.A zygote or early embryo
is not akin to the unassembled pieces of a hammer; while such pieces depend upon
an external agent to assemble them in the proper fashion, a zygote or early embryo
has no such need. Given a supportive environment – one that provides simply nutri-
tion, oxygen, and protection from harmful external influences – a zygote or early
embryo will develop into a being that has a capacity in hand for rational thought and
that actually thinks rationally.That the actualization of this potentiality requires time
and internal development does not count against its being an active potentiality.
A zygote or early embryo and a hammer differ greatly in that the former is a
“natural substance,” whereas the latter is an “artifact.” Aquinas’s Aristotelian
understanding of the distinction between natural substances and artifacts leads to
different conclusions about what is required for there to be an active potentiality
in each type of thing. Pasnau correctly understands Aquinas’s criterion for an
artifact to have an active potentiality for performing its proper function and thus
being the type of artifact it is.An assembled hammer requires no further change in
its constitution in order to actualize its potentiality to drive nails; it thus has a
hammer’s definitive capacity as an active potentiality, and thereby is a hammer.The
unassembled pieces of a hammer, on the other hand, require change in their
constitution brought about by an external agent before being able to actualize a
hammer’s definitive capacity, and thus are not yet a hammer.
For a natural substance, though, its ordered natural development, the principle
of which is active and internal to it, is sufficient for it to be that toward which it
is developing. Though I have not found an explicit statement by Aquinas on
this point, it is likely that he would follow Aristotle, who concludes in his 
De generatione animalium:
When we are dealing with definite and ordered products of nature, we must
not say each is of a certain quality because it becomes so, but rather that they
become so and so because they are so and so, for the process of becoming attends
upon being and is for the sake of being, not vice versa.
(Aristotle, 1984, 778b2–6; see Reichlin, 1997, p. 15)
A key difference between a natural substance and an artifact is the location of their
respective “formal causes.”17 When a builder is building a house, the formal cause
of the house is the idea the builder has in their mind of how the house should
appear – that is, what structure it is to have – once completed. Perhaps this idea has
been materially instantiated in a blueprint. Once the house is completed to the
builder’s satisfaction, in accord with the mental or printed blueprint, the formal
cause is now located in the house itself.The matter, having been assembled in the
proper fashion, has taken on the form of the house which had previously been
found only in the blueprint.The form of the house is not present in the matter
composing it until the building process is complete.
For a natural substance, however, there is no analogue to the builder in whose
mind the formal cause of the substance is located – putting aside the possibility that
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God acts as such a builder. Rather, the formal cause must be located in the natural
substance itself as it is developing toward its final appearance and structure. Its
blueprint is internal to it in a way that a house’s blueprint is not, since the latter
has an external efficient cause that brings it from being potentially a house to being
actually a house. A natural substance, which has an internal efficient cause of
its development, must be guided in its development by the formal cause already
instantiated in it as it moves from being, for example, a human being with
the potential for rational thought to a human being who actually thinks ration-
ally after having developed the requisite organic structure. A human being’s form
is thus present in the matter composing it from the moment its development
begins.
I conclude that the interpretations offered by Donceel and Pasnau,18 while they
closely follow what Aquinas explicitly says concerning embryogenesis, do not
correctly take account of the role Aquinas’s nuanced concept of  “active potentiality”
plays in defining the nature of a zygote or early embryo in the light of contempo-
rary genetic understanding. Evidence that a zygote or early embryo has an active
internal principle guiding its ordered natural development into a being that
actually thinks rationally is sufficient, I contend, to conclude that it is already a
rational being. It has an active potentiality for rational thought and is thereby
informed by a rational soul.Thus far, I have consistently referred to “a zygote or
early embryo,” because a contentious issue among interpreters of Aquinas concerns
whether a one-celled zygote – the immediate product of conception – or an early
embryo – formed approximately two weeks after conception – should be properly
understood as informed by a rational soul.The remainder of this chapter offers an
adjudication of this debate.
Ford
Norman Ford argues that neither an active potentiality for rational thought, nor an
embryo’s existence as an “individual substance,” is possible until approximately
fourteen days after fertilization is complete. At this time, the embryo implants on
the wall of its mother’s uterus and begins to form the “primitive streak,” which is
the “epigenetic primordium”19 of the central nervous system: the brain and spinal
cord. The primitive streak’s formation indicates that an embryo is beginning
to develop a cerebral cortex and thereby demonstrates its having an active poten-
tiality to engage in rational operations. The occurrence of this event also signals
an end to the possibility of twinning: an embryo’s division into one or more
genetically identical separate organisms. Ford contends that a preimplantation
embryo’s intrinsic capacity to twin indicates that it is not a unified, individual sub-
stance; rather, it is a conglomeration of individual cells.20 Once twinning is no
longer possible and an embryo’s cells have begun to function collectively as one
organism – evidenced by the loss of cellular totipotentiality21 – there is sufficient
evidence to warrant the assertion that the embryo is informed by a rational soul.
Thus, Ford concludes, a human being begins to exist about two weeks after
conception.
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While the event of uterine implantation coincides with formation of the primitive
streak, it is the latter that signals the beginning of a human being on this account
(Smith, 1983, p. 206). Furthermore, while the primitive streak’s appearance provides
evidence that an implanted embryo has an active potentiality for rational thought, it
is the impossibility of division into genetically identical twins, once the primitive
streak appears, which signals the embryo’s existence as a unified, individual substance
and not a conglomeration of distinct substances.The key biological markers, accord-
ing to Ford, which indicate an embryo’s existence as “an individual substance of a
rational nature,” are the impossibility of twinning, the loss of cellular totipotentiality
and the beginning of differentiation into embryonic and extraembryonic tissues, and
the beginning of organized cellular functioning to sustain the life of one organism.
Ford begins his case by considering the possibility that an individual human
being begins to exist at conception. He asserts that at the completion of fertilization,
there exists something that has a unique genetic identity and a unique ontological
identity as a biological cell. It does not, however, have a unique ontological identity
as a human being. After the first mitotic event – the first division of a one-celled
zygote – two cells exist which have the same genetic identity, but are ontologically
distinct (Ford, 1988, p. 117, 2001, p. 160, 2002, p. 65).The same follows for every
event of cellular mitosis until the point is reached when mitosis that results in
ontologically distinct beings can no longer occur.
The ontological uniqueness of each cell in a preimplantation embryo is
evidenced by the lack of differentiation among them. Cells remain undetermined
for quite some time as to where they will go and what role they will play in the
developing organism. The same indeterminism occurs in cases of twinning. A
single cluster of cells is shared in the early developmental process by what will
become two ontologically distinct organisms; to which organism each cell will
ultimately go is largely undetermined (Ford, 1988, pp. 133–5).
Another implication of cellular indeterminacy in a preimplantation embryo is
that a great number of cells, once they become differentiated from other cells, are
used to form extraembryonic material: the trophoblast (Ford, 1988, p. 124).These
cells do not contribute to the “embryo proper.” Only the “inner cell mass” (ICM)
is differentiated from the cells that form the trophoblast to form the embryo itself.
Furthermore, there is no strict determiner for which cells will form the trophoblast
versus the ICM. Ford points out that it is a matter of which cells are spatially
located in relation to other cells and the outer membrane – zona pellucida – that
places cells into the trophoblast or ICM. Carlos Bedate and Robert Cefalo also
note the requirement of “positional information” for cellular differentiation and
development in a preimplantation embryo. They argue that the requirement for
such information, which is not coded in a preimplantation embryo’s DNA but
results from the interaction of embryonic molecules with maternal molecules,
implies that “an individual zygote does not possess in itself all the necessary, and
surely not sufficient, information to become a human person” (Bedate and Cefalo,
1989, p. 644).A zygote thus appears to have only a passive potentiality to become
a human being, because it requires extrinsic information for its development.
Differentiation into the trophoblast and ICM occurs at the morula stage. Ford
argues:
At the morula stage, it is extremely difficult to establish the presence of the
sort of unity that would be required for the cluster of cells to be an actual
ontological individual.There does not appear to be any strict commitment or
rigid predetermination in cells from the earliest cleavages to become the inner
cells . . .The relatively independent behaviour of the individual cells, together
with the indeterminate and uncommitted nature of their developmental
potential within the cluster of cells as a whole, seems to be incompatible with
the individuation of the morula itself as a distinct ontological individual.
(1988, pp. 148–9)
Nevertheless, the question arises whether, once the cells have differentiated at the
end of the morula stage, the ICM constitutes an ontologically unique individual.
Ford states that there is still indeterminate differentiation that occurs as the embryo
implants itself on the uterine wall (Ford, 1988, p. 161). Some of the ICM’s cells,
formed before implantation, will not in the end form part of the embryo proper,
but will form extraembryonic material. Hence, there cannot be a unique individ-
ual entity until all the cells which will contribute to the formation of the embryo
proper are determined to that end and no other. Prior to strict cell determination,
there is more than one entity present – the embryo proper and extraembryonic
material – and they cannot be completely differentiated from each other.
In addition to the possibility of an embryo having been constituted by different
cells, due to the lack of differentiation in its preimplantation form, more than one
ontologically unique organism may be formed out of the cluster of undifferenti-
ated totipotent cells.At any time before the primitive streak is formed, one or more
cells may separate from the others, divide through mitosis, and form a new cluster
that may implant in the uterus and form another, genetically identical, organism.
The possibility of such division is lost when the primitive streak is formed
(Ford, 2002, pp. 66–7).
Ford thus concludes, based on the lack of cellular differentiation and the
possibility of twinning, that a preimplantation embryo cannot be a person under
the Boethian definition since it is not an “individual substance.” The primitive
streak’s appearance, coincident with uterine implantation, indicates an embryo’s
existence as an ontologically unique organism informed by a rational soul:
The appearance of the primitive streak is an important landmark, indicating
the position of the embryo proper with the main features of the new individual’s
body plan.This appears to be the stage of development when the cells of the
epiblast first become organized through this primitive streak into one whole
multicellular individual living human being, possessing for the first time a
body axis and bilateral symmetry. Its developing cells are now integrated and
subordinated to form a single heterogeneous organic body that endures with
The beginning of a human person’s life 33
34 The beginning of a human person’s life
its own ontological as well as biological identity through all its subsequent
stages of growth and development.A new human individual begins once the
matter of the epiblastic cells become one living body, informed or actuated by
a human form, life-principle or soul that arises through the creative power of
God. The appearance of one primitive streak signals that only one embryo
proper and human individual has been formed and begun to exist. Prior to
this stage it would be pointless to speak about the presence of a true human
being in an ontological sense.A human individual could scarcely exist before
a definitive human body is formed.As mentioned earlier, the formation of an
ontological individual with a truly human nature and rational ensoulment
must coincide.
(Ford, 1988, pp. 171–2; cf. Smith, 1983; van Inwagen, 1990, pp. 152–4;
Shannon and Wolter, 1990; McCormick, 1991;
Olson, 1997, pp. 89–93; Eberl, 2000a)
Critics of Ford’s position argue that cellular totipotentiality does not imply a lack
of organic unity, since organized cellular functioning to sustain the life of a single
organism begins when fertilization is complete, and the possibility of a preimplan-
tation embryo dividing into genetically identical twins does not count against its
existence as an individual substance. While I have previously advocated Ford’s
account (Eberl, 2000a) and continue to consider it a metaphysically coherent and
plausible position, I agree with the critics who conclude that Ford does not offer
a sufficiently compelling argument to deny that a preimplantation embryo may be
an individual human organism informed by a rational soul.
“Organic” unity is often understood in this debate as a definitive sign of the
“substantial” unity required in the Boethian definition of personhood Aquinas
adopts. Since, however,Aquinas holds strict criteria for something to have substantial
unity, it is necessary to see if the concept of organic unity satisfies the relevant
criteria. Aquinas notes various ways in which something may be considered a
“unity.” For example, a heap of stones is a unity in terms of the constituent stones
being spatially contiguous, a house is a unity in terms of its constituent parts being
functionally organized in a certain fashion, and a mover and that which it moves
are a unity in terms of their agent/patient relationship (QDA, X; SCG, II.57).
None of these types of unity count as substantial unity, though.Aquinas defines a
substance as unum simpliciter (“one unqualifiedly”). Examples of things that are
unum simpliciter are elemental substances, certain mixtures of elemental substances,
immaterial substances, and living organisms (Pasnau, 2002, p. 88). Aquinas
understands living organisms “to have a unity fundamentally different from that of
nonliving aggregates” (Pasnau, 2002, p. 93):
For since the body of a human being or any other animal is a natural whole,
it will be called “one” insofar as it has one form; by which it is perfected
[i.e., completed or made whole] not merely as an aggregate or an assemblage
of parts, as in the case of a house and other things of this kind.
(QDA, X)
A living organism is unum simpliciter, because its heterogeneous parts do not each
have their own substantial form. Rather, they are all informed by one substantial
form by which each part has its own existence and specific nature (QDA, X; SCG,
II.57; In DGC, I.xv.108).This unity among a living organism’s parts is signified by
their interdependent functioning. Mere “functional unity” is not sufficient for
substantial unity.The bricks, roof tiles, wood beams, etc., that compose a house are
functionally unified in that they must all be organized in a certain fashion relative
to each other in order for the house to exist with its proper structural integrity;
but a house is not unum simpliciter.A house’s functional unity is distinguished from
that of a living organism, because a living organism’s parts depend upon their
functional relationship to each other for their very existence as the types of things
they are (QDA X.ad 15; SCG, II.57; see van Inwagen, 1990, pp. 81–97). A brick
depends upon its functional relationship to the other parts of a house in order to
exist “as a part of the house”; but it does not depend upon that relationship in
order to exist “as a brick.” An organ – for example, an eye – that composes an
organism depends upon its functional relationship to the organism’s other organs
not only for its existence “as a part of the organism,” but also for its existence “as
an eye.”Aquinas asserts that an eye which is functionally disconnected from a living
organism can be called “an eye” only equivocally; it is no longer an eye in the
proper sense of the term.
Hence, for Aquinas, a living organism’s organic unity – defined in terms of the
interdependent functional relationship among its parts (cells, tissues, organs, etc.) –
is a paradigm example of substantial unity. In reviewing Ford’s account, then, it is
necessary to determine whether the cells composing a preimplantation embryo are
functionally interdependent. Evidence of their functional interdependence would
make it reasonable to assert, contra Ford’s conclusion, that a preimplantation embryo
has organic, and thus substantial, unity.
Therefore, the first criticism of Ford’s position is that the evident totipotentiality
of the cells constituting a preimplantation embryo does not indicate that the
embryo lacks organic unity. Paul Flaman asserts, “The totipotentiality of cells or
groups of cells does not mean that they can not be parts of one ontological indi-
vidual, one living organism or one human being” (Flaman, 1991, p. 41; cf. Lee,
1996, pp. 94–5; Serra and Colombo, 1998, p. 172; Panicola, 2002, pp. 80–1). Flaman
supports this contention by pointing out that “Even in the adult human being
‘stem cells’ in the bone marrow are pluripotent.22 These cells which actualize a
pluripotentiality are certainly parts of one ontological individual, living organism
or human being” (Flaman, 1991, p. 41).
That cellular totipotentiality does not inhibit a preimplantation embryo’s
organic unity is evidenced by indications of an inchoate organization and inter-
communication among the embryo’s cells. Such organization and intercommuni-
cation may also indicate functional interdependence among the cells. Evidence of
an inchoate organization among a preimplantation embryo’s cells is their coming
together at implantation to form the primitive streak, as well as other embryonic
and extraembryonic tissues shortly thereafter. Germain Grisez charges that “Ford
has trouble explaining why a few thousand distinct individuals work together in
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embryogenesis to make themselves into one individual” (Grisez, 1989, p. 37;
cf. Lee, 1996, p. 102). Flaman and others note that an embryo has an “identifiable
body plan”before implantation and formation of the primitive streak (Fisher, 1991,
p. 66; Flaman, 1991, p. 46; Serra and Colombo, 1998; Vial Correa and Dabike,
1998, pp. 317–28).
Furthermore, Ford acknowledges that there is some sort of “clock” mechanism
programmed in a zygote’s DNA that guides organic development and “continues
through childhood for the growth of teeth, biological changes at puberty,
adulthood etc. right through to old age” (Ford, 1988, p. 155, note 37).This clock
“seems to be set from the time of fertilization, with each cell’s ‘clock’ running in
dependence on, and in co-ordination with, what is happening in its surrounding
cells” (Ford, 1988, p. 155). Ford interprets this phenomenon as supporting his view
that each cell constituting a preimplantation embryo is a distinct individual organ-
ism that has its own internal clock, which is synchronized with the clocks of the
other cells. Grisez, though, considers such harmonious synchronization to be what
one would expect if such cells “are, not a mass of distinct individuals, but integral
parts of one developing individual” (Grisez, 1989, p. 38).
The fact that some of a preimplantation embryo’s cells exercise their potentiality
to become extraembryonic organs – for example, the placenta or umbilical cord –
as opposed to constituting the ICM or embryo proper, is also not a threat to the
embryo’s organic unity. So-called “extraembryonic” organs may be understood
rather as prenatal organs of the embryo itself.As Anthony Fisher contends:
The biological evidence is clearly that these tissues are formed by the embryo,
usually with its genetic constitution, and for its sole benefit and use, and are
indeed its organs: they are clearly not the mother’s organs, nor a tumor, nor
some alien third organism living symbiotically with mother and embryo.
(Fisher, 1991, p. 60; cf. Grisez, 1989, p. 38; Flaman, 1991, p. 44;
Howsepian, 1997, p. 38; Finnis, 1999, p. 15)
On this construal, the placenta and umbilical cord are understood as parts of a
developing fetus.When the fetus is born and no longer requires those parts, they
are naturally shed or otherwise artificially removed. Once removed from the
fetus, the placenta and umbilical cord are no longer parts of the fetus and may
be disposed of or used for some other purpose – for example, the derivation of
stem cells.
Ford’s case against a preimplantation embryo’s organic unity is supported by the
contention that information not coded in its DNA, but which is from an extrinsic
source – namely, maternal molecules that interact with the embryonic molecules –
is required for the embryo to exercise its preimplantation development and implant
upon the uterine wall (Bedate and Cefalo, 1989). By investigating the growth of
ovarian teratomas,23 however,Antoine Suarez concludes:
The domain governed by embryonic information remains well separated from
the domain governed by maternal information . . .The biological identity of
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the human embryo is not determined by the influence of the maternal
environment, but depends basically on the information capacity of the embryo
itself . . . that the adult into which an embryo develops is a man and not a dog
or a cat, depends on embryonic information alone.
(Suarez, 1990, p. 630; cf.Austriaco, 2002, p. 672)
Granting the claim, though, that a preimplantation embryo requires extrinsic
information to execute its developmental plan toward implantation, Patrick Lee
argues that this requirement does not count against the embryo being an organized
individual:
Even if it were true that some information is received from maternal
molecules, this would not show that the preimplantation embryo was not a
complete human individual.There is no reason to expect that all of the future
features of the developing organism should be already determined by its inter-
nal genetic make-up . . . If informational factors are received from maternal
molecules, still, how this information fits within the overall development of
this organism is determined from within by the organism’s own directed
growth . . .primary organization comes from within the embryo itself.
(1996, p. 101)
There is evidence that a preimplantation embryo, despite the totipotentiality of its
constituent cells to form any embryonic or extraembryonic tissue, or even another
embryo, has an intrinsic organization grounded in its unique genetic identity to
grow by cellular mitosis, implant itself in its mother’s uterus, and develop into a
mature human being capable of rational thought. Evidence of a preimplantation
embryo’s organic unity provides a reasonable foundation for asserting the embryo’s
substantial unity, fulfilling Aquinas’s requirement that something be unum simpliciter
in order to count as a substance.The above responses to Ford’s account show that
his charge that cellular totipotentiality decisively precludes organic unity lacks a
sufficient foundation to demonstrate that a preimplantation embryo cannot be an
“individual substance.”
The totipotentiality of a preimplantation embryo’s constituent cells also allows
for the embryo to potentially divide into genetically identical twins. It appears to
be quite metaphysically problematic for one individual organism to give rise to two
distinct organisms; especially if the substantial form of each organism in question
is a rational soul.24 This is Ford’s most powerful means of arguing for his conclusion
that rational ensoulment cannot occur before uterine implantation. Ford’s
interpretation of the twinning phenomenon, however, can be called into question
and alternative interpretations offered.
Ford considers it problematic that an individual human organism informed by a
rational soul could potentially divide into two or more human organisms. The
following questions arise: Does the rational soul informing the first organism
divide? Do all the organisms share the same rational soul with the original? Does the
original organism cease to exist, its soul separating from its matter, and are two new
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rational souls created to inform the divided matter? There is also a fundamental
issue concerning identity. That something is identical to itself is necessary, and
the relation of identity is transitive. Hence, a zygote is identical to itself and, if a
preimplantation embryo has the same rational soul as the zygote from which it
developed, then the embryo is identical to the zygote. If the embryo divides into
twins, it appears that each twin is identical to the original embryo and thus to the
zygote. The twins are obviously not identical to each other, but they must be
identical if they are both identical to the original embryo, since identity is transitive.
Therefore, an incoherency seems to follow from the assertion that an embryo
capable of dividing into twins is a substance identical with itself.
Against Ford’s depiction of the twinning phenomenon, I propose that the best
way to describe the phenomenon, which is both consistent with Aquinas’s account
of human nature and avoids the above identity issue, is that the original rationally
ensouled embryo loses some of its matter and the matter becomes informed by a
new rational soul.As George Klubertanz explains:
It is quite probable that the human soul is created at the moment when the
new individual is formed by the union of ovum and sperm. If this is what hap-
pens, then, in the division of the embryo by which identical twins are formed,
the individual soul remains in one of the parts . . .Meanwhile, as soon as the
other part is fully separated, and so removed from the information of the
already created soul, a new soul is created for the second twin . . . the original
human being does not cease to be, but loses half [or some percentage] of its
matter; and in the new being thus formed by division a new soul is created.
(1953, pp. 410–11)
On this construal of the twinning phenomenon, when one organism A divides
into two organisms B and C, either B or C is identical to A,25 because one of them
has the same substantial form as A.26 If, say, B is identical to A, then B’s existence
can be traced back to the one-celled zygote from which A developed before its
division. In this case, C is not identical to A, because its substantial form is a new
rational soul that was created at the moment of A’s division (Suarez, 1990, p. 631;
Fisher, 1991, pp. 61, 67; Flaman, 1991, p. 50; May, 1992, pp. 80–1; Crosby, 1993,
pp. 410–11; Finnis, 1999, p. 15; Panicola, 2002, pp. 80–1).Therefore, since it is not
the case that both B and C are identical to A, no incoherency follows from B and
C not being identical to each other and A being a substance identical to itself.
Natural embryonic twinning is thus akin to the artificial production of a “clone”
insofar as an external agent acts upon an organism to separate some of its matter
from it and the matter comes to constitute a genetically identical organism with its
own substantial form (Ashley and Moraczewski, 2001, pp. 195–8).While the bio-
logical process of twinning is not fully understood, it appears to be a random event,
with no apparent internal genetic factor or any clear environmental factor that
causes an embryo to twin (Piontelli, 2002, p. 19). To the best scientific under-
standing, it is as likely that twinning is caused by factors respective of the uterine
environment acting upon weak intercellular bonds to cause the embryo to lose
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some of its cells as it is that an embryo is genetically “programmed” to divide.
If there were a genetic determiner for twinning intrinsic to an embryo, then one
could argue that this factor precludes an embryo that has it from being an
individual substance prior to its division.There is, though, no conclusive evidence
of an intrinsic genetic determiner for twinning (Ford, 1988, p. 119).
A preimplantation embryo and an adult human being have the same potentiality –
that is, a passive potentiality which requires some external manipulation – for
producing a genetically identical human organism.As Patrick Lee explains:
Theoretically, any of our cells could be cloned; that is, a cell could be isolated
and something done to the cell to activate it so that it began to replicate using
the whole genetic code instead of the restricted part of it relevant to its
specialty.27 One could claim, then, that each cell of our body has the active
potentiality, given the right conditions, to produce a distinct organism. But of
course the right conditions referred to here include much more than just an
appropriate environment. Something must be done positively to activate
it. Similarly, the right conditions referred to by Ford, for the splitting of a
two-, three-, four- or eight-celled embryo into twins, are more than just the
appropriate environment.
(Lee, 1996, p. 93; cf. Panicola, 2002, p. 81)
Ford’s account faces a dilemma. If a preimplantation embryo has an active
potentiality to divide into genetically identical twins – and the conclusion follows
from this premise that the embryo cannot be an individual substance – then Ford
must conclude that an adult human being – who has the same type of potentiality
to produce a genetically identical clone – cannot be an individual substance as well.
On the other hand, if a preimplantation embryo is best understood as having a
passive potentiality for twinning (Grisez, 1989, p. 38; Flaman, 1991, p. 48; May,
1992, p. 80), because it requires more than merely its supportive environment for
such an event to occur, then, since an adult human being is also best considered as
having a passive potentiality to produce a clone, both embryo and adult exist as
individual substances.
I propose that, when an embryo twins, it is not the case that it is “dividing,” but
that it loses some of its matter. Since the separated matter is totipotent – that is, it
has an active potentiality to develop into a human being – it is immediately
informed, once separated, by a rational soul. It is not necessary to accept Ford’s
conclusion that a preimplantation embryo’s potentiality to divide is a threat to its
previous substantial unity. Furthermore, the understanding of twinning as an event
in which an embryo merely loses some of its matter allows for an embryo to
maintain its substantial unity through the twinning process; and thereby one of the
resultant twins is identical to the original embryo.
Having examined Ford’s account of human embryogenesis from a Thomistic
metaphysical perspective, I conclude that the possibility of a human embryo
dividing into genetically identical twins does not preclude its being informed by a
rational soul. Nevertheless, even if one grants that cellular totipotentiality and the
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possibility of twinning do not preclude a preimplantation embryo’s existence as
an individual substance with organic unity, more needs to be said to support the
assertion that the embryo’s substantial form is a rational soul, as opposed to a
merely vegetative or sensitive soul; especially given that Aquinas explicitly
holds that an embryo’s first substantial form is a vegetative soul. Responding to this
issue requires providing a reason to think that a preimplantation embryo has an
active potentiality for rational thought. I will elucidate one attempt to provide such
a reason.
Ashley
Benedict Ashley argues that a human zygote contains the epigenetic primordia of
the biological structures proper to a human being. In place of the developed
cerebral cortex (Donceel and Pasnau) and the primitive streak (Ford),Ashley points
to a zygote’s DNA-filled nucleus as the “control center” that regulates embryonic
biological functioning, such that a zygote is a unified, individual substance from
fertilization onward:
From the moment of fertilization there already exists in the zygote (and this
was probably already pre-determined in the ovum) a metabolic polarity, with
the nucleus determining the upper pole of the metabolic gradient, and a bilat-
erality which will eventually be fundamental to the plan of the adult body.
Consequently, as the first cell-divisions take place, there is already some dif-
ferentiation in the cytoplasm of the daughter cells.They may be totipotential
when separated, but as existing in the morula, they already constitute hetero-
geneous parts.At this stage it appears that the maternal RNA produced in the
cytoplasm by the DNA of the nucleus of the original ovum plays a regulative
role, and the nuclei, with their new unique DNA, are still relatively quiescent.
Nevertheless, it was the nucleus of the zygote which initiated the whole
process, and it will be the new nuclear DNA which finally takes over the reg-
ulation of the development from the blastula on.Thus, during this intermedi-
ate phase, it is still the nuclear DNA which has ultimate regulatory control,
although it permits the maternal RNA to play its own role.We ought, there-
fore, to hold that, during this time, the primary organ are the daughter nuclei,
which originated from the nucleus of the zygote. Since all are essentially
similar, they can be said to act collectively, although it is probable that some
of them, or even one, located at the superior pole of the organism, has the
dominant effect, and can be identified as the primary organ of the whole.
(Ashley, 1976, p. 123; cf.Ashley and Moraczewski, 2001, p. 197)
Various studies on the development of mouse embryos support Ashley’s descrip-
tion of an inherent organizational structure in a zygote and its daughter cells that
determines an embryo’s future biological development (Gardner, 1997, 2001, 2002;
Beddington and Robertson, 1999; Piotrowska and Zernicka-Goetz, 2001;
Piotrowska et al., 2001).
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Ashley correctly understands Aquinas to hold that there is a “primary organ” by
which a soul’s power to move the other parts of its body is manifested (QDA IX.ad
13, X.ad 4, X.ad 11, XI.ad 16; In Sent, I.8.v.3.ad 3).28 Aquinas asserts that the
primary organ is the foundation of an animal’s unity as an organic substance and
thus indicates that the animal is ensouled. Hence,Ashley and Albert Moraczewski
conclude:
By “a body proportionate to ensoulment as a human person,”Aquinas meant
a body with a principal organ capable of being the efficient cause of the activities
specific to a human person, given the organism’s state of development. Present
embryology shows that the zygote fulfills this requirement.
(2001, p. 194)
In fact, all parties discussed in this debate recognize the need to define a primary
organ in order to assert that a developing embryo has a rational soul. Donceel and
Pasnau contend that the primary organ is the brain with a functioning cerebral
cortex, because it is directly correlated with both rational operations and metabolic
regulation. Ford argues that the primitive streak is the primary organ because it is
the epigenetic primordium for the brain and nervous system. Ashley finds the
zygotic nucleus to be the primary organ as it is the epigenetic primordium of the
primitive streak, and thus of the brain and nervous system (Ashley, 1976, p. 124).
The zygotic nucleus not only functions as a preimplantation embryo’s metabolic
regulator, but is also the epigenetic primordium for the organ correlated with
rational operations: the cerebral cortex formed out of the primitive streak.
This supports the conclusion that a one-celled human zygote is informed by a
rational soul:
Thus the primary organ that is required in the fetus for its intellectual ensoul-
ment is not the brain as such but a primary organ capable of producing a brain
with the capacity for intellectual cognition in the body at some appropriate
phase of the human life cycle. What is the primary organ that causes the
human body to develop so as to be proportionate to ensoulment and human
personhood? Modern embryology shows clearly that it is the nucleus of the
zygote produced by the fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm,
since the nucleus 1) contains all the genome or information (formal cause)
required to build the mature human body with its brain as its primary organ
and the instrument of intellection; and 2) is the principal efficient cause
proportionate to the task of the mature development of the human organism.
(Ashley and Moraczewski, 2001, pp. 199–200)
It is not merely because of its unique genetic identity that a zygote is an individual
human being. For its genetic identity will not remain unique if an identical twin
or clone is formed, or be sufficient for a human being to develop if a hydatidiform
mole is produced.29 A zygote must also have a primary organ and any other
intrinsic biological factors necessary for its unilateral development into an actually
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thinking rational human being.30 In normal cases, a human zygote has an active
potentiality to be an actually thinking rational human being, and this is sufficient
to conclude that it is informed by a rational soul. By applying Aquinas’s
metaphysical principles to contemporary embryological data, I conclude that a
human being begins to exist at conception.31
Conclusion
My goal in this chapter has been to develop a proper Thomistic understanding of
the beginning of a human being’s life, which involves determining when one can
assert that a rational soul informs a human body.The evidence required to support
such an assertion is a body’s having, at minimum, active potentialities for vegetative,
sensitive, and rational operations. I conclude in agreement with Ashley’s contention
that these active potentialities are present when an organism with human DNA
comes into existence with some sort of primary organ through which integra-
tive organic functioning is exercised; such functioning indicates the organism’s
substantial unity. At the very beginning of human life, the primary organ is the
nucleus of a one-celled human zygote. A zygotic nucleus provides the epigenetic
primordium of a human being’s brain and nervous system. A human brain is the
integrative foundation for a human being’s sensitive and vegetative operations,32 and
is correlated with rational operations. The presence of the brain’s epigenetic pri-
mordium is thus sufficient for a human zygote to have active potentialities for a
rational soul’s proper operations, since the zygote’s ordered natural development will
result in an actually thinking rational human being.Therefore, one can assert that a
human zygote is informed by a rational soul and is thus a human being – a person.
Introduction
As with the beginning of a human being’s life, formulating a proper Thomistic
account of a human being’s death, given current scientific data, is quite contentious.
Experts in the fields of medicine, biology, philosophy, and theology center the debate
on three proposed criteria for determining when death occurs.2 The classical
“circulatory/respiratory” criterion specifies death to occur when the intake, process-
ing,and distribution of oxygen throughout the body – the body’s most vital metabolic
functions – irreversibly cease.3 Without oxygen,all bodily systems begin to shut down
and necrosis ensues. In 1968, with the published report of the Ad Hoc Committee of
the Harvard Medical School (Ad Hoc Committee, 1968), many scholars and medical
practitioners began to argue that, since the brain is the central organ which regulates
the body’s metabolic functions, irreversible cessation of the functioning of the
brain “as a whole” – cerebral cortex, cerebellum, and brainstem – constitutes death.
This “whole-brain” criterion of death is based on the understanding that a human
organism cannot function as a unified whole without a functioning brain.4
The general acceptance of whole-brain death has led to the postulation that
perhaps not every part of the brain must irreversibly cease functioning in order
for death to occur. Some scholars emphasize that the so-called higher-brain
functions of the cerebral cortex are responsible for the peculiarly human
“personal” activities of conscious rational thought and volition. Hence, they argue
that a human being’s death, as a person, occurs when their cerebral cortex becomes
irreversibly nonfunctional.This higher-brain concept of death is used as the basis
to argue that patients in an irreversible persistent vegetative state (PVS) are no
longer persons and thus should be considered dead.
In what follows, I will examine arguments for and against these various under-
standings of death from the standpoint of Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human
nature. I will begin with a brief review of what Aquinas explicitly states about
death and then evaluate how his account best coheres with current biological data.
Aquinas’s account of human death
Aquinas’s account of a human being’s death begins with his understanding of
a rational soul as a human body’s substantial form and its unitive function as
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such: “The body is united by the soul; a sign of which is that, when the soul
departs, the body is dissolved” (SCG, II.58). As the substantial form of a human
body, a rational soul is the principle of the body’s (1) existence (esse), (2) unified
organic functioning, and (3) specific nature as a “human” body.5 Aquinas asserts
(1) and (2) in the following passages:
“To live” is said in two ways. In one way, it is the very existence of a living
thing, which results from a soul united to a body as form. In the other way,
“to live” stands for the operation of life.
(QDV, XIII.4.ad 2)
“To live” stands for the operation of the soul which it produces in the heart
insofar as it is a mover . . . and it infuses this life first in the heart, and afterwards
in all the other parts [of the body].6
(In Sent, I.8.v.3.ad 3)
As noted in Chapter 2, Aquinas understands a rational soul to be the principle of
a human body’s organic functioning and to operate by means of a “primary organ.”
Following Aristotle, Aquinas identifies this primary organ as the heart; although
contemporary science would identify it as the brain. Rendering a human body’s
primary organ as the brain, as opposed to Aquinas’s explicit reference to the heart,
is warranted by the criteria Aquinas gives for considering the heart as the primary
organ. First, Aquinas describes the primary organ as that through which the soul
“moves” or “operates” the body’s other parts. Second, he describes the primary
organ as the “ruler” of the body’s other parts in the sense that it orders them as a
ruler orders a city through laws (QDA, X.ad 4).Third, he cites the dependence of
the body’s other parts upon the primary organ (QDA, XI.ad 16). It is now known
that the brain functions as the source of operation for a body’s vital autonomic and
voluntary functions, regulates such functions and orders them to support the body’s
holistic-level existence and activity, and is the critical organ upon which the body’s
other vital organs – including the heart and lungs – depend for their functioning.
It is thus evident that the brain best satisfies Aquinas’s description of the primary
organ and thereby warrants substituting it for the heart in Aquinas’s account.
Aquinas’s two understandings of life entail two understandings of death:
Since death is the loss of life, it must be similarly distinguished so that it
designates at one time the loss of that union by which a soul is united to a
body as form, and at another time the loss of the operation of life.
(QDV, XIII.4.ad 2)
Though he separates two understandings of the term “death,”Aquinas nevertheless
considers them united in one and the same event.When the union of a rational
soul and its body is dissolved, the dissolution of the body’s unified organic
functioning immediately follows: “If that which holds the individual contrary
parts7 together is removed, they tend toward what is fitting to them according to
nature, and thus the dissolution of the body is brought about” (QDV, XXV.6).
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Aquinas understands death to occur because a premortem human body is not
perfectly informed by its rational soul.As a result, material defects can arise in the
body that may make it unsuitable for being informed by a rational soul (QDA,
VIII.ad 9, XIV.ad 13).8 Such defects result in a body’s unsuitability for having a
rational soul as its substantial form, which occurs when it becomes unable to actu-
alize the soul’s vegetative capacities:
Although the soul, which is the cause of life, is incorruptible, yet the body,
which receives life from the soul, is subject to change; and through this it
withdraws from the disposition according to which it is suited for the
reception of life.And thus the corruption of a human being occurs.
(QDA, XIV.ad 20)
Just as form does not come into matter unless the matter is made proper
through the requisite dispositions, so, with the cessation of the requisite
dispositions, a form cannot remain in the matter.And in this way the union of
soul9 and body is dissolved; if natural heat and moisture and others factors of
this sort [i.e., vital metabolic factors] are removed, insofar as by these a body
is disposed toward reception of a soul.
(QDA, IX.ad 16)
Aquinas thus defines a human being’s death – the separation of their rational soul
from their body – as occurring when the body is no longer able to actualize the
soul’s vegetative capacities.The clinical criterion for determining when this event
occurs is the irreversible loss of vital metabolic functioning as evidenced by,
according to Aquinas, the cessation of respiratory activity: “If breath is subtracted,
the union of soul10 to body fails; not because breath is the medium [of the union],
but because the disposition is removed through which the body is disposed toward
this union” (ST, Ia.76.7.ad 2).
Having reviewed Aquinas’s explicit account of human death, I will proceed to
outline the contemporary debate between the higher-brain, whole-brain, and
circulatory/respiratory concepts and criteria of human death. Illuminating this
debate is key because a properly Thomistic account of human death may end
up differing from Aquinas’s explicit account as contemporary biological under-
standing is taken into account to determine when a human being’s rational soul
separates from their material body and the body corrupts.
Recent interpretations
As with Aquinas’s explicit account of human embryogenesis, some may reject or
ignore his explicit account of human death because of the outdated biological
information at his disposal. Aquinas’s account, however, primarily concerns
metaphysical principles and invokes biology only twice: when he asserts that the
heart is the body’s primary organ through which the soul moves the rest of the
body’s parts, and when he asserts that the cessation of respiratory functioning is
the proper criterion for determining when death occurs. One can thus put aside
those two specific biologically based assertions and instead apply Aquinas’s
metaphysical account of the soul–body relationship to the contemporary biological
understanding of how and when death occurs.
Higher-brain concept of death
The higher-brain concept of death defines the end of a human being’s biological
existence in terms of the loss of “the capacity to think, feel, be conscious and
aware of other people” (Veatch, 1988, p. 173).The criterion for establishing the loss
of this capacity is the irreversible cessation of neocortical functioning. Robert
Veatch thus concludes,“A person should be considered dead when there is an irre-
versible loss of higher brain functions” (Veatch, 1988, p. 173). Some scholars advo-
cate higher-brain death as a direct interpretation of Aquinas’s understanding of
human nature.Their argument is based upon the Thomistic principle that one can
assert that a specific type of form informs a particular material body only by
observing the body performing the operations that are peculiar to that type of
form, or its having the inherent capacity to perform such operations. Therefore,
since the form of a human being is a rational soul, the capacity for conscious
rational thought being peculiar to that type of soul, one can assert that a particu-
lar body is informed by a rational soul, and thus composes a human being, only by
observing that it has at least the capacity for conscious rational thought.
As noted in Chapter 1, Aquinas claims that conscious rational thought does
not occur by means of a bodily organ; as, say, sight occurs by means of the eyes and
visual cortex. Aquinas’s claim, however, does not preclude rational activity and
neural activity being correlated with one another; as long as the correlation is not
explained in terms of a relation of identity or reduction of the former to the latter.
Allowing such a correlation makes plausible the coherence of Aquinas’s account of
human nature with contemporary neurobiological data. Given the evident corre-
lation between rational operations and cerebral functioning, it seems reasonable to
conclude that irreversible loss of cerebral functioning implies the loss of the capacity
for rational operations while a human being remains embodied. Due to this
implication, it appears to follow that one cannot assert that a rational soul informs
the body of a PVS patient.
Hence, D.Alan Shewmon, arguing from a Thomistic standpoint, concludes that
irreversible loss of cerebral functioning entails the loss of a rational soul as a body’s
substantial form (Shewmon, 1985).11 This construal of death involves a reversal
of the “succession of souls” Aquinas holds to occur in human embryogenesis.12
A human being is informed by a rational soul until their body becomes structurally
insufficient to support the soul’s definitive capacity for rational thought. While
Aquinas understands the mind not to function through a bodily organ, he never-
theless asserts that the operation of a rational soul’s sensitive and imaginative
capacities, which do function through bodily organs, is required to provide the
mind with its proper object of thought while a human being is embodied.13 Thus,
the loss of higher-brain functioning, which neurobiological evidence indicates is
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required for imaginative operation and is correlated with rational activity, precludes
rational activity while the soul informs a material body.14 At the loss of higher-
brain functioning, then, it appears that a “substantial change” occurs in which the
rational soul separates from the body and a sensitive or vegetative soul is instanti-
ated as the body’s substantial form – depending upon whether any sensitive capacities
remain in the still living body.The body is thereby no longer identical to the body
that composed the human being because it has a different substantial form, and a
substance’s persistent identity requires that it be informed by the same substantial
form (Eberl, 2004, pp. 353–9).The body will continue to be informed by at least
a vegetative soul until it reaches a point of deterioration where it can no longer
structurally support vital metabolic functions. At this point, the vegetative soul is
annihilated, the body ceases to exist as an organic whole, and it is reduced to a
mere collection of basic elements.
Shewmon thus concludes:
The moment the brain cells in the hemispheres . . .become irreversibly
damaged, the body is rendered incompatible with the human essence, forcing
a substantial change. The [rational] soul departs and a vegetative soul is
actualized, which had been virtually present all along in the vegetative aspects
of the original human soul.
(1985, p. 48)
In summary, then, the minimum sufficient condition for the death of a person
is the irreversible destruction of those parts of the brain necessary for the
properly human functions of the [rational] soul, namely intellect and will.
(1985, p. 61)
Accepting the higher-brain concept of death, from a Thomistic standpoint, requires
one to argue that when a body is no longer able to provide the biological
foundation necessary for conscious rational thought, a substantial change occurs in
which the rational soul separates and the body becomes informed by either a
sensitive or vegetative soul. If this is what indeed occurs in cases of PVS, then the
body on the bed is a “humanoid animal” or perhaps a mere “vegetable” (Shewmon,
1985, p. 51).15
This purportedly Thomistic account suffers from three serious flaws. First, it is
at odds with Aquinas’s contention that a rational soul’s separation from its body is
signaled by the body’s inability to actualize its vegetative capacities; a PVS patient
retains the intrinsic activity of spontaneous respiration and other vital metabolic
functions.The higher-brain concept of death involves an unwarranted separation
of a soul’s rational capacity from its sensitive and vegetative capacities.
In his explicit account of human embryogenesis, described in Chapter 2,
Aquinas holds that a human being’s proper capacities do not begin to exist in a
developing human embryo at the same time; the vegetative capacities are actualized
first, then the sensitive capacities, and finally the rational capacity which signals the
existence of a human being. Nevertheless, once a rational soul informs a human
body that has developed sufficiently, it alone possesses all of a human being’s proper
capacities: vegetative, sensitive, and rational. It is not the case that there are three
souls informing a fully developed human body. Rather, the vegetative soul that first
informs a living human embryo is annihilated once the embryo develops to the
point where it has sense organs and sufficient neural development for sensitive
operations; it is then informed by a sensitive soul that has both sensitive and
vegetative capacities. The sensitive soul is annihilated once the point is reached
where neural development is sufficient to support rational operations and the
embryo becomes informed by a rational soul that has vegetative, sensitive, and
rational capacities. Aquinas argues at great length that a human being’s proper
capacities have their source in one substantial form: a rational soul (ST, Ia.76.3–4;
In DA, II.5; DUI, I).
Given Aquinas’s strong contention of the unicity of a human being’s substantial
form, it is not surprising that he characterizes human death differently from the
way he does human generation. Once a rational soul informs a properly disposed
human body, the body must lose its disposition for all the soul’s proper capacities
in order for the separation of soul and body to occur.Accepting the higher-brain
interpretation entails the following metaphysical description of how death occurs:
there exists first a rational substance informed by a rational soul, and then possibly
a nonrational animal substance informed by a sensitive soul, and finally a merely
living substance informed by a vegetative soul before its final transformation into
a lifeless corpse. This description violates the widely held principle of Ockham’s
Razor, which states that ceteris paribus the simplest explanation of a given phe-
nomenon – that is, the explanation that is the least metaphysically complex by
requiring the postulation of the least number of entities – is the explanation to
which one ought to give assent.
Finally, aside from the metaphysical determination of when death occurs, the
higher-brain concept is epistemologically problematic for two reasons. First, it is
extremely difficult to determine accurately which structures of the brain are
correlated with rational activity and when such structures become irreversibly
nonfunctional. In fact, there are a number of cases in which PVS patients have
been misdiagnosed (Steinbock, 1989; Childs et al., 1993; Andrews et al., 1996). A
significant example is Patricia White Bull, a New Mexico woman who awoke from
a sixteen-year coma after being diagnosed as “permanently vegetative.”16 Second,
while Aquinas notes that one can determine the presence of a certain capacity
based upon observation of its corresponding activity (ST, Ia.87.1; Pasnau, 2002,
pp. 336–41), it does not follow that failure to observe an activity entails the lack of
its corresponding capacity.Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that a PVS patient does
not have the capacity for rational thought only on the basis of not having observed
the performance of any rational activity or correlative neural activity.
A rational soul is not only the seat of a human being’s rational capacity; it is also
a human body’s substantial form and is thereby the source of its sensitive and
vegetative capacities.While PVS patients may no longer be able to actualize their
rational or sensitive capacities, their souls remain embodied and active by reason of
48 The end of a human person’s life
The end of a human person’s life 49
their vegetative capacities. Before death, a human being is composed of a rational
soul informing an organic body, and is not identified with merely the exercise of
their rational capacity (Smith, 1990a,b; Moreland, 1995; Moreland and Wallace,
1995; Moreland and Rae, 2000, pp. 316–37). Hence, we cannot be certain that a
PVS patient is no longer a human being – a person – until there is incontrovert-
ible evidence that their rational soul has altogether ceased to be active as their
body’s substantial form. Irreversible cessation of higher-brain functioning may
serve as evidence that a soul’s rational capacity can no longer be actualized while
it remains embodied, and one may wish to infer from this evidence that the
rational soul has ceased to inform that body. Such an inference, however, is invalid
because a PVS patient’s remaining vegetative operations serve as evidence that their
rational soul remains active as their body’s substantial form insofar as the soul’s veg-
etative capacities are still actualized in that body.
Aquinas’s explicit statements regarding a human being’s death indicate that he
takes the cessation of vital metabolic functioning to be the proper evidence that a
rational soul has ceased to inform a particular body.As mentioned earlier, it may be
the case that a proper Thomistic understanding of death, when viewed in the light
of contemporary biological data, may end up differing from Aquinas’s explicit
account. Nevertheless, the argument supporting a higher-brain interpretation of
Aquinas’s account does not conclusively or persuasively demonstrate that this
interpretation is a proper contemporary rendering of Aquinas’s account. As I will
show in what follows, defining death in terms of the irreversible loss of a human
organism’s vital metabolic functioning is the most plausible interpretation of
Aquinas’s view in light of the current biological understanding of death. Such an
interpretation allows for a contemporary rendering of Aquinas’s account without the
radical departure from his explicit assertions required by the higher-brain
interpretation.The fulcrum of the debate now shifts to the determination of whether
the irreversible loss of vital metabolic functioning should be identified with the
cessation of the brain’s functioning as a human body’s “central organizer” or with the
cessation of the vital metabolic functions themselves: circulation and respiration.
Whole-brain criterion
Philip Smith (Smith, 1990a,b,c) and Benedict Ashley (Ashley and O’Rourke, 1997,
pp. 316–37; Ashley, 2001) argue for the whole-brain criterion of death from a
Thomistic perspective. For Ashley, this parallels his interpretation of Aquinas’s
account of human embryogenesis, described in Chapter 2, wherein he argues that
the presence of a body’s central organizer from the one-celled zygote onward
indicates a rational soul’s presence as the body’s substantial form.
The whole-brain criterion has its roots in an understanding of death being
related to an organism “as a whole.”As James Bernat puts it:
My colleagues and I have defined death as the permanent cessation of
functioning of the organism as a whole.“The organism as a whole” is an old
50 The end of a human person’s life
biological concept [Loeb, 1916] that refers not to the whole organism
(the sum of its parts) but to that set of vital functions of integration, control, and
behavior that are greater than the sum of the parts of the organism, and that
operate in response to demands from the organism’s internal and external
milieu to supports its life and to maintain its health. Implicit in the concept is
the primacy of the functional unity of the organism.
(Bernat, 1998, p. 17, emphasis mine;
cf. Bernat, 2002)
Bernat defines the “critical functions” of an organism as a whole, the cessation of
all of which is necessary and sufficient to constitute the loss of an organism’s
functional unity:
Critical functions of the organism as a whole comprise three distinct and
complementary biological categories: 1) vital functions of spontaneous breath-
ing and autonomic control of circulation; 2) integrating functions that assure
homeostasis of the organism. . . and 3) consciousness . . .The critical functions in
all three categories must be permanently lost for the organism to be dead.
Correlatively, the presence of any of the three elements constitutes sufficient
evidence for life.
(Bernat, 1998, p. 17, emphasis mine;
cf. Bernat, 1999)
I will show that Bernat’s description of what is necessary and sufficient to
constitute death is consonant with Aquinas’s understanding of human nature.
Bernat’s three categories of critical functions that define the existence of an
organism as a whole can be collectively termed the organism’s “integrative unity.”
From a Thomistic standpoint, a human being’s integrative unified existence
involves a human body informed by a soul that has rational, sensitive, and
vegetative capacities. Clearly, a soul’s rational and sensitive capacities correspond to
Bernat’s reference to consciousness. Furthermore, it is reasonable to correlate
Bernat’s vital and integrating functions with a soul’s vegetative capacities. I thus
propose, in agreement with Smith and Ashley, that the Thomistic concept of death
involves the irreversible loss of a human being’s rational, sensitive, and vegetative
capacities: “A person is dead when there has been total and irreversible loss of all
capacity for integrating and coordinating physical and mental functions of the
body as a unit” (White et al., 1992, p. 81).
The above reference to the loss of a human being’s capacity for integrating and
coordinating their physical and mental functions raises a key issue. Many of the
cases that are considered in determining when a human being has died involve the
utilization of various forms of life-support technology to assist or replace the vital
metabolic operations of a patient who has suffered the loss of whole-brain
functioning. Hence, we must consider to what degree the utilization of various
forms of life-support technology impacts upon the Thomistic account of human
nature and death.
The end of a human person’s life 51
Aquinas understands a human being to be composed of a living biological
organism. Furthermore, Aquinas considers natural substances, such as biological
organisms, and artifacts to be significantly distinct types of beings:“Natural bodies
are substances more than artificial bodies; for they are substances not only due to
their material part, but also due to their formal part” (In DA, II.1). A natural
substance has intrinsic unity – that is, it is unum simpliciter (“one unqualifiedly”)17 –
by having a single, unique substantial form informing the matter that composes it.
An artifact, on the other hand, has unity in a merely “accidental” sense insofar as it
is an aggregate of natural substances organized in a particular fashion to perform
certain functions or instantiate certain properties.
This fundamental difference between natural substances and artifacts precludes
an artifact becoming a “proper part” of a natural substance; an artifact cannot be
informed by a natural substance’s substantial form. An artifact is unsuitable for
being informed by a natural substance’s substantial form, because the artifact
already has its own principle of organization – namely, the accidental form that
results from the aggregate or functional unity of the artifact’s constituents. Of
course, simply having its own principle of organization is not sufficient to preclude
something from becoming informed by a natural substance’s substantial form.
A banana has its own principle of organization, but it loses that principle through
the process of digestion in which the banana is broken down into its constituent
elements and those elements become part of the functional integrity of the
organism that consumes it. A pacemaker, on the other hand, does not lose its
principle of organization when it is placed inside a patient with bradycardia – an
abnormally slow heart rate; it retains the integrity of the material constitution and
programming that causes it to function properly in emitting weak electrical
impulses to stimulate contraction of the heart muscle when it falls below a certain
rate.While a pacemaker’s functioning assists a patient’s biological functioning, the
pacemaker’s function is not a function of the patient.There is no functional unity
of the patient with the pacemaker, because the patient does not direct the pace-
maker’s functioning.The pacemaker functions due to its own internal constitution
and programming; it is not “caught up in the life” of the patient (van Inwagen,
1990, p. 94).
Aquinas defines a human being’s death in terms of their rational soul separating
from their material body, which occurs when the body is no longer properly dis-
posed to actualize the soul’s vegetative capacities.The requisite disposition is lost
when the body’s vital metabolic functions cease. It is important to note that it is a
body’s loss of its soul’s vegetative capacities that occasions the soul’s separation.
Hence, the criterion for a human being’s death must be amended to refer to their
body’s loss of the capacity for vital metabolic functions, and not just the cessation
of the functions themselves. A human being in cardiac arrest suffers the cessation
of vital metabolic functions – circulation and respiration – and the loss of brain
functioning quickly follows due to anoxia. But they may be able to have their vital
metabolic functions restored through CPR. If the cessation of vital metabolic func-
tions were sufficient for death, then a human being resuscitated by CPR would
be considered as having died – their soul having separated from their body – and
then coming back to life – their soul reinforming their body. While reports of
“near-death experiences” may corroborate this interpretation, it is more plausible,
I contend, to consider them as having ceased to actualize their soul’s vegetative
capacities and then actualizing those capacities once again with the external
assistance provided by someone performing CPR on them.
One can cease to actualize one’s capacity for vital metabolic functions and then
actualize that capacity once again with external aid. Being dependent upon external
aid to support the actualization of one’s capacity for vital metabolic functions thus
seems consistent with a body’s continuing to be informed by a rational soul.The
external aid provided by CPR or a pacemaker, however, is not constitutive of a
human being’s vital metabolic functions. CPR simply “jump-starts” such functions
and a pacemaker helps to regulate them; neither actually performs those functions.
A mechanical ventilator, on the other hand, does perform a vital metabolic
function: it forces air into the lungs, which in turn stimulates cardiac activity. If
cardiac arrhythmia or asystole develops, which usually occurs, then additional
artificial support must be provided for cardiac functioning to continue. Patients
who suffer the cessation of whole-brain functioning require mechanical ventilation
and other artificial life-support measures to maintain both respiratory and cardiac
activity (Field et al., 1988, pp. 818–19).
There is an important distinction between having one’s vital metabolic functions
“jump-started” or regulated by external aid and having such functions “taken over”
by external artificial support.The distinction is in terms of a human being having
control over such functions.An artifact cannot be informed by a natural substance’s
substantial form due to the artifact having its own principle of organization, which
precludes its being under the natural substance’s functional control.A human being
having control over their vital metabolic functions is arguably a necessary criterion
for them to have the functional integrity one would expect of an organic substance
that is unum simpliciter. I thereby propose that a human being remains alive – that
is, their vegetative capacities are intact – only if they have the capacity to coordinate
their vital metabolic functions. The persistence of uncoordinated metabolic
functions – vital or otherwise – is not sufficient to constitute a human being’s
substantial vegetative activities. It is not merely the persistence of vital metabolic
functions that suffices for a human body – and hence the human being it composes –
to be alive and have integrative unity. Rather, a human being must have an “active
potentiality”18 to exercise such functions. If a human being cannot actually
perform their vital metabolic functions, then they are dead. If a mechanical
ventilator or cardiopulmonary bypass machine actually performs a human being’s
vital metabolic functions, then such functions and the capacity for performing
them are no longer attributable to the patient dependent upon such a device;
unless the patient’s dependence on artificial life support is temporary and their
inability to actually perform their vital metabolic functions is reversible – for
example, a patient who is put on cardiopulmonary bypass while undergoing an
open-heart procedure. A patient who is permanently dependent upon artificial
lifesupport has only a “passive potentiality” to receive the benefits – that is,
oxygenated air being introduced and circulated throughout their body – which
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such support can provide.19 I thus conclude that a human body loses integrative
unity when it no longer has the active potentiality to coordinate the vital
metabolic functions of circulation and respiration, and such functions can be
maintained only by external artificial means.The clinical sign of this capacity being
lost is the irreversible cessation of spontaneous heartbeat and respiration.
When integrative unity has been irreversibly lost, a body is no longer
“proportionate” for rational ensoulment; it can no longer materially support a
soul’s proper capacities in a unified substance:
As the source of life and the single organizing principle of the body, the soul
not only enables the person to breath, circulate blood, think, choose, etc., but
it also unifies these diverse activities into an integrated whole or system.When
the soul separates from the body at death, the remaining organism is deprived
of its internal unity and its radical capacity for human actions.Thus, human
death . . . [is equated] with the death of the organism as a whole.
(Smith, 1990c, pp. 24–5; cf. Smith, 1990a,
pp. 54–5;Ashley, 2001, p. 8)
Advocates of the whole-brain criterion and those of the circulatory/respiratory
criterion agree that the loss of a body’s integrative unity is the proper concept of
death.The difference between the two positions regards whether the cessation of
whole-brain functioning is sufficient to constitute the loss of integrative unity.
Ashley argues that the cessation of whole-brain functioning constitutes death, from
a Thomistic perspective,based upon the principle – utilized in his account of a human
zygote’s ensoulment – that a rational soul “moves” the heterogeneous parts of its body
through a primary organ:“Physical life can exist only when the principal part of the
total organism maintains its integrative unity by providing its highest and most specific
function, both exists and operates at least minimally” (Ashley, 2001, pp. 7–8).
An additional reason for holding the whole-brain criterion is that it defines
death in terms of the one organ that is directly correlated with all of a human
being’s proper capacities: vegetative, sensitive, and rational. Shewmon, in advocating
whole-brain death before adopting his current criterion (see below), asserts:
The vast literature on “brain death” reveals two basic schools of thought
regarding the essence of human death: loss of integrative unity of the body and
loss of specifically human properties [i.e., the capacity for conscious rational
thought and volition]. If the intellectual soul is indeed the substantial form of
the body, these two aspects ought to converge to one and the same patho-
physiological event. I take this conceptual unity to be as fundamental an axiom
as either separate notion, so that convergence of the two approaches could be
used as a kind of litmus test for formulations of death.
(1992, p. 31)
Despite Shewmon’s later denial of this “fundamental axiom,” I consider it to have
value because it disallows the distinction favored by some scholars – namely,
advocates of the higher-brain concept of death – between “personal death” and
“biological death” (Rachels, 1986, pp. 5–6, 24–7).Ashley also adopts this axiom as
it serves to define the loss of all of a human being’s proper capacities as coinciding
in a single, empirically verifiable event: the cessation of whole-brain functioning
(Ashley, 2001, p. 8).
Whole-brain death consists of the cessation of all three sets of critical functions
Bernat defines as individually sufficient for a living human organism to exist
(Bernat, 1998, p. 18). Furthermore, since these critical functions correspond to the
Thomistic understanding of a rational soul’s vegetative, sensitive, and rational
capacities, I conclude that the irreversible cessation of whole-brain functioning20
constitutes a human being’s death from a Thomistic standpoint.Whole-brain death
is the event which indicates a rational soul’s separation from its body (Smith, 1990a,
p. 55; Manni, 1999, p. 106;Ashley, 2001, p. 9).
Circulatory/respiratory criterion
In a reversal of his previous positions, Shewmon rejects the whole-brain criterion
after examining cases in which a human body appears to maintain its integrative
unity after whole-brain functioning has ceased. Such cases lead Shewmon to
conclude that the brain does not function as the body’s central organizer. Rather,
Shewmon argues that the brain “fine-tunes” the vital metabolic functions that the
body itself exercises as an integrated whole (Shewmon, 1997, 1998a, 2001). If, as
Shewmon argues, a body can maintain its integrative unity without any brain
functioning, then whole-brain death cannot be equated with a human organism’s
death. Shewmon thus advocates a return to the circulatory/respiratory criterion
for determining when death occurs.
Shewmon’s argument that the cessation of whole-brain functioning does not
entail the loss of integrated somatic functioning can be formalized as follows:
(1) Somatic integrative unity does not entirely depend on whole-brain
functioning – i.e., such unity can be maintained despite the loss of whole-
brain functioning.
(2) The brain’s role is more modulatory of an already unified living organ-
ism, than constitutive of that organism’s present unity; somatically inte-
grative functions are all the more effective when modulated by the brain,
but they do not entirely vanish without the brain.
(3) Therefore, loss of somatic integrative unity is not a physiologically tenable
rationale for equating whole-brain death with death of an organism as a
whole.
(2001)
Shewmon purports that a human organism, without a functioning brain, can have
“at least one emergent, holistic-level property” and that the existence of any such
property is sufficient for an organism to have integrative unity (Shewmon, 2001,
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p. 460).To demonstrate that the requisite holistic-level property exists, Shewmon
provides what he terms a “litany of non-brain-mediated somatically integrative
functions” that have been observed to persist in the body of a whole-brain dead
patient. Such functions include homeostasis of various mutually interacting chem-
icals, cellular waste handling, energy balance, maintenance of body temperature,
wound healing, infection fighting, stress responses, proportional growth, and even
sexual maturation (Shewmon, 2001, p. 467–8).21
Shewmon appeals to a number of cases in which a whole-brain dead patient
appears to exhibit integrative somatic functioning. One set of cases involves
whole-brain dead pregnant women who are able, with artificial life support and
pharmacotherapy, to maintain a nutritive uterine environment until the fetus can
survive on its own (Dillon et al., 1982; Field et al., 1988; Bernstein et al., 1989).
Corrado Manni describes such women as “biological incubators” whose ability to
provide a supportive uterine environment does not count against their being
declared dead, because they lack intrinsic integrative somatic unity since their
prolonged somatic survival requires at minimum mechanical ventilation and some
degree of pharmacotherapy (Manni, 1999, p. 115). Shewmon counters that such a
description “does injustice to the complex, teleological, organism-level, physiological
changes of pregnancy (weight gain, internal redistribution of blood flow favoring
the uterus, immunologic tolerance toward the fetus, etc.), which occur despite the
absence of brain function” (Shewmon, 2001, p. 469; cf. Siegler and Wikler, 1982,
pp. 1101–2; Lütz, 1999, p. 120; Potts, 2001, pp. 484–5).
The second type of case to which Shewmon appeals involves patients who are
properly diagnosed as whole-brain dead and yet survive for extended periods of
time with very little life-support technology. The most extreme case is that of a
19-year-old boy who was declared whole-brain dead at age four and, at the time
of Shewmon’s article,“remains on a ventilator, assimilates food placed in his stom-
ach by tube, urinates spontaneously, and requires little more than nursing care.
While ‘brain dead’ he has grown, overcome infections, and healed wounds.”
Shewmon concludes,“There is no question that he became ‘brain dead’ at age four;
neither is there any question that he is still alive at age nineteen” (Shewmon, 1998a,
p. 136; cf. Lütz, 1999, p. 121; Jones, 2000, p. 98; McMahan, 2002, p. 430).
Despite the absence of spontaneous heartbeat and the requirement of mechan-
ical ventilation for respiration to occur, Shewmon contends that these patients
exhibit somatic integrative unity by virtue of exercising somatic functions such as
digestion, waste excretion, infection resistance, wound healing, chemical and
cardiovascular homeostasis, growth, and development associated with the beginning
of puberty. Shewmon thus concludes that these patients cannot be considered
dead, even though they lack whole-brain functioning.
A third type of case supporting Shewmon’s denial of whole-brain death involves
patients whose brains are “functionally disconnected” from the rest of their body
and yet maintain clear evidence of somatic integrative unity – as with Guillain-
Barré Syndrome (GBS) (Shewmon, 1997, pp. 65–6) – and may even be conscious –
as in cases of high cervical cord transection (Youngner and Bartlett, 1983;
Shewmon, 1998a, pp. 140–1, 1999). Referring to such cases, Shewmon contends,
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“If the body’s integrative unity depended on brain functioning, then the body
should fall apart just as surely from functional disconnection from the brain as from
destruction of the brain” (Shewmon, 1998a, p. 140).
Guillain-Barré Syndrome is a condition in which patients present with varying
degrees of neuropathy. In its most severe form, GBS clinically resembles whole-brain
death, with cerebral activity detectable by electroencephalogram being the only
means of distinguishing GBS from whole-brain death (Langendorf et al., 1986;
Drury et al., 1987; Coad and Byrne, 1990; Hassan and Mumford, 1991; Marti-Masso
et al., 1993; Stojkovic et al., 2001). GBS patients initially require life support in the
form of mechanical ventilation, nutrition and hydration, and pharmacotherapy;
over time, however, they usually recover neural functioning and life support can
cease as they regain the ability to respire spontaneously, among other functions
(Coad and Byrne, 1990; Stojkovic et al., 2001, p. 431). While GBS resembles
whole-brain death, it is not equivalent to whole-brain death, because the loss
of neural function is reversible and there is persistent electrical activity in the
cerebral cortex.
High cervical cord transection involves a structural “break” between the upper
vertebrae and the brainstem, as in the injury suffered by Christopher Reeve
when he was thrown from a horse (Reeve and Rosenblatt, 1998).This structural
separation results in there being no electrical communication between the brain-
stem and the rest of the body. Patients in this condition are conscious and able to
control those parts of their body that remain neurally connected to the brain above
the transection – for example, facial muscles, eyes, and mouth – but they cannot
spontaneously respire and must be connected to a mechanical ventilator.
Patients with GBS or high cervical cord transection are not dead, for GBS is
reversible and high cervical cord transection does not preclude consciousness.
Hence, such patients are rationally ensouled, which is sufficient for their bodies to
have integrative unity. If, however, GBS and high cervical cord transection are
functionally equivalent to whole-brain death, insofar as all three conditions involve
the loss – regardless of reversibility – of electrical communication between the
brainstem and the rest of the body, the bodies of patients in these conditions should
not have integrative unity. This conclusion contradicts what follows from these
patients being rationally ensouled.
As a result of this contradiction, Shewmon concludes that the notion of whole-
brain death being sufficient for the loss of integrative unity should be abandoned
(Shewmon, 1997, p. 66). Physiological data do not support the equivalence of
whole-brain death with a human organism’s death:
The integrative functions of the brain, important as they are for health and
mental activity, are not strictly necessary for, much less constitute, the life
of the organism as a whole. Somatic integration is not localized to any 
single “critical” organ but is a holistic phenomenon involving mutual inter-
action of all the parts. Under ordinary circumstances the brain participates
intimately and importantly in this mutual interaction, but it is not a sine qua
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non; the body without brain function is surely very sick and disabled, but
not dead.
(Shewmon, 2001, p. 473; see Truog, 1997; Byrne and 
Rinkowski, 1999; Lütz 1999; Jones 2000;
Austriaco et al., 2001; Potts 2001)
According to the Thomistic understanding of human nature, a rational soul’s
separation from its body occurs when the body can no longer support the soul’s
rational, sensitive, and vegetative capacities. If, as Shewmon maintains, integrative
vegetative operations can remain in a whole-brain dead human body, one ought to
conclude that a rational soul continues to inform such a body until it ceases its vital
metabolic functions of circulation and respiration (Seifert, 1992, 1993, 2000; Jones,
2000, p. 109).
Does this conclusion require abandoning the Thomistic understanding of
human death in terms of whole-brain death? Not necessarily. There are several
issues that can be raised about the cases Shewmon uses to support his conclusion
and the inferences he draws.
First, in the cases of pregnant women who were kept alive to carry their fetuses
to term, “a great deal of effort had to be taken to keep their bodies alive” (Potts,
2001, p. 489; cf. Manni, 1999, p. 115). David Field and his colleagues list the
measures required to maintain the body of a 27-year-old pregnant woman for nine
weeks so that she could successfully gestate a healthy fetus: mechanical ventilation,
vasopressors to treat fluid-resistant hypotension, warming or cooling blankets to
treat temperature lability, nutritional support, replacement hormones to treat
endocrine abnormalities, aggressive surveillance for and treatment of infections,
and heparin prophylaxis (Field et al., 1988, p. 818). Field notes that “maximum
effort was directed at treating the severe hypotension, temperature fluctuations,
diabetes insipidus, hypothyroidism, and cortisol deficiency that were thought to be
the result of the autoregulatory function of the brain” (Field et al., 1988, pp. 816–17).
The requirement of extensive technological and pharmacological support – far
beyond the “little more than nursing care” required in Shewmon’s case of the
19-year-old whole-brain dead boy – indicates that the source of such patients’
vegetative operations is not something intrinsic to them, but rather is from an
extrinsic source. If so, then there are no grounds for asserting that these patients
have active potentialities for vegetative, sensitive, and rational operations and are
thereby informed by rational souls.
Second, Shewmon describes a human brain as more a “regulator” or “fine-tuner”
of a body’s vital metabolic functions, rather than being constitutive of them. It does
not seem, however, that this distinction makes a real difference in criticizing the
whole-brain criterion.While brainstem functioning is certainly not solely responsi-
ble for the vital metabolic functions of circulation and respiration, a human body
cannot carry out such functions on its own in the absence of brainstem functioning.
The assumption of such functions by life-support machinery indicates that the body
has lost the capacity to perform them under its own control.These functions are no
58 The end of a human person’s life
longer part of the body’s “integrative” organic life, since, according to Aquinas,
artifacts cannot be integrated into the substantial unity of a natural substance such as
a biological organism. Hence, integrative unity has been lost in such cases.
Third, one may question the validity of the inference Shewmon makes based on
his contention that certain holistic-level functions can be carried out in the
absence of whole-brain functioning, and that an organism’s possession of “at least
one emergent, holistic-level property” (Shewmon, 2001, p. 460) is sufficient for it
to have integrative unity. Shewmon’s conclusion that certain functions – for example,
homeostasis, energy balance, wound healing, stress responses, sexual maturation,
and proportional growth (Shewmon, 2001, pp. 467–8) – are “integrative” just
because they are holistic does not follow. Such functions can be understood as
emerging from the interaction of a body’s organ systems without entailing that the
body has the integrative unity required for it to compose an individual substance
that is unum simpliciter with a single substantial form. As Nicholas Tonti-Filippini
contends:
There is, however, a difference between the dynamic interactions of matter
and form which is a living human individual, and the human organism whose
organs keep functioning and interacting in a merely systemic way without the
dynamic and ongoing integration of some form of control of the system as a
whole.The essential dynamic organization and integration which constitute a
living human body are far more than the bio-mechanical interaction of organs
within the body.
(1991, p. 33)
A human body’s having control over its vital metabolic functions is a necessary
criterion, I contend, for it to have integrative unity. Furthermore, such control
must be exercised over the specific activities of circulation and respiration, which
have long been understood as the fundamental metabolic functions necessary for
somatic integrative unity.Without circulation and respiration, all other holistic-level
somatic functions rapidly cease. Shewmon’s case for abandoning the whole-brain
criterion depends upon there being cases in which spontaneous heartbeat and
respiration occur in the absence of whole-brain functioning. Shewmon has not
presented any such case.
While Shewmon has not presented any case involving spontaneous heartbeat
and respiration in the absence of whole-brain functioning, he nevertheless purports
that, in the cases he does present, patients who have survived for years without
whole-brain functioning have somatic integrative unity and thus are not dead.
These cases, though, fail to be conclusive for two reasons. First, all of the patients
require mechanical ventilation; none are capable of spontaneous respiration as well
as other metabolic activities:“Immediate intervention is needed for the brain dead
individual to survive, which includes the ventilator, but also includes pharmaco-
logical intervention (epinephrine, vasopressin, careful maintenance of electrolyte
and water balance)” (Potts, 2001, p. 489).
The end of a human person’s life 59
Second, as Michael Potts notes,“Shewmon’s examples of multi-year survivors of
whole brain death suffered their injuries as young children, whose systemic plasticity
is greater than that of adults” (Potts, 2001, p. 489).22 Given the cases that Shewmon
cites – the oldest patient being 14 years old and prepubescent when he suffered
whole-brain death – it appears that the organic systems of young children, possibly
up to some point just prior to the onset of puberty, are more “plastic” than those
of more mature human beings. Shewmon admits that an “age factor” was present
among the cases he analyzed (Shewmon, 1998b, p. 1543). Perhaps the integrative
functions normally carried out by the brainstem in mature human beings can be
taken on by other neural structures in young children; although not the most vital
functions of heartbeat and respiration. Nevertheless, it may be the case that the
bodies of such patients ought to be considered as rationally informed until death
is declared using the traditional criterion.23
Finally, I wish to address the cases Shewmon uses of GBS patients and those who
suffer high cervical cord transection. Although GBS patients cease to exercise
their vital metabolic functions and thereby require artificial life support, they
retain the capacity to perform such functions due to the reversibility of their
condition; this is sufficient to assert that they remain informed by a rational soul.
Once the conditions associated with GBS are alleviated, a patient’s capacity to
perform vital metabolic functions will be actualizable once again.
Cases of patients with high cervical cord transection are more difficult to
contend with. Given that life-support machinery cannot become a proper part of
a human body’s substantial unity and that a body dependent on artificial support
for its vital metabolic functions cannot have integrative unity, it follows that the
body of a patient with high cervical cord transection is no longer informed by
their rational soul below the point of the transection. The patient remains
conscious and able to control their body above the level of the transection, which
indicates that they are alive and informed by their rational soul; but their soul now
informs only their head and those parts of their body which their brain can still
control.The rest of their body, though still structurally joined to them, is no longer
a proper part of them, because it no longer participates in their integrative organic
functioning.With the help of artificial life support, the rest of the body continues
to circulate oxygenated blood to the brain, which allows it to continue functioning
and the patient to remain conscious.This relationship, though, of bodytobrain is no
different than if the patient’s head were severed and connected to an external
mechanical pump; neither the pump nor the body are proper parts of the patient.
This conclusion is quite counterintuitive and Shewmon exploits this feature of it:
Is such a body an implacably disintegrating “collection of organs,” or a live
“organism as a whole” that happens to be severely disabled and dependent on
medical technology? If the former, then we would have the bizarre anomaly
of a “conscious corpse”; if the latter, then the [brain dead] body must equally
be an “organism as a whole” despite its severe disability and technological
dependence.
(1999, p. 320)
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Shewmon presents a false dilemma, because the above account does not entail the
“bizarre anomaly” of a “conscious corpse” for two reasons. First, it is not the body –
the so-called corpse – which is conscious, but the human being now composed of
only a head. Second, the part of the body that no longer composes the human
being is a “corpse” only in the technical sense of not being informed by a rational
soul; but this does not imply that there is no life in the body. The cells and
independent organ systems maintained with artificial assistance are each alive,
each informed by a vegetative soul; they just no longer constitute the human
being’s life – that is, their vegetative capacities are no longer those of the patient’s
rational soul. If a patient with high cervical cord transection regains functional
unity of their brainstem with the body connected to them – by having new
neural tissue or an artificial electrical conductor24 grafted onto the spinal cord to
eliminate the transection – then their rational soul would reinform the body owing
to their brainstem’s control over the body’s vital metabolic functions being
regained.
I thus offer the following conclusion regarding the proper Thomistic concept
and criterion of death.A human being’s death, which consists of their rational soul
separating from its body, occurs with the irreversible cessation of the body’s inte-
grative unity.The loss of somatic integrative unity is normally associated with the
cessation of whole-brain functioning, in agreement with Aquinas’s understanding
of how a rational soul moves the various parts of its body through a primary organ.
In cases of young children, however, who suffer the cessation of whole-brain
functioning, an alternative primary organ may assume some of the associated inte-
grative functions.Thus,while the concept of human death is univocally understood
as the loss of somatic integrative unity in all cases, the criteria for determining
when such loss has occurred may differ depending on what primary organ fulfills
the requisite integrative functioning. In most cases, the whole-brain criterion is
appropriate; but, in cases of young children, the circulatory/respiratory criterion
may be most appropriate for a proper diagnosis of death.
Conclusion
My aim in this chapter has been to develop a proper Thomistic understanding of
the end of a human being’s embodied existence – the possibility of postmortem
bodily existence aside (Eberl, 2000b).As with the beginning of human life, such an
understanding involves determining when a rational soul can be asserted as the
substantial form of a particular human body.The evidence supporting this assertion
is the body’s having at least active potentialities for vegetative, sensitive, and rational
operations. I conclude that, parallel to the conclusion arrived at in Chapter 2, the
presence of a primary organ through which integrative vegetative functioning is
exercised, and thus a human body’s organic/substantial unity is achieved, signals
that the body is informed by a rational soul. Evidence that the brain typically
functions as the integrative foundation for its body’s vegetative and sensitive
operations, as well as being correlated with rational operations, indicates that it is
a fetal, infant, and adult human body’s primary organ in most cases.Therefore, the
cessation of both a brain’s rationally correlated and biologically integrative
functioning indicates that a particular human body is no longer informed by a
rational soul. With the possible exception of young children, the whole-brain
criterion is sufficient for determining when a human being has died.
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Introduction
Three issues that dominate current bioethical discussions regarding the beginning
of human life – and which have polarized debate in scientific, social, and political
arenas – are abortion, human embryonic stem cell (ESC) research, and human
cloning. The first has been a significant point of public debate since the US
Supreme Court’s Roe v.Wade and Doe v. Bolton decisions in 1973.The latter two
issues garnered national and international attention beginning in 1998 and 1997,
respectively, and the recent reports of the President’s Council on Bioethics (PCB),
Human Cloning and Human Dignity (2002) and Monitoring Stem Cell Research
(2004), demonstrate that debate on these issues is not likely to end anytime in the
near future. Having argued for a Thomistic account of when a human being begins
to exist in Chapter 2 and elucidated Aquinas’s natural law ethic in Chapter 1, I will
now apply these metaphysical and moral positions to these issues of contemporary
societal concern.
Abortion and abortifacient contraceptives
The term “abortion” refers to the termination of a pregnancy, which results in a
human embryo or fetus’s death. Such a death is always intrinsically bad from a
Thomistic perspective, because, as I concluded in Chapter 2, the proper contem-
porary interpretation of Aquinas’s view of when a human being begins to exist is
when fertilization is complete. Hence, any abortion involves the death of a human
being – a person.1 In the following section regarding ESC research, I will articulate
this view more fully, as well as Aquinas’s understanding of the fundamental, intrinsic
value of a human being’s existence. Despite the inherent negativity of any abortion,
the question remains whether some forms of abortion may be morally permissible
or occur without anyone being morally responsible.We must, therefore, consider
four distinct types of abortion:
1 spontaneous abortion, also know as “miscarriage;”
2 directly intended abortion;
3 indirectly intended abortion;
4 abortion by means of an abortifacient contraceptive.
4 Issues at the beginning
of human life
Abortion, embryonic stem cell 
research, and cloning
A spontaneous abortion is the only form of abortion for which nobody may be
morally responsible. It is typically caused by some natural factor that is not under
anyone’s control which results in either an embryo failing to implant in the uterus
or a fetus dislodging from the uterus sometime after implantation. In some cases,
though, a spontaneous abortion may be caused, or its likelihood increased, by some
behavior on the mother’s part or an environmental condition for which certain
individuals, institutions, or societies may be responsible.All other forms of abortion
entail some measure of moral responsibility insofar as they involve human
intervention in the natural process of a pregnancy.
Directly intended abortion occurs when a woman or some other agent desires
to end a pregnancy and does so through either a surgical procedure or a chemical
inducement, such as RU-486. In most cases, it is a pregnant woman herself who
seeks an abortion with the surgical procedure performed by someone else; though,
in some cases, an abortion is caused by someone else who seeks to end a pregnancy
against the woman’s own wishes.The moral impermissibility of directly intended
abortion is clearly stated by Aquinas when he asserts,“It is by no means permissible
to kill the innocent” (ST, IIa-IIae.64.6; cf. Kavanaugh, 2001, pp. 125–32; Gómez-
Lobo, 2002, p. 85).Aquinas also refers specifically to causing an unborn fetus’s death
in the case of someone who strikes a pregnant woman:“If the death of either the
woman or the animated fetus results, he will not avoid the crime of homicide”
(ST, IIa-IIae.64.8.ad 2; cf. CDP,VII).
Indirectly intended abortion occurs when a medically necessary procedure must
be performed to save a pregnant woman’s life which has the foreseen side-effect of
bringing about the embryo or fetus’s death. Examples of such procedures include
removing a pregnant woman’s uterus with a malignant tumor, removing the
pathological section of a fallopian tube in the case of an ectopic pregnancy where
the embryo has implanted in the tube, or a pregnant woman receiving radiation
and chemotherapy to remit a malignant cancer.These procedures are morally per-
missible insofar as they are justified by the Principle of Double Effect (PDE),which
I argued in Chapter 1 that Aquinas holds. PDE states that an action taken to
produce some consequence, that is “good” per se, may be permissible even if it pro-
duces a foreseen negative consequence, that is per se morally impermissible, pro-
vided that the relative value of the negative consequence does not outweigh that
of the good consequence, and the production of the negative consequence is not
directly intended as an end or the means by which the good consequence is brought
about. The above procedures all count as indirectly intended abortions and are
thereby justified by appeal to PDE (Irving, 2000; Gómez-Lobo, 2002, p. 95).The
directly intended end of each action is a “good” per se – namely, saving the mother’s
life.The foreseen abortion is not a directly intended end – that is, continuation of
the pregnancy would be desired in the absence of the maleficent conditions.
Abortion is not the means by which the mother’s life is saved; if in the first case,
for example, the fetus had developed to the point of extra-uterine viability and
could survive on its own, its survival once the cancerous uterus was removed
would have no effect on whether the mother’s life was saved. Finally, the embryo
or fetus’s death does not outweigh the good of the mother’s life being saved insofar
as all human beings have an equal fundamental value.
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Other forms of abortion, however, done for various apparently good intentions,
fail to be justified by PDE. Perhaps a woman seeks an abortion to avoid the severe
economic, emotional, or physical burdens that may befall her because of her low
socio-economic status, lack of access to adequate health care, or absence of paternal
and familial support.While avoiding such burdens, especially if the circumstances
of her life make them particularly acute, is certainly a good worth pursuing,
utilizing abortion as a means to achieve this good does not meet the conditions of
PDE.Alfonso Gómez-Lobo notes that, in such cases:
The death of the fetus is the means to the attainment of the good end, not a
mere accidental consequence. It is intended because it is the main immediate
goal of the procedure or, if not, it surely is the standard consequence thereof.
Finally, if anything less that the protection of life is the intended good effect,
there will be a significant disproportion between the two consequences of
the action.
(2002, pp. 95–6)
Since the pregnancy’s termination and the embryo or fetus’s consequent death is
directly intended as the means whereby the woman avoids the anticipated burdens,
and the good effect of avoiding those burdens is disproportionate to a human
being’s death, an abortion sought for this reason is not justifiable by appeal to PDE.
What about abortion in cases of rape? In such cases, an abortion may occur in
one of two ways: (1) a surgical abortion procedure that occurs sometime after
implantation when the victim knows she is pregnant; (2) use of an “emergency
contraceptive pill” (ECP) that prevents implantation by altering the uterus’s lining
such that the embryo will not implant. (1) is judged morally impermissible for the
same reasons given above with respect to a woman’s desire to avoid the anticipated
burdens of pregnancy, birth, and child-rearing. Although the emotional burdens
associated with carrying and potentially raising – if adoption is not utilized – the
child of her rapist are certainly the most severe any woman may ever have to expe-
rience, the good of avoiding such burdens does not outweigh the fundamental
goodness of a human being’s life and the abortion would be directly intended in
this case.
(2) presents a quite different sort of case, however. ECPs, as mentioned above,
may function as an “abortifacient” by preventing an embryo’s implantation in the
uterus.The use of any postcoital drug or contraceptive device that functions as an
abortifacient, such as an IUD, would be morally impermissible insofar as it directly
causes an embryo to abort (Ford, 2002, p. 92).An ECP, though, may also function
as simply a “contraceptive” by preventing ovulation or fertilization,2 or not
function at all given the uncertainty that a rape victim was in her fertile period at
the time of the attack (Ford, 2002, p. 94).
Norman Ford analyzes statistical data regarding the frequency of pregnancies
after rape and the various potential causes of some of those pregnancies failing
naturally, as opposed to being caused by ECPs. He concludes,“Conservatively, one
could assume that the risk to the life of an embryo [by utilizing an ECP after rape]
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would be about 8 percent or less” (Ford, 2002, p. 94). In the absence of confirmatory
evidence that fertilization has occurred in a woman who has been raped, the “risk”
that using an ECP would cause an embryo to abort is sufficiently low to justify its
use in the case of rape by appeal to PDE:3
It would seem to be ethically permissible to administer ECPs as soon as
possible within 72 hours of rape to prevent conception if, after inquiry, there
were no reasonable grounds to believe an embryo had been already conceived.
In this case a risk of loss of an embryo due to the medication would not
be more than about 8 percent, not disproportionate or significant after
rape . . .But an ECP could not ethically be taken if a test showed conception
had, or most likely had, occurred.
(Ford, 2002, pp. 94–5; cf. Finnis, 1999, p. 17)
One cannot directly intend that an embryo be aborted if chances are that there is
no embryo present in the first place.What is directly intended, by administering an
ECP, is the prevention of ovulation or fertilization, which is a morally acceptable
good worth pursuing in comparison to the overwhelming emotional burden –
along with other potential burdens – a rape victim who finds herself pregnant may
face. If, however, there is certainty or a high probability that an embryo already
exists, then the use of an ECP becomes an abortifacient and the abortion is directly
intended as the means by which the rape victim avoids the anticipated burdens
resulting from her pregnancy.
Any form of directly intended abortion is morally impermissible from a
Thomistic perspective. Nevertheless, bringing about an embryo or fetus’s death as
the result of a necessary life-saving medical procedure may be permissible if the
conditions of PDE are satisfied. An embryo or fetus’s death may also be risked –
given a sufficiently low probability of its existence – in order for a rape victim to
avoid the burdens associated with pregnancy in such a tragic situation. I will now
consider two more recently debated issues that involve the death of human embryos
or fetuses, among other effects that will be discussed: ESC research and cloning.
Human embryonic stem cell research
The first successful derivation of stem cells from human embryos was reported by
James Thomson and his colleagues in 1998 (Thomson et al., 1998). ESCs are self-
renewable and “pluripotent,” which means they can generate various types of cells,
tissues, and perhaps even organs. ESC research thus has the potential to produce
significant therapeutic benefits insofar as stem cells could be cultured and devel-
oped into such things as blood cells, cardiac muscle, bone marrow to treat
leukemia, and insulin-producing pancreatic cells to treat diabetes. Stem cells may
even be developed into neural tissue to treat victims of Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, or
stroke (Kondziolka et al., 2000).
The moral controversy surrounding ESC research concerns the process
by which ESCs are derived. ESCs are found in the inner cell mass (ICM) of a
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blastocyst – the ball of cells that constitutes a human embryo prior to its
implantation in the uterus – and must be “isolated” by removing the entire ICM
and placing it in an appropriate culture medium.4 Without the ICM, the remain-
ing components of the blastocyst cannot develop into a fetus or child. Deriving
ESCs from the ICM thus disrupts the biological integrity of the blastocyst and the
embryo becomes nonviable; it is no longer capable of developing into a fetus.
Hence, those who consider a human being to exist from the zygote stage onward
argue that ESC research is morally impermissible, for it involves the destruction of
a human being who has a strong right to life. Those who argue in favor of
continued ESC research contend either that a blastocyst is not a human being, but
merely a ball of cells with human DNA, or that a blastocyst may be a human being,
but its right to life is outweighed by the enormous therapeutic benefits which may
result from ESC research. The current policy in the United States permits ESC
research and provides federal funding for research conducted on ESC lines5 cre-
ated before August 9, 2001. On that date, President George W. Bush announced
that no further research on human embryos for the purpose of deriving ESCs will
be supported by federal funding (Bush, 2001). A revision of this federal policy is
under debate in the US Congress as of this writing.
In order to determine whether ESC research is morally permissible, several
questions must be answered. First, what is the metaphysical status of a human
blastocyst? Is it merely a ball of cells with human DNA or is it a human being?
Second, what is the moral status of a human blastocyst? Does it have a strong – or
perhaps inviolable – right to life, or can it be destroyed for the sake of the thera-
peutic benefits that might result from ESC research? Third, if ESC research is
morally impermissible, what moral limits does this impose on reaping the benefits
of such research, given that the research will no doubt continue despite any moral
sanctions? Finally, what morally permissible alternatives might there be to ESC
research that have the potential to provide similar therapeutic benefits?
Metaphysical status of a human blastocyst
A key first step in addressing the moral permissibility of ESC research is to establish
the metaphysical nature of a human blastocyst. Is it a human being or is it merely
a ball of cells with human DNA? Arguments for the latter position consist of claims
that a blastocyst is a “potential” human being in this respect: although it is not yet
a human being, if placed in a uterus and not disturbed, it will develop into such a
being. Joseph Donceel, Robert Pasnau, and Norman Ford defend this view from a
Thomistic perspective.6 Prior to uterine implantation or the formation of the
cerebral cortex, according to these authors, a human being does not exist because
the embryo is not informed by a rational soul. By contrast, Benedict Ashley’s
account entails that a human blastocyst is a human being because it requires only
a supportive uterine environment to develop into an actually thinking rational
being. It is already informed by a rational soul that is the metaphysical blueprint
for such development. I concluded in Chapter 2 that a human zygote is a rationally
ensouled human being and that embryonic development is an extended process of
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actualizing that human being’s vegetative, sensitive, and rational capacities.
Therefore, the destruction of a human blastocyst that occurs in the derivation of
ESCs constitutes a human being’s death.
Aside from arguments put forth from a Thomistic perspective, Ronald Green
argues against the claim that a human being begins to exist as a zygote by pointing
out that the fertilization process from which a zygote results is precisely that – a
process. It is therefore quite difficult, and probably arbitrary, to pinpoint exactly
when rational ensoulment occurs and a human being begins to exist (Green, 2002,
p. 21). Robert Orr counters that Green overlooks the relevance of the fact that the
process is occurring in the first place and asserts that “the beginning of life is at the
beginning of the beginning of the process, not the end of the beginning” (Orr,
2002, p. 58). A remaining question, however, is what event the “beginning of the
beginning of the process” denotes. Perhaps we should not be concerned with
identifying the event it denotes, since the concern here is not with the process of
fertilization, but with the embryonic development that follows. Even so, there is a
good candidate for the event that signals the end of two substances – sperm and
ovum – and the beginning of a new substance – the zygote. This event is
“syngamy,” which is when the twenty-three maternal chromosomes line up with
the twenty-three paternal chromosomes. Green admits:
In biological terms, if we think of a new individual as coming into being with
the appearance of a cell having a new “diploid” genome, a full complement of
forty-six chromosomes, syngamy would seem to be a good candidate for a
starting point.This is the moment that the “zygote” is said to come into being.
(2002, p. 21)
Though Green does not challenge the idea that syngamy constitutes the
“moment” at which a zygote comes into being, he raises further challenges to the
claim that a zygote or early embryo is an individual human being. He does so by
appealing to Ford’s argument based on twinning and cellular totipotentiality.
Having addressed Ford’s argument in Chapter 2, I contend that there is nothing
implausible about taking syngamy as the event which signals the “beginning of the
beginning” of the process of a human being’s life.
Once ESCs are derived from the ICM, however, we are no longer dealing with
an ensouled human being. While ESCs have the potential to give rise to many
different cells, tissues, and even organs, they cannot develop into a whole organism:
It should be clear, however, that ES cells are not themselves embryos because,
although they are pluripotent in that they could develop into any cell or tissue
of the body, they are not totipotent. They are not capable of forming a new
individual, as a fertilized egg or single cell taken from a four cell embryo might
if cultured in vitro and placed in a uterus. Culture of ES cells followed by
placement in the uterus would not result in the implantation of an embryo
and eventual birth of a child.
(Robertson, 1999, p. 111;
cf. Maienschein, 2002, p. 18)
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Ted Peters challenges this view by noting that a human ESC “contains all the same
genetic material as the early embryo from which it is derived. It lacks only the
environmental structure (trophoblast, etc.) to permit it to become an embryo”
(Peters, 2001, p. 132). Peters raises this challenge in an effort to show that the
potentiality of a human ESC is no different from that of any cell of an adult human
body,which requires only a bit of genetic reprogramming and a suitable environment
to develop into a “cloned” human being.This comparison calls into question the
importance of an early embryo’s potentiality with respect to its status as a human
being, if such potentiality is had by not only the ESCs derived from it, but also any
cell of a developed human body.
Peters fails to note, though, that there are two relevant types of potentiality –
“active” and “passive,” as defined in Chapter 2 – and an early embryo’s potentiality to
become an actualized human being differs in type from the potentiality an ESC or a
somatic cell has to become such a being. An early embryo needs only a suitable
uterine environment to continue its development and has within itself everything
needed to form the tissues and organs required for the vegetative, sensitive,and rational
operations definitive of a human being.A somatic cell from which a human being may
be cloned does not have this sort of potentiality. In the cloning process a somatic cell’s
biological integrity is violated in that its nucleus is removed and implanted in an
enucleated ovum, which is then induced to divide and thereby reproduce partheno-
genetically. An ESC’s potentiality is more like that of a somatic cell than an early
embryo. Peters attempts to equate an ESC with an early embryo by stating that the
former requires simply “environmental” factors, such as a trophoblast – the layer of
cells that attaches the blastocyst to the uterus and out of which is formed the placenta
and umbilical cord – to develop into a human being.This attempt fails because a tro-
phoblast is not an “environmental” factor, but a biological component of an embryo
in the blastocyst stage, one that the embryo requires for its continued development;
the fallopian tube and uterus are the relevant environmental factors. Hence, an ESC,
lacking a trophoblast and the other biological components required for its develop-
ment into a human being – that is, lacking those things that are an early embryo’s
proper parts – does not have the inherent active potentiality that an early embryo has.
Its potentiality is merely passive insofar as the requisite parts must be added to it.7
Thus, there clearly is nothing morally wrong – at least, there clearly is no
mistreatment of a human being – involved in the manipulation of ESCs to grow
cells, tissues, and organs with human DNA.The case is not so clear, however, when
it comes to destroying early human embryos to derive ESCs from the ICM.
Whether this practice is morally permissible is the issue on which the morality of
ESC research hinges.
Moral status of an early human embryo and the 
ethics of ESC research
Embryos used for ESC research are typically surplus embryos which were produced
as part of an in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedure, but then, rather than being
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implanted, were cryogenically preserved – “frozen.” Embryos can also be created
directly for the purpose of stem cell derivation through IVF or cloning. In addi-
tion to the ICM of early embryos, pluripotent stem cells may be derived from the
germ cells of aborted fetuses (Shamblott et al., 1998). Consequently, fetal germ cell
(FGC) research holds similar therapeutic promise as ESC research, yet it does not
require the destruction of an embryo in the process of stem cell derivation. In
this section, I will address the moral status of embryos produced through IVF
and the permissibility of using such embryos for ESC research. I will also consider
the permissibility of deriving stem cells from the FGCs of aborted fetuses. Later,
I will consider the moral permissibility of creating embryos directly for ESC
research through cloning.
In a typical IVF procedure, anywhere between five and twelve zygotes are
created and cultured to divide up to the four- or eight-cell stage, at which point
some of them are transferred into a woman’s uterus in the hope that at least one or
two will implant and develop into a viable fetus.The remaining embryos are either
immediately destroyed or, in most cases, cryogenically preserved for possible future
use if the initial procedure fails to result in a pregnancy. If the initial procedure is
successful, though, and the parents no longer require the frozen embryos and do
not wish to donate them to another infertile couple, they will eventually be
destroyed.
Another option for parents who have used IVF is to donate their surplus frozen
embryos for ESC research.There are two arguments for the moral permissibility of
using surplus embryos from IVF for research that will involve their destruction.
First, such embryos are not human beings and thus have no right to life that is
violated by their destruction. Second, although they may be human beings, such
embryos are destined for destruction anyway and it is preferable that they be
destroyed in a way that may yield significant therapeutic benefits.
Moral status of surplus embryos from IVF
I have argued earlier and in Chapter 2 that an early human embryo is a human
being and that it remains one even if it is frozen, or in a petri dish, or in a woman’s
reproductive tract. Peter Singer and Karen Dawson believe otherwise. They
contend that, if one argues for the personhood of an early embryo based on its
potentiality to develop into a fully actualized human being, such potentiality is not
present in a laboratory-produced, unimplanted embryo as robustly as it is in an
embryo already present in woman’s natural reproductive environment (Singer and
Dawson, 1990).Their contention is based on the lower probability that an embryo
existing in a laboratory or in a frozen state will develop into a human being, and
the fact that human intervention is required to actualize such an embryo’s poten-
tiality – just as human intervention is required to bring sperm and ovum together
to form a zygote. Singer and Dawson conclude that a laboratory-produced, unim-
planted embryo’s potentiality for personhood is a passive potentiality akin to that
of a sperm or ovum, rather than the active potentiality of an embryo already in an
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environment conducive to its natural development:
Whereas the embryo inside the female body has some definite chance of
developing into a child unless a deliberate human act interrupts its growth, the
egg and sperm can only develop into a child if there is a deliberate human act.
In this respect the embryo in the laboratory is like the egg and sperm, and not
like the embryo in the human body.
(1990, p. 87)
Singer and Dawson mischaracterize the potentiality of a laboratory-produced,
unimplanted embryo in two ways. First, the probability that a potentiality will
be actualized is irrelevant to whether or not the potentiality is present in a
substance. As long as the substance has within itself everything required for it to
attain the actualized state, aside from a supportive environment, then it does
not matter if it is deprived of the requisite environment for its development.There
is nothing internally distinct between an embryo in a fallopian tube traveling
toward the uterus for implantation, an embryo in a petri dish waiting to be trans-
ferred to a uterus for implantation, and a frozen embryo waiting to be thawed and
then transferred for uterine implantation. The only difference is the lack of a
supportive environment in the latter two cases, but this difference has no bearing on
whether the embryo has an intrinsic potentiality to develop into a fully actualized
human being.
Second, the need for human intervention to actualize a laboratory-produced,
unimplanted embryo’s intrinsic potentiality also makes no difference to whether
the embryo has a natural tendency to develop, given a supportive environment,
into an actually living, sentient, and rational being.The difference in potentiality
between sperm and ovum, and an embryo in a fallopian tube, lies not in the fact
that the former require human intervention whereas the latter does not, but in the
fact that the former must cease to exist by combining together to form a new
substance. No substantial change results from the human act of transferring an
embryo from a petri dish to a woman’s reproductive tract.There is no metaphysical
change in the nature of the embryo itself, as there is in the case of sperm and ovum
forming a zygote.
It is not sufficient, however, simply to establish that an early embryo which is the
product of IVF is a human being.An argument for its strong moral status must also
be provided. Typically, when one claims that something is a human being or a
person, it is assumed that it has a “right to life” or that it cannot be treated as a
mere means, rather than as an end in itself (Kant, 1785, ch. 2). Aquinas, though,
never defines a human being’s moral status in terms of its having a “right” or in
terms of its being “an end in itself.” Rather, he defines a thing’s moral status solely
in terms of its intrinsic goodness.Whatever “rights” it may have are derived from its
inherent value and the natural law mandate to pursue the good in all its forms
while avoiding evil.Thus, for example, a nonhuman animal has a measure of good-
ness insofar as it is a living, sentient being.The value of its nature as such ought to
be respected unless it would interfere with respecting the value of a being with a
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greater degree of intrinsic goodness, such as a living, sentient, and rational being.
Aquinas’s natural law ethic thus recommends – although Aquinas himself does not
explicitly endorse – some form of “animal rights” in cases where respect for ani-
mals’ intrinsic goodness does not detract from the pursuit of essential human goods
(Barad, 1988).8
A human being’s intrinsic goodness is based on their nature as a living, sentient,
and rational substance – a person. Rationality, in Aquinas’s view, is the highest
capacity found among natural substances because it enables a person to come to
know universal conceptual truths and to determine their own actions (ST, Ia.29.1).
Hence, he says, the term “person” is attributed to rational beings insofar as they
have a special dignity – that is, a particularly high degree of intrinsic goodness
among natural substances (ST, Ia.29.3).
Peters contends, against Aquinas, that “dignity is a relational concept that begins
first with the external conferral of dignity before it is claimed by a person as some-
thing intrinsic” (Peters, 2001, p. 128).This contention would perhaps be true if a
thing’s goodness were solely a matter of convention, or existed only in view of its
usefulness or desirability for those rational beings with the capacity to confer dig-
nity upon it. For Aquinas, though, the goodness which makes something desirable
in the first place must be found in the thing itself.There would be no starting point
for, say,my desire to own a bird unless there was something intrinsically good about
the bird. One could counter that whatever feature of the bird that makes ownership
of it desirable, that feature makes such ownership desirable only to me – subjectively –
and not desirable in itself – objectively.The denial of any objective intrinsic good-
ness in the bird requires the denial that the bird has a place in the natural order and
that its existence, with all the capacities appropriate to its avian nature, is beneficial
to the world whether or not any rational being considers it desirable. Space does
not permit me to argue here against such a denial, but I raise this point to show
what Peters is committed to if he holds that human beings or other things do not
have intrinsic dignity in some measure.
From a Thomistic perspective, an early embryo is a human being and thereby
has an intrinsic dignity – an inherent goodness that must be promoted. Life,
Aquinas asserts in formulating his natural law ethic, is a fundamental good for
human beings (ST, Ia-IIae.94.2; Finnis, 1980, p. 86). Without life, none of a
human being’s other inherently valuable capacities – including rationality – can be
actualized in the service of contributing to the overall goodness of the natural
world in which human beings exist and flourish.To act against the existence and
flourishing of a human being – in this case, an early embryo – constitutes a morally
impermissible act that must be avoided due to the natural law mandate to promote
life as a fundamental good.
Some supporters of ESC research admit that an early embryo is a human being
whose life is intrinsically valuable to a certain degree, but argue that its value is not
significantly strong and ought to be weighed against the value of reduced human
suffering from diseases such as leukemia,Alzheimer’s, and Parkinson’s, the remedy of
which is the promise of ESC research. Karen Lebacqz and the members of the
Geron Ethics Advisory Board9 maintain that an early human embryo’s intrinsic
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goodness should be respected in ESC research “by ensuring that it is used with care
only in research that incorporates substantive values such as reduction of human
suffering” (Geron Ethics Advisory Board, 1999, p. 33).This conclusion,which results
from weighing the value of an early embryo against the value of reduced human
suffering, conflicts with the implications of Aquinas’s method of moral reasoning.
Aquinas holds that certain goods may be violated for the sake of a greater good;
for example, the goodness of plant life may be violated insofar as it is necessary to
promote the greater good of animal and human life (ST, IIa-IIae.64.1). Human life,
in fact, may not be an absolutely inviolable good if what is at stake is the promotion
of other human lives or other greater goods.As Gómez-Lobo notes in interpreting
Aquinas’s natural law ethic:
At times it may seem as if the grounding good – life itself – should always take
precedence over everything else. Indeed, it is so basic that in most cases it is
clear that aiming at other goods at the cost of life would be irrational.Yet there
may be circumstances in which not even life should be preserved at all costs.
It may be rational to give up one’s life (which is not the same as taking one’s
life) so that others may live.
(2002, p. 40)
Aquinas recognizes, for example, that it is virtuous for a human being to sacrifice
their life for the greater good of bearing witness to the Christian faith (ST,
IIa-IIae.124.3–4). He even asserts that it may be lawful for the state to take the life
of a wrongdoer who may be a source of corruption, and thus the wrongdoer’s life
is sacrificed for the sake of the common good (ST, IIa-IIae.64.3–4).
Nevertheless, when Aquinas turns to the question whether it is lawful to kill an
innocent human being, he unequivocally asserts that such killing is never permissible
(ST, IIa-IIae.64.6). It is interesting to note that the primary reason Aquinas gives
for this prohibition is that an innocent human being’s life “preserves and advances”
the common good insofar as each human being is unavoidably a member of a
community and one’s existence is inherently beneficial to one’s community so long
as it does not become a corrupting influence.The Geron Ethics Advisory Board
holds that it may be “respectful” to an early embryo to sacrifice its life for the sake
of the common good because ESC research has the potential to reduce human suf-
fering. Aquinas, though, would counter that the embryo’s very existence already
contributes to the common good even if its contribution is not readily apparent or
must await the embryo’s further development. Destroying an embryo for ESC
research thus fails to promote not only the goodness of the embryo’s life, but also
the goodness of the community to which the embryo unavoidably belongs and for
which it may provide significant material contributions once it develops to the
point where it may actualize its rational capacity.
Using embryos that are destined for destruction
Many early embryos produced by IVF are not allowed to develop to the point
where they may make a material contribution to the common good. They are
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destined for destruction because they are no longer needed for future IVF
attempts. Although some people have attempted to adopt frozen surplus embryos
to give the embryos at least a chance of implantation and development into fully
actualized human beings, this approach is legally complicated and has not caught
on with any fervor (Watt, 1999, 2001; Davidson, 2001; Iozzio, 2002; Berkman,
2003;Tonti-Filippini, 2003).This raises the question whether it would be wrong
to substitute, for the usual manner in which these embryos are destroyed, one that
may produce significant therapeutic benefits; instead of the embryos’ lives simply
being “wasted” in a process that destroys them but yields no further good.
President Clinton’s National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) concluded
that the destruction of surplus embryos from IVF for ESC research would not be
wrong since they “have no prospect for survival even if they are not used in
deriving ES cells.” They have no such prospect because their destruction is
accepted as part of the routine course of IVF:“If embryo destruction is permissi-
ble, then it certainly should be permissible to destroy them in a way that would
generate stem cells for bona fide research” (NBAC, 1999, p. 53). Françoise Baylis
points out, however, that this way of arguing for the permissibility of ESC research
presumes the moral permissibility of destroying surplus embryos from IVF (Baylis,
2001, pp. 54–5). Although the destruction of surplus embryos is legally accepted
and widely practiced in the United States and in other nations, its moral status
remains controversial and hence furnishes poor support for the claim that because
surplus embryos are destined for destruction anyway, it is morally permissible to
destroy them for ESC research. Since a human embryo’s destruction simpliciter is
morally impermissible according to Aquinas’s natural law ethic, neither the
destruction of surplus embryos from IVF nor their destruction for the sake of ESC
research is justifiable.
Fetal germ cells as a source for deriving stem cells
Surplus embryos produced by IVF are not the only source of pluripotent stem
cells.They may also be derived from FGCs of human fetuses that have already been
destroyed through procured abortion.As shown earlier, directly intended abortion
is clearly morally impermissible according to Aquinas. The question here is
whether, given that abortion is morally impermissible, one may use aborted fetal
tissue for the purpose of obtaining FGCs in order to derive stem cells. On the one
hand, there appears to be no moral quandary, because the abortion and the obtaining
of FGCs are two separate actions and the latter is morally neutral. As long as
abortion is not performed for the intended purpose of obtaining FGCs for research,
it seems that obtaining FGCs from aborted fetal tissue is morally permissible inso-
far as it is disconnected from the act of abortion. On the other hand, obtaining and
using FGCs from aborted fetal tissue to derive stem cells may involve “complicity”
in the immoral act of abortion.This issue of complicity with an immoral action
also bears on whether it is permissible either to benefit from ESC research if the
promised potential for significant therapeutic breakthroughs is realized, or to
conduct research using ESC lines derived and cultured by someone else.
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John Robertson argues that there is no moral complicity in any of these cases,
given certain conditions:
If the original immoral derivation of ES cells occurred with the intent to make
later ES cell research possible, then it is reasonable to view the later researchers
as complicit in the original derivation, on the causative theory that the deriva-
tion would not have occurred if the later use had not been contemplated.
Complicity based on causation, however, would not exist if the original
immoral derivation of cells would have occurred regardless of the activities of
any particular later researcher. Once the ES cells have been derived for partic-
ular kinds of research or for particular researchers, they exist and could be used
by other researchers. Under a causative theory of complicity, making the ES
cells available to later researchers would not make those researchers complicit
in the immoral derivation of the ES cells if their research plans or actions had
no effect on whether the original immoral derivation occurred.
(1999, p. 113)
Under a causative theory of complicity, neither derivation nor later use of ES
cells from abortions that would otherwise have occurred would make one
morally complicit in the abortion itself because there is no reasonable basis for
thinking that donation of tissue for research after the decision to abort has
been made would have caused or brought about the abortion.Thus persons
who think that induced abortion is immoral could support the use of fetal
tissue or ES cells derived from abortions as long as the derivation or later
research or therapy had no reasonable prospect of bringing about abortion,
just as they could support organ donation from homicide victims without
approving of the homicide that made the organs available.To do so, however,
such individuals would have to be convinced that research uses of fetal tissue
from abortions otherwise occurring would not bring about future abortions
or in some way make abortion appear to be a positive, praiseworthy act.
(1999, p. 114)
Moral complicity, Robertson contends, involves having a “causative” role in the
occurrence of some action. So long as one’s research using ESCs derived from
embryos which are destroyed in the process – or one’s derivation and use of stem
cells derived from aborted fetal tissue – does not in any way cause either the
embryo’s destruction or the abortion when it would not have occurred otherwise,
then that act is justified. One would also be justified in being the beneficiary of
such research (Cataldo, 2002; Green, 2002).
The question remains, however, whether one’s use or benefit from stem cell
research, though not causally related to the past destruction of an embryo or fetus,
may encourage future embryonic or fetal destruction.Albert Moraczewski asks:
Would the destroyer of the embryo benefit financially – directly or indirectly –
from the use of stem cell lines? Most likely. Would not such persons be
encouraged to destroy additional embryos for the sake of obtaining stem cells,
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especially since there is already a call from more stem cell lines in order to have
a wider genetic representation? And if it turns out that the use of stem cells
actually proves to be clinically successful in the treatment of one or more
serious medical conditions, the demand for additional stem cells will increase
enormously.Thus the use of stem cell lines obtained from the destruction of
human embryos rewards the original evil doer and encourages him to repeat
performance. Is this not scandal in its strict sense?
(2002, p. 45)
James Bopp, Jr raises the concern that any research utilizing fetal products, such as
tissue for transplantation or FGCs,“will add one more reason for women to have
an abortion” (Bopp, 1994, p. 72).
The issue, as Moraczewski notes, has to do with the concept of “scandal,” which
Aquinas defines as “something said or done less rightly, causing another’s [moral]
ruin” and occurs when “someone by his admonition, inducement, or example leads
another to sin” (ST, IIa-IIae.43.1). Aquinas further specifies two types of scandal:
active and passive.Active scandal occurs
when someone by his evil word or deed intends to induce another to sin; or,
if he does not so intend, when the deed is such that by its nature it is an
inducement to sin; for example, someone publicly commits a sin or something
that has a resemblance to sin.
(ST, IIa-IIae.43.1.ad 4)
Passive scandal, on the other hand, occurs “when it is outside of the agent’s
intention, and outside the nature of the action, and yet someone who is disposed
toward evil is induced to sin” (ST, IIa-IIae.43.1.ad 4).Aquinas contends that active
scandal is always an occasion of moral wrongdoing on the part of the agent who
scandalizes another, while passive scandal may not entail moral wrongdoing on the
part of the agent so long as the word or action which led to the other’s moral
downfall was good in itself (ST, IIa-IIae.43.2). Peter Cataldo correctly notes that
scandal, thus understood, is irrelevant to the question of complicity with an
immoral action that has already occurred (Cataldo, 2002, p. 36). Nevertheless, the
concern remains that using or benefiting from the derivation of stem cells from
early embryos or FGCs of aborted fetuses may “scandalize” others in the future to
destroy more embryos or abort more fetuses for research purposes.
Consider the case of someone with Parkinson’s disease who may benefit from
therapeutic treatment developed from ESCs that have been cultured to give rise to
neural tissue. Does this person’s willingness to benefit from the treatment for their
disease lead in some fashion to the moral downfall of a researcher who will destroy
more embryos in the future to derive ESCs? In order to count as a case of active
scandal, the person would have to either (1) do an evil action with the intention
of leading the researcher to destroy more embryos, or (2) do an action which is of
such a nature that it leads the researcher to destroy more embryos – even if they
did not intend to induce the researcher to perform such an act – by (3) publicly
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doing an evil action or by (4) giving the appearance of doing an evil action that
leads the researcher to destroy more embryos. If the person who suffers from
Parkinson’s directly supports embryo destruction for ESC research or otherwise
publicly expresses their desire to benefit from the research for the intended
purpose of inciting the progress of such research and the further destruction of
embryos, then they may be involved in active scandal under condition (1).This is
because the moral wrongness of embryo destruction has been independently estab-
lished above and it is morally wrong in itself to encourage another to do an
immoral action. If, however, they have not explicitly supported or called for further
ESC research in this manner, but commit only the act of willfully receiving therapy
that results from ESC research, it is not at all apparent that they are guilty of active
scandal. It is not apparent because condition (2) – in the form of either (3) or (4) –
requires that the agent commit an evil action or give the appearance of doing so.
Receiving therapy which is beneficial to one’s health does not in itself constitute
an evil action. To contend otherwise would beg the question whether receiving
such therapy is a case of active scandal.
If any scandal occurs merely because someone willfully receives therapy that
results from ESC research, that scandal can at most be passive scandal. It will
constitute such scandal if the researcher whose intentional act is to derive ESCs by
destroying an embryo is already disposed toward doing this action whether or not
any particular person willfully elects to receive the resulting benefits. The same
conclusion applies to a researcher, other than the one who destroys the embryo,
who uses a cultured ESC line to develop beneficial therapies.This is so unless the
researcher explicitly requests further ESCs to assist their research and thereby
intentionally encourages another to destroy more embryos.The case is similar with
the use of FGCs from aborted fetuses to derive stem cells and develop beneficial
therapies. So long as a researcher who utilizes FGCs or derived stem cell lines, or
a person who willingly receives whatever therapy may be developed, does not
directly intentionally encourage further abortions for the sake of providing more
FGCs, they are morally justified in their own action.
It could be objected that there may be some researchers who are not already
disposed to destroying embryos to derive ESCs, but would become so disposed,
and very likely engage in acts of embryo destruction, given further demand for
ESCs. Thus, since the researcher who uses derived ESCs or the sufferer of
Parkinson’s who reaps the benefits of such research contributes to that demand,
they are both contributing to the likely increase of an immoral practice.Would this
not constitute some form of scandal?10 This objection is consequentialist in nature,
which is inimical to Aquinas’s natural law ethic. Whereas Aquinas is concerned
with the nature of a moral act, consequentialists are concerned only with what
results from a moral act. Furthermore, consequentialism does not take into account
whether the positive or negative effects of one’s act involve the act of another
moral agent.11 Nonconsequentialist theories, such as Aquinas’s, do not require that
one moral agent be responsible for the acts of another moral agent, except in
special circumstances such as those which define scandal.
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Hence, merely increasing the demand for ESCs may constitute morally illicit
scandal from a consequentialist perspective, if ESC derivation is itself judged to be
morally illicit from the same perspective, because those whose acts result in the
increased demand are to some degree responsible for what others do to meet that
demand. For Aquinas, however, a prerequisite for scandal is an agent’s performance
of an inherently “evil” act, which thereby influences another agent to perform their
own evil act. Benefiting from medical research or using derived ESCs to develop
beneficial therapies are not inherently evil acts. Furthermore, while it could be
argued that generating a demand for ESCs “by its nature is an inducement to sin,”
no particular person is the target of such inducement and the demand for ESCs
may go unmet. It is up to the conscience of each person who has the resources to
engage in ESC derivation to weigh the demand for ESCs against the moral illicitness
of embryo destruction.That someone elects to respond to the demand and engage
in acts of embryo destruction is not the responsibility of those who generated the
demand indirectly through their development or use of therapies that result from
ESC derivation; although the beneficiary’s moral responsibility would be different
if they explicitly lobbied for further ESC derivation.
Consider the following analogy. As Robertson notes, benefiting from organs
donated by homicide victims does not entail approval of the act of homicide which
made the organs available for transplant. But a physician who is not typically
inclined toward homicide may judge that it would help meet the extensive
demand for vital organs for transplant if they began secretively euthanizing home-
less patients whose deaths would be of no negative consequence to society, or so
they convinces themselves.12 Does it constitute scandal for those who benefit from
organ transplant to have created the demand whereby this physician was motivated
to begin killing innocent people to meet it? A potentially disanalogous feature is
that increasing the supply of vital organs for transplant can be accomplished in
other, morally licit, ways, such as participating in a public awareness campaign or
better counseling of families of deceased or dying patients about organ donation.
Thus, the burden of moral responsibility for the homeless persons’ deaths falls
squarely on the shoulders of the physician who neglected to pursue these alterna-
tive means to meet this demand. As will be shown in the next section, however,
there are morally licit alternatives to ESC research to meet the demand for
beneficial therapies for diseases such as Parkinson’s. Hence, the burden of moral
responsibility for the act of embryo destruction to derive ESCs likewise falls
squarely on the shoulders of the researcher who neglects to pursue these alternative
avenues of research.
Alternatives to ESC research
Given the conclusion that the intentional destruction of human embryos for ESC
research is intrinsically morally wrong, it is important to point out some of the
viable alternatives to ESC research that may produce similar therapeutic benefits.
The first is research on adult stem cells (ASCs). ASCs function similarly to ESCs,
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but are not as pluripotent; they can generate more cells of the same kind or, with
coaxing, produce one or two other types of cells.ASCs have been identified in the
pancreas, in bone marrow, and even in the brain, as well as in many other parts of
the body. Hence, although ASCs are more limited than ESCs, they can neverthe-
less be potentially cultured to produce some of the key cells and tissues sought by
proponents of ESC research: insulin-producing pancreatic cells to treat diabetes,
bone marrow to treat leukemia, and even neural tissue (Juengst and Fossel, 2000;
Ahmann, 2001, p. 148; Coors, 2002, p. 306; Ford, 2002, p. 60; Doerflinger, 2003,
p. 785, n. 51; Prentice, 2003; PCB, 2004, pp. 121–6; Prentice in PCB, 2004,
pp. 309–46). Stem cells may also be derived from neonatal products such as
umbilical cord blood, fetuses that have spontaneously miscarried (Michejda, 2002),
perhaps even from unfertilized ova:
Experiments are now being conducted that show “that monkey eggs can be
chemically treated and modified to the point where they begin behaving
enough like embryos to generate stem cells – all without the addition of
sperm normally required for embryogenesis, and without any capacity to grow
into a baby monkey.” If research using parthenogenesis in humans could produce
pluripotent stem cells directly, and not totipotent embryonic stem cells first,
there would be little ethical debate since at no time would a developing
embryo be formed. This could be the source of stem cells that have all the
potentially good qualities of embryonic stem cells and the ethical advantage of
not having been derived from an embryonic cell mass.
(McCartney, 2002, p. 616;
see Mitalipov et al., 2001)
In conclusion, there are various, morally unproblematic, potential sources for both
ESCs and other types of stem cells that may fulfill most, if not all, of the therapeutic
promise of ESCs derived directly from human embryos. Human embryos have an
active potentiality to develop into fully actualized living, sentient, and rational
human beings and are thereby already human beings – persons – themselves.They
thus possess a level of intrinsic goodness and an inherent dignity that merits robust
respect and rules out the kind of instrumentalization that entails their destruction.
Therapeutic and reproductive human cloning
Closely related to ESC research is the possibility of creating human organisms that
are genetically identical to already existing human organisms: cloning. The two
issues are closely related in that cloning may be a means of creating human
embryos in order to derive ESCs for research purposes: “therapeutic” cloning.
Cloning may also be used to create human embryos which subsequently are
implanted into a woman’s uterus in order to gestate and eventually give rise to a
live birth:“reproductive” cloning.
Cloning occurs in two ways: “blastomere separation” and “somatic cell
nuclear transfer” (SCNT). Blastomere separation involves splitting a two-, four-, or
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eight-celled embryo and is basically a form of induced twinning.The first successful
case of blastomere separation involving human embryos was reported in 1993 by
Jerry Hall and his colleagues at George Washington University (Hall et al., 1993).
SCNT is a much more complicated process in which the nucleus of an adult somatic
cell is isolated and inserted into an enucleated ovum.The ovum is then induced to
replicate itself and thereby reproduce parthenogenetically. SCNT was first success-
fully used to clone a mammal by Ian Wilmut and his colleagues at the Roslin
Institute. In 1996, they announced that “Dolly” – a cloned sheep – had been born
on July 5 of that year (Wilmut et al., 1997). In 2001, Advanced Cell Technology
announced that it had successfully cloned human embryos for nonreproductive
research purposes (Cibelli et al., 2001, 2002).13 To date, no scientifically confirmed
case involving the live birth of a human clone from SCNT has been reported.
Therapeutic and reproductive cloning,14 using either blastomere separation or
SCNT, differ from one another with respect to the intended end of the process.
Reproductive cloning aims at the live birth of a child, whereas therapeutic cloning
aims at the creation of an embryo from which ESCs may be derived, or on which
research can be done to further our understanding of early human development.
A number of reasons have been given for allowing cloning to go forward. On the
reproductive side, cloning may (1) allow infertile couples to produce biologically
related children, (2) prevent inheritable genetic diseases from being passed on from
a particular parent, (3) provide for “rejection-proof” transplants, and (4) allow for
the “replication” either of loved ones who have died or of individuals of great
genius, talent, or beauty (PCB, 2002, pp. 79–80).15 Cloning by means of blastomere
separation as part of an IVF procedure adds further potential applications: (5)
improving the chances of a successful pregnancy for those who produce only a
limited number of embryos, (6) allowing preimplantation genetic diagnosis of one
of the twin embryos before the other is implanted, (7) retaining a genetically
identical embryo to serve as a potential replacement or as an organ/tissue donor
for the implanted embryo, and (8) producing embryos for donation or sale to
others (National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction, 1994, p. 254).
The rationale for conducting therapeutic cloning is the same as the rationale for
supporting ESC research: it results in the production of undifferentiated ESCs
which then can be used to grow specialized cells, tissues, and organs to treat or cure
diseases such as Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, diabetes, and leukemia, as well as spinal
cord injury. Therapeutic cloning may be more advantageous than ESC research
involving spare embryos from IVF or tissue from aborted fetuses insofar as the cells,
tissues, and organs developed from the latter sources will not be a perfect genetic
match with any potential recipient, and thus rejection by the recipient’s immune
system will remain a risk and require further treatment to nullify. Cells, tissues, and
organs developed from ESC lines derived from a clone of the recipient, however,
will be free from the risk of rejection. Experiments with mouse ESCs support the
potential success of therapeutic cloning in this regard (Munsie et al., 2000).
As many reasons have been given to restrict or ban cloning as have been given
to go forward with it.With respect to reproductive cloning, concerns stem from
(1) the possibility of psychological harm to the clone resulting from their perception
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of themselves as an individual with no unique identity, (2) the nature of cloning as
the “manufacture” of human beings, (3) the possibility that cloning will lead to
eugenic selection, (4) the confused family relations a clone may have with their
progenitor as well as with their progenitor’s children, siblings, and parents, and (5)
the effect cloning may have on society’s view of children and on the control one
generation may have over the next (PCB, 2002, pp. xxviii–ix). An additional
concern regards potential physical harm to the clone resulting from the fact that
SCNT is a novel and imperfect process. When Wilmut et al. created Dolly, they
began with 434 ova, 277 of which were successfully infused with DNA from
somatic – mammary epithelium – cells. Of those 277 ova with a complete genome,
only 29 formed a blastocyst. Out of 29, 13 were implanted in ewes, and only one
of those thirteen resulted in a viable pregnancy that gave birth to Dolly (Wilmut
et al., 1997, table 1). Clearly, more work is required before SCNT can be consid-
ered a safe and reliable process; especially considering the fact that Dolly developed
premature arthritis, showed signs of advanced cellular aging, and survived only half
the normal life-span of a sheep of her breed (Ross, 2003). John Haldane notes a
further risk to a clone’s health:
In the course of time, due to ultraviolet radiation and chemical contamina-
tion, body cells are liable to be damaged. In itself this may not matter if the
process of replacement proceeds normally. However, cloning from adult body
cells carries the risk of creating an embryo out of mutant genetic material.The
resulting clone would then have a greater chance of developing cancer and
could also be expected to have below average life-expectancy.
(2000, p. 200)
Reasons given against therapeutic cloning echo those given against ESC research
in general.At the forefront are three contentions: that early embryos have the moral
status of persons; that research on embryos – cloned or not – wrongfully exploits
developing human life; and that such exploitation is wrong in the further sense that
it may harm the moral fabric of society (PCB, 2002, pp. xxxiii–iv). Much of the
above discussion regarding the moral permissibility of ESC research will apply to
therapeutic cloning as well.At this point, it is important to consider the metaphys-
ical nature of clones – created for either reproductive or therapeutic purposes – as
a basis for determining their moral status.
Metaphysical status of a human clone
The first obvious question in considering the metaphysical status of a clone is
“What is a clone?”According to the PCB:
A “clone” (noun, from the Greek klon,“twig”) refers to a group of genetically
identical molecules, cells, or organisms descended from a single common
ancestor, as well as to any one of the one or more individual organisms that
have descended asexually from a common ancestor.
(2002, p. 42)
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Next, it is appropriate to ask “When does a clone come into existence, biologically
speaking?”And this should be followed by “When does a clone begin to exist as a
person?”
Clones produced by means of blastomere separation come into existence in the
same way naturally occurring identical twins do. Once a group of cells has been
separated from a blastocyst, it constitutes a distinct blastocyst which has the same
potential to develop into a fully actualized human organism. Hence, the biological
and metaphysical status of a clone produced in this way will be the same as any
genetically identical twin.16
Clones produced through SCNT are not akin to identical twins with respect to
their initial formation. Rather, they resemble zygotes formed naturally through
fertilization of an ovum.As the PCB correctly observes:
The initial product of SCNT is a single cell, but it is no ordinary cell. It is also
an “egg” and a “reconstituted egg.” But even that is not the whole story.The
“reconstituted” egg is more than reconstituted; it has been capacitated for
development. Because the egg now has a diploid nucleus, it has become
something beyond what it was before: it now contains in a single nucleus the
full complement of genetic material necessary for producing a new organism.
And being an egg cell, it uniquely offers the cytoplasmic environment that can
support this development.The product of SCNT thus resembles and can be
made to act like a fertilized egg, a cell that not only has the full complement
of chromosomes but also is capable (in animals) or may be capable (in humans)
of developing into a new organism. In other words, in terms of its future
prospects, it is a “zygote-like entity” or a (cloned) “zygote equivalent.”
(2002, p. 47)
Julian Savulescu disagrees with this point, maintaining that nuclear transfer should
not be understood as equivalent to natural conception:
Conception involves the unification of two different entities, the sperm and the
egg, to form a new entity, the totipotent stem cell. In the case of cloning, there
is identity between the cell before and after nuclear transfer – it is the same cell.
(2001, p. 219)
There is no doubt that conception involves two distinct entities combining to
form a new entity in a process where each of the original two entities ceases to
exist. Savulescu denies that the same type of metaphysical event happens in SCNT,
because the ovum which is enucleated remains the same ovum once the nucleus
of the progenitor’s somatic cell is infused within it.
It is evident that most of what constitutes an ovum’s biological integrity remains
unchanged throughout the SCNT process. It has the same amount of cytoplasm
and the same organelles bound by the same transparent membrane; only its nucleus
has been “swapped.” An ovum fertilized by a sperm cell, though, retains an even
greater degree of its biological integrity throughout the fertilization process; it loses
nothing, but only gains additional genetic material. A fertilized ovum, therefore,
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appears to be a stronger candidate for being “the same cell” as it was before
fertilization than does an ovum that has lost its central biological component and
has had it replaced by a component from a different cell. Savulescu describes
SCNT as “a process of turning on some switches in an already existing cell”
(Savulescu, 2001, p. 219). But this description does not do justice to the significant
change in an ovum’s biological integrity that occurs when it loses its nucleus and
gains another.An ovum’s having “some switches” turned on is a more apt descrip-
tion of what happens when an ovum is penetrated by a sperm cell, thereby receiv-
ing additional genetic information, than it is when an ovum undergoes nuclear
substitution. If one holds, as Savulescu does, that when fertilization of an ovum
occurs, the resulting cell is not diachronically identical to the one that existed
before the event, one should also hold that when an ovum undergoes nuclear
substitution, the resulting cell is diachronically nonidentical to the original.
With respect to the question “When does a clone first begin to exist as a person –
that is, as a human being with full moral status?” there are three main responses that
require discussion. First, a clone becomes a person when it develops beyond the
fourteen-day mark, for it is at that time that its division into identical twins is no
longer possible and it is successfully implanted in a supportive uterine environment
(PCB, 2002, p. 136). Second, a clone becomes a person when it is “conceived”
through either blastomere separation or SCNT (George and Gómez-Lobo in
PCB, 2002, p. 258).Third, an implanted clone becomes a person when it develops
a brain with the capacity to support consciousness (McMahan, 1999, p. 83).
The first response is based on Ford’s argument that it is problematic to regard an
embryo that is capable of dividing into two distinct embryos as an individual
organism, yet a prerequisite for personhood is that a thing qualifies as an individ-
ual organism (Ford, 1988). I have addressed Ford’s argument in Chapter 2 and
concluded that an embryo’s ability to produce a genetically identical twin does not
preclude its existence as an individual organism prior to the twinning event.
Furthermore, nothing prevents the embryo from being identical to one of the
resultant twins; though there is no epistemic criterion for determining which of the
two is the twin to which it is identical. Hence, the argument from twinning does
not sufficiently demonstrate that it is metaphysically or biologically problematic
to regard a cloned embryo in the first fourteen days of its existence as an individual
organism, and thus a human being (PCB, 2002, pp. 154–5; George and Gómez-
Lobo in PCB, 2002, pp. 262–4).
The second response comports with the conclusion arrived at in Chapter 2
regarding when a human being begins to exist. So long as a cloned embryo has
everything in itself, other than a supportive environment, required to develop into
a being that actually thinks rationally, it is correctly regarded as informed by a
rational soul insofar as it has an active potentiality for rational thought.There is no
reason to deny that a cloned embryo fulfills this criterion for rational ensoulment
once it is “conceived” through either blastomere separation or SCNT.
The conclusion, however, that a cloned embryo has enough potentiality for
rational thought that it qualifies as a human being from the moment of its
existence is controversial, leading some to opt for the third response above.
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Jeff McMahan, for example, assumes for the sake of argument that human beings
are essentially souls and draws out a negative implication of the view that souls are
first present at conception or the completion of nuclear transfer:
And if [the soul] is present at either event, it seems that the soul can exist with-
out the capacity for consciousness, for there appears to be nothing present in
the womb in the early stages of pregnancy that has the capacity for
consciousness.The soul, it seems, must await the development of the brain in
order for consciousness to become possible.
(1999, p. 79)
McMahan argues that if the soul depends on the brain to have the capacity for
consciousness, then it cannot have such a capacity when it is separated from the
body after death; human beings would thus spend the afterlife in an unconscious
state. He then considers the Thomistic position for which I argued in Chapter 2 –
namely, that “we begin to exist at conception and have the capacity for consciousness
at that point, but cannot exercise our capacity” (McMahan, 1999, p. 79). He argues
that this view has the same unfortunate implication regarding the afterlife:
If the explanation of why the soul is unable to exercise its capacity for
consciousness in the period following conception is related to the absence of
brain function, then we should expect that the soul will also be unable to
exercise that capacity in the afterlife, when brain functions have ceased.
(1999, p. 79)
The subject of McMahan’s discussion, as he describes it, is not precisely Aquinas’s
position. As noted in Chapter 1, Aquinas denies that human beings are essentially
souls. Rather, we are essentially “rational animals”: composites of soul and body.
This construal of human nature allows for a human rational soul to persist beyond
the death of its body, and thereby for a human being’s continued existence insofar
as their rational soul is the “blueprint” for their material body and has all the capac-
ities specific to their nature as a living, sensitive, and rational being (Eberl, 2000b,
2004).This mode of postmortem existence, however, is “unnatural” and “incom-
plete” (QDA, I; QDSC, II; Eberl, 2000b, pp. 215–16). Though a human being
may exist as composed of their soul alone, they will not be able to exercise all their
proper capacities without their body (ST, Ia.77.8). In particular, since Aquinas
asserts that a human mind requires the bodily activities of sensation and imagination
to engage in conscious rational thought (ST, Ia.84.6–8), a separated soul on its own
will not be an actually conscious thinking thing:
The disembodied soul after death is consequently something like the mirror
image of a human being who is in a persistent vegetative state . . .When the
soul of a person is separated from the body, Aquinas thinks, the cognitive
powers that person had are curtailed and restricted.
(Stump, 2003, p. 211)
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This conclusion agrees with McMahan’s, but unlike McMahan, Aquinas does not
consider it absurd or problematic. He argues that a separated soul is an actually
conscious thinking thing insofar as God is able to infuse objects of thought, which
are normally derived from sensation, directly into the mind (ST, Ia.89.1). He also
argues that a separated soul retains the objects of thought – universal, intelligible
forms – it had previously derived from sensation while embodied in its “intellectual
memory” (ST, Ia.79.6), and can thus consciously reflect on such objects while
disembodied (ST, Ia.89.5–6).This response may strike one as ad hoc and so it may
seem as if the soul should be understood as perpetually unconscious when it
is without its body. If so, then the hope for a consciously experienced afterlife
is nonetheless preserved in Aquinas’s account of a separated soul’s reunion with its
“resurrected” body (Eberl, 2000b). At worst, then, human beings may exist for a
time – between death and bodily resurrection – as unconscious entities, but will
consciously experience the afterlife once their souls inform their resurrected
bodies.Therefore, the Thomistic view that a rational soul informs a human body
from conception – or nuclear transfer – onward does not have the problematic
implication about the afterlife that McMahan supposes it to have.
The debate regarding a cloned embryo’s potentiality does not end here. Some
scholars argue that, though a cloned embryo is a potential human being, its potential
is not sufficient for it to already be a human being:
But the potential to become something (or someone) is hardly the same as being
something (or someone), any more than a pile of building materials is the
same as a house.A cloned embryo’s potential to become a human person can
be realized, if at all, only by the further human act of implanting the cloned
blastocyst into the uterus of a woman.
(PCB, 2002, p. 48)
This assessment of a cloned embryo’s potentiality fails to consider Aquinas’s
distinction, described in Chapter 2, between active and passive potentiality. A
cloned embryo has an active potentiality to be an actually thinking rational human
being, because it has everything internally required for its ordered natural development
toward such a state of actuality. A cloned embryo’s potentiality is not akin to the
potentiality of a pile of building materials to be a house. Such materials have
merely a passive potentiality to be a house, because they require an external agent
to organize them into the structure of a house.A cloned embryo with a complete
human genome directs its own organized development from a single-celled zygote
into a fully developed human being who actually thinks rationally.
A cloned embryo in a petri dish, though, does require external aid if its
development is to continue beyond the earliest stages; it must be implanted in a
supportive uterine environment. R.Alta Charo thus asserts:
A fertilized egg or early embryo in a petri dish most certainly has an intrinsic
tendency to continue growing and dividing.Without the provision of an arti-
ficial culture medium, however, it will never grow and divide more than about
1 week. If the provision of such a medium is considered a form of external
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assistance akin to that at issue in passive potentiality, then the fertilized egg is
a potential week-old embryo, not a potential baby.
(2001, p. 86)
The provision of a uterus or artificial culture medium is not “a form of external
assistance akin to that at issue in passive potentiality.”Though obviously a form of
external assistance, it is merely a supportive environment for the cloned embryo to
exercise its own developmental capacity. Uterine implantation or placement into a
culture medium does not alter the intrinsic nature of the embryo itself or bestow
upon it more inherent potentialities than it already possesses.
The form of external assistance in question is akin to an astronaut’s spacesuit or
an underwater explorer’s submarine. Each provides what the astronaut or under-
water explorer need to exercise their vital metabolic capacities, but the lack of such
support does not entail that they lack those capacities. If an astronaut’s spacesuit
malfunctions and stops supplying oxygen, their vital metabolic functions will cease
shortly thereafter. If, however, a fellow astronaut fixes their suit in a timely fashion
and restores the flow of oxygen, their vital metabolic functions will resume.This
indicates that the astronaut’s intrinsic capacity for such functions remained despite
the loss of the requisite supportive environment. Does their dependence on their
fellow astronaut’s assistance in restoring their supportive environment entail that
their potentiality for being alive is merely passive? It does not because the assistance
provided does nothing to alter or replace the astronaut’s organic structure by which
they are able to breathe in and circulate oxygen, and it is this intrinsic capacity
which distinguishes living from nonliving organisms.Another example of external
assistance that provides merely a supportive environment is the incubator most
premature babies require to continue their postnatal development. Although such
babies will surely die without the assistance provided by the incubator, their
dependence on it does not entail that their potentiality for full development is
merely passive and not self-directed.
I thus conclude that a cloned embryo’s potentiality for development into an
actually thinking rational human being does not preclude its existence as a human
being already. This is because the potentiality at issue is an active potentiality, a
potentiality that is part of the embryo’s intrinsic nature, defined by its being
informed by a rational soul:
An embryo is, by definition and by its nature, potentially a fully developed
human person; its potential for maturation is a characteristic it actually has, and
from the start.The fact that embryos have been created outside their natural
environment – which is to say, outside the woman’s body – and are therefore
limited in their ability to realize their natural capacities, does not affect either
the potential or the moral status of the beings themselves.A bird forced to live
in a cage its entire life may never learn to fly. But this does not mean it is less
of a bird, or that it lacks the immanent potentiality to fly on feathered wings.
It means only that a caged bird – like an in vitro human embryo – has been
deprived of its proper environment.
(PCB, 2002, p. 156)
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A further criticism of the argument from potentiality for the view that a cloned
embryo is an actual human being is that the argument proves too much. For
example, Savulescu asserts that since a human being can be cloned from a somatic
cell, any such cell that currently constitutes my body is potentially a human being
(Savulescu, 2001, p. 220; cf. PCB, 2002, pp. 148–9). But here again we have an
assertion that ignores the active/passive potentiality distinction. Many changes,
requiring the activity of an external agent, must accrue to a somatic cell before it
can, in the relevant sense, have the potential to become a fully actualized human
being.A somatic cell requires reorganization of its internal structure in order for it
to develop into a human being, and this fact prevents it from having an active
potentiality for such development:
In general, it is reasonable to say that in order for an entity to be an embryonic
animal, the entity must be able, given a favorable environment (of the sort
natural to the species in question), but without prior reorganization, to undergo
embryological development, that is, to commence or continue developing
into a mature animal.
(Burke, 1996, p. 509, emphasis mine)
Furthermore, as Michael Burke points out, to countenance the possibility that a
somatic cell has the same potentiality as an embryo to become a fully actualized
human being is to presume that it is already a human being.This presumption is
implausible because a somatic cell that is part of a human being cannot itself be a
human being:
Like many of our concepts, human is “maximal,” meaning that a proper part of
a human, be it a small part (such as a cell) or large part (including, say, all of
the human except a cell) is not itself a human.
(1996, p. 510)
In Thomistic terms, when a rational soul informs a human body, it informs
the body as a whole, every part of it (ST, Ia.76.8).Therefore, all parts of a human
being’s body are proper parts of them and not substances in their own right –
unless they become separated from the body.17 Since a somatic cell is not a
substance itself, but only part of a substance, it cannot be a human being; nor can
it have its own rational soul informing it and thereby giving it an active potential-
ity for further self-directed development into a fully actualized human being. A
cloned embryo, on the other hand, is not a proper part of a human being – par-
ticularly since it is produced in vitro – and thus nothing precludes it from having
its own rational soul such that it is an actual human being with an active poten-
tiality for further development as such a being. To compare a cloned embryo’s
potentiality to that of a somatic cell is illegitimate insofar as there are metaphysi-
cal reasons why a somatic cell, unlike a cloned embryo, lacks an active potentiality
to develop into a fully actualized human being.
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Moral status of a human clone and the ethics of cloning
A number of arguments against the permissibility of human cloning invoke the fact
that it is an “unnatural” form of reproduction and, as mentioned above, involves the
“manufacture” of human beings. Many scholars take this view to represent a
“natural law” approach to cloning. Peters, for example, contends that this approach
betrays a veiled naturalism, a variant of the alleged “thou shalt not play God”
commandment. It seems to presuppose that what nature bequeaths us prior to
human choice has a higher moral status than what happens when we influence
nature through technological intervention.
(1997, p. 20)
Kathinka Evers thinks that to assess cloning on the basis of natural law is to come
up with no clear or definitive answer as to whether cloning is morally permissible:
Consequently, if the objection is to carry any weight we must assume the third
interpretation, by which cloning should fail to conform to some natural moral
law. But this is a notoriously opaque argument: the existence and contents of
such an alleged law would have to be established. Its existence is not self-evident,
and prima facie cloning could just as well agree with as violate a natural moral
law. In other words, cloning could be either natural or unnatural by conforming
(or failing to conform) to some natural moral law, the existence of which
remains to be proven.
(1999, p. 74)
In answer to Peters and Evers, I maintain that Aquinas’s account of natural law, as
described in Chapter 1, neither results in the “opaque argument” Evers describes
nor places a higher value on “what nature bequeaths us” than on the ways in which
human beings may influence nature through the proper exercise of reason. For
example, Aquinas provides sound argumentation for the self-evidence of natural
law – even if some human beings fail to acknowledge its self-evident truth (ST,
Ia.94.4, 6) – and shows that the contents of natural law are suitably derived from
an analysis of human natural inclinations (ST, Ia.94.2).Therefore, a clear, determinate
assessment of cloning based on natural law is possible.
Certain scholars invoke natural law principles, either implicitly or explicitly, to
defend the permissibility of cloning.Some members of the PCB, for example,contend
that concerns about possible harms to a cloned child – whether psychological harm
from being a “duplicate” of someone else or physical harm from being produced
through an imperfect process – are ill placed next to the inherent goodness of exis-
tence itself (PCB, 2002, pp. 81–2): Better to exist with some psychological or physi-
cal disadvantages than not to exist at all. Furthermore, Joseph Fletcher argues in favor
of cloning’s progression on the basis of the inherent goodness of humanity’s rational
capacity and its use: “Man is a maker and a selector and a designer, and the more
rationally contrived and deliberate anything is, the more human it is” (1971, p. 779).
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Neither of these arguments is compelling from a Thomistic natural law perspective.
The first argument fails because, as other members of the PCB point out, although
existence itself is indeed an important good, other important goods – such as a child’s
psychological and physical well-being – must also be promoted. Far from being pro-
moted, they may be violated through the deliberate creation of a child through
cloning (PCB, 2002, p. 84). One cannot deliberately intend something that is morally
impermissible – for example, psychological or physical harm to a child – in order to
achieve something good, such as existence (ST, IIa-IIae.64.5.ad 3; In Rom, III.1).
Fletcher’s argument fails because it attributes an overriding value to any use of
human reason, while neglecting the distinction between proper and improper uses
of reason.Aquinas understands reason, in part, as a human being’s ability to perceive
the inherent goodness in things they may pursue or in actions they may do. But
anything may be considered good in some respect; for example, a shoplifter may
consider their act of stealing to be good insofar as it fulfills their desire for a
diamond necklace.A human being may rationally tend toward something or intend
to perform some action that is less good than something else they are capable of
pursuing or doing. Aquinas thus exhorts “prudence” as a virtue necessary for the
development of “rightly ordered reason” (ST, Ia-IIae.57.5; Nelson, 1992).“Rightly
ordered reason” properly perceives the inherent goodness in things and in potential
actions, and weighs various goods according to their conformity with, or capacity
to promote, the flourishing of human nature.Therefore, not just any exercise, but
only the prudent exercise of human reason is morally good. Hence, one must
investigate whether cloning – in either its therapeutic or reproductive forms – is a
prudent application of human reason and scientific ingenuity, and not simply
presume that it is good because it follows from reason and human design.
A third, and arguably the most persuasive, implicit use of natural law to support
cloning – in particular, to support therapeutic cloning – cites the ways in which
cloning can promote human health. Health is certainly a fundamental good for
human nature. It is essential to each human being’s existence, as well as to their
ability to exercise various capacities:“Health indeed is esteemed as a kind of virtue”
(ST, Ia-IIae.71.1.ad 3).The PCB notes several uses of therapeutic cloning that can
promote human health. Cloning can be used to improve understanding of human
disease, to devise new treatments for human diseases, to produce immune-compatible
tissues for transplantation, and to assist in gene therapy (PCB, 2002, pp. 130–3).
As compelling as this third defense of continued progress in therapeutic cloning
may be, there are other goods that must be taken into account in an ethical
evaluation of cloning. In what follows, I will first cite concerns about therapeutic
cloning with respect to its intended end compared with a human embryo’s inherent
goodness. I will then examine the moral permissibility of reproductive cloning in
light of the inherent goodness of the natural social structure of human families.
Therapeutic cloning
Therapeutic cloning, like ESC research, has as its most proximate intended end the
derivation of ESCs, the achievement of which clearly and unavoidably involves an
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embryo’s destruction.The more remote intended end of therapeutic cloning is the
set of human health benefits mentioned earlier. Some scholars argue that the
goodness of the remote end is what is primarily intended by medical researchers
involved in therapeutic cloning. They claim that the unavoidable destruction of
human embryos is an unintended “side-effect” of the purpose for which they are
created:
Thus, in the case of cloning-for-biomedical-research, it is wrong to argue, as
some do, that embryos are being “created for destruction.” Certainly, their
destruction is a known and unavoidable effect, but the embryos are ultimately
created for research in the service of life and medicine.
(PCB, 2002, pp. 141–2)
This argument invokes the PDE, described in Chapter 1, as a means of justifying
therapeutic cloning, as well as ESC research. It purports to succeed even if embryo
destruction is prima facie morally impermissible.
In order for PDE to be applicable in this case, the following conditions must
hold: first, the negative value of the impermissible consequence – in this case, the
destruction of human embryos – does not outweigh the positive value of the good
consequence – the health benefits mentioned earlier. Second, the production of the
impermissible consequence is not directly intended as an end or the means by which
the good consequence is achieved. That the first condition holds in this case is
plausible, for it may indeed be the case that the potential health benefits from
therapeutic cloning at least equal the inherent goodness of a cloned embryo’s
existence. But even if the first condition is satisfied, the second is not. This is
because therapeutic cloning involves the creation of embryos with the purpose of
destroying them. As William FitzPatrick notes, ESC derivation from a cloned embryo
is “constitutive” of its destruction and not merely causally related to it:
The means we here aim at and employ in pursuit of curing disease involves
isolating the inner cell mass of a five-day-old embryo by “removing” the
trophectoderm (the rest of the blastocyst), which is done by cutting it away
with microsurgery or breaking it down through immunosurgery . . . this pro-
cedure does not merely cause some distinct harm but constitutes the destruction
of the embryo. We therefore cannot say that we’re aiming at the embryo’s
being disaggregated but not at its being destroyed, or that its destruction is
merely a foreseen but unintended side effect of our action . . .we cannot avoid
the conclusion that [therapeutic] cloning involves creating an embryo with
the intent of destroying it.
(FitzPatrick, 2003, pp. 33–4;
cf. Haldane, 2000, pp. 192–4)
FitzPatrick goes on to argue that, despite the inapplicability of PDE to therapeutic
cloning, the moral worries about such cloning are not sufficiently compelling to
“ultimately lead us to oppose it, at least until we have clear evidence of less problematic,
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equally effective, and comparably accessible alternatives” (FitzPatrick, 2003, p. 36).
Pace FitzPatrick, the inherent goodness of a human embryo’s existence, insofar as it
has an active potentiality to develop into an actually thinking rational human
being, indeed warrants opposition to therapeutic cloning just as it warrants
opposition to ESC research in general, as I argued above.
Reproductive cloning
Reproductive cloning raises a different set of moral concerns, and the opinions
about its moral permissibility often differ from those about therapeutic cloning.
For instance, both the majority and minority recommendations of the PCB call for
a ban on reproductive cloning, whereas the PCB recommends that therapeutic
cloning be subjected to a four-year moratorium (majority) or be allowed to go
forward, subject to regulation (minority) (PCB, 2002, pp. xxxv–ix).Two members
of the PCB, however, both of whom are natural law theorists who support the
majority recommendation, claim that therapeutic cloning is more morally
problematic than reproductive cloning. “It is our considered judgment that
cloning-for-biomedical-research, inasmuch as it involves the deliberate destruction
of embryos, is morally worse than cloning-to-produce-children” (George and
Gómez-Lobo in PCB, 2002, p. 266).
These theorists nonetheless have sufficient moral worries about reproductive
cloning to call for a ban on it in addition to at least a moratorium on therapeutic
cloning; though they would prefer a total ban on both forms of cloning.
What is morally problematic about reproductive cloning from a Thomistic
natural law perspective? A primary issue stems from the social disruption in which
human cloning may result, which would be at odds with the natural law mandate
to maintain a harmonious social order insofar as human beings are by nature “social
animals” (In NE, I.9).As noted in Chapter 1,Aquinas explicitly cites the education
of offspring as following from the first principle of natural law together with the
social aspect of human nature (ST, Ia-IIae.94.2, IIa-IIae.57.4). He further contends
that determinate parentage is fundamentally necessary for a child’s optimal
upbringing:
We see in all animals in which the education of offspring requires the care of
male and female, that there is not indeterminate sexual intercourse, but the male
with a certain female. . .Hence, it is contrary to human nature that indetermi-
nate sexual intercourse occur, but the male ought to be with a determinate
female. . .It is thus natural for the male18 in the human species to be concerned
for the certainty of offspring, because on him rests the education of offspring.
This certainty,however,would be lifted if sexual intercourse were indeterminate.
(ST, IIa-IIae.154.2; cf. SCG, III.122–3)
Aquinas’s reference to a human male’s “natural concern for the certainty of 
offspring” implies a natural bond or affinity between parents and their biologi-
cally related offspring that arises once their biological relationship is known
90 Issues at the beginning of human life
(ST, IIa-IIae.26.9).The responsibilities that naturally follow from this bond, such as
education and general upbringing, generate a desire to know exactly to whom one
is related as a parent. Ronald Cole-Turner elucidates the nature of this bond:
Furthermore, as creatures became more complex and needed parents to rear
them, sexual reproduction assured that both parents have a genetic interest
in their offspring, so sexual reproduction can be seen as ultimately encouraging
the care of offspring by two parents. For human beings, this parental invest-
ment must be substantial if the child is to thrive. Sexual reproduction creates
a genetic bond between both parents and the child.
(1997, p. 127)
Parents are naturally driven to care for their genetically related offspring; though
this does not preclude them from caring equally for offspring to whom they are
not genetically related. Nevertheless, to maximize the likelihood that children
receive their proper upbringing in an optimal fashion, they should be related to
those responsible for their upbringing in such a way that the latter have a natural
inclination to fulfill their parental obligations.
These remarks about the value of the natural bond between parents and their
genetically related offspring bear on the moral permissibility of reproductive cloning.
They do so because such cloning disrupts the natural order of procreation through
which this bond is generated.The result is that parents of a cloned child may not
experience as strong a natural inclination to care for the child, even if the child is
genetically related to one of them.This is because the child is genetically unrelated
to at least one of the parents – if not both in the case of donated genetic material –
and the child’s relationship to its parents is the result of choice, selection, and artifice,
rather than openness to whatever sort of child may result from natural procreative
activity. Paul Conner exploits this negative feature of reproductive cloning:
Clones would not be related to others in society in any way more profound
than by human desire and by technology that has no flesh or soul and that
always introduces human limitations, if not errors. For example, those who
produce or pay for a clone would not be responsible for his or her upbring-
ing in the same way as true parents, who are the cause of a child’s conception
(origin) and contribute equally to his or her real make-up (nature). Cloners
would be responsible only by desire and choice. Should any undesired limita-
tions develop in their clone, their original choice would be sorely tested.
Moreover, their parental instincts would not be fulfilled primarily on a level of
human nature but on a level of personal preference. Hence, much shallower
roots than natural ones would bind clones to their originals, to their designers
and makers, and to their purchasers.
(2002, p. 654)
Reproductive cloning does not provide as strong a bond between parent and child
as natural procreation.As a result, proper care and upbringing may not necessarily
Issues at the beginning of human life 91
be provided, particularly in cases where a “defective product” is created. The
“natural and social affinity” at the foundation of familial relationships and the family’s
nature “as a place of unconditional belonging” may thus be compromised (Waters,
1997, pp. 84–5).
Not only may a cloned child’s upbringing be potentially threatened by the weak
parental bonds generated through reproductive cloning, but societal relationships in
general are at risk:“Familial relationships are the foundations for fulfilling the social
dimension of human nature” (Conner, 2002, p. 653). A child who does not have
properly structured familial relationships, particularly with its parents, may have
difficulty in its future social engagements. Lisa Sowle Cahill voices this concern in
her testimony before the NBAC during its 1997 hearings on human cloning:
Cloning violates “the essential reality of human family and . . . the nature of the
socially related individual within it. We all take part of our identity, both
material or biological, and social, from combined ancestral kinship networks . . .
Whether socially recognized or not, this kind of ancestry is an important part
of the human sense of self (as witnessed by searches for ‘biological’ parents and
families), as well as a foundation of important human relationships.” Cloning
to create children, Cahill concludes, would constitute an “unprecedented
rupture in those biological dimensions of embodied humanity which have
been most important for social cooperation.”
(p. 53)
Cahill emphasizes the “biological dimensions of embodied humanity” and cites
their importance in defining a human being’s individual and social identity. This
emphasis echoes Aquinas’s own emphasis, elucidated in Chapter 1, on a human
being’s essential “animality.” It also echoes his definition of human nature not
simply as an immaterial soul – a purely psychological entity – but as a soul–body
composite – a psychobiological entity.This emphasis is supported by Cahill’s point
that adopted children, even those who are raised in the most nurturing and loving
of adoptive families, are naturally inclined to seek out their biological parents.The
PCB also notes this phenomenon in voicing its concerns about reproductive
cloning that uses donated genetic material – material that belongs to neither of the
parents by whom the cloned child will be raised:
A desire to seek out connection with the “original” could complicate his or her
relation to the rearing family, as would living consciously “under the reason” for
this extra-familial choice of progenitor.Though many people make light of the
importance of biological kinship (compared to the bonds formed though rear-
ing and experienced family life), many adopted children and children con-
ceived by artificial insemination or IVF using donor sperm show by their
actions that they do not agree.They make great efforts to locate their “biolog-
ical parents,” even where paternity consists of nothing more than the donation
of sperm.Where the progenitor is a genetic near-twin, surely the urge of the
cloned child to connect with the unknown “parent” would be still greater.
(2002, pp. 111–12)
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This argument could be criticized on the grounds that it ignores or devalues
alternative family structures that are prevalent in contemporary society and among
various cultures (de Melo-Martín, 2002, pp. 251–2). This criticism is certainly
worth noting, for it is indeed true that children are in many cases raised success-
fully by parents or guardians who are not genetically related to them; and in many
cases children suffer abuse or neglect at the hands of parents who are their genetic
progenitors.
The first set of cases, though – that is, those of successful parenting by people
who are genetically unrelated to their children – reveals only that the natural bond
between parent and offspring, and the moral responsibility for education and
upbringing attached to that bond, may be assumed by other human beings through
intentional choice.The above assertions about the nature of familial bonds and nat-
ural responsibility in genetic parent–child relationships do not discount either the
fact that strong bonds may exist in alternative family structures or the fact that
commensurate responsibility may be assumed by others – for example, heterosexual
and homosexual couples who adopt children.The creation of such bonds, however,
through intentional choice is not optimal and is employed only as a means of
rearing children when the creation of natural bonds through genetic relatedness is
not possible. In cases where such relatedness is possible, nongenetic parent–child
relationships are typically not sought.This is evidenced by the great lengths some
couples go through in using IVF to have genetically related offspring when they
cannot do so otherwise, and do not choose to adopt a nongenetically related child.
But reproductive cloning is a means of creating children whose genetic relation-
ship to at least one parent is nonexistent. It also involves intentional choice and
human artifice where they are not necessary. Other means already exist to allow
those incapable of having genetically related children to become parents.
The second set of cases – those in which children are neglected or abused by par-
ents to whom they are genetically related – shows, at most, that the natural bond
between parent and offspring may be mitigated by human intention and that behav-
ior contrary to natural law can commonly occur. Human beings, according to
Aquinas, have an innate awareness of natural law (ST, Ia.79.12, Ia-IIae.94.1.ad 2), but
it is not equally known by every human being (ST, Ia-IIae.94.4).Aquinas notes that
various factors, such as “passion, evil habit, or an evil natural disposition” may
pervert one’s reason and thus diminish the ability to properly understand and apply
the principles of natural law.As a result, some parents may eschew the responsibil-
ity they naturally possess for their genetically related offspring. But such behavior
is the result of intentional choice influenced by a perversion of reason; it does not
demonstrate that in some cases a natural bond and commensurate responsibility is
lacking between genetically related parent and child.
Conclusion
Based on the metaphysical conclusion I reached in Chapter 2, I have argued in this
chapter that a human embryo enjoys the full moral status that a fully actualized
human being is recognized to possess. It does so because a human embryo, from
conception onward, has an active potentiality to become an actually thinking
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rational human being – a person. Consequently, directly intended abortion and the
use of abortifacient contraceptives are morally impermissible. Furthermore, despite
the potentially significant therapeutic benefits of ESC research and therapeutic
cloning, each is morally impermissible because it unavoidably involves the directly
intended destruction of human embryos. ASC research, often derided by
proponents of ESC research or therapeutic cloning, holds a significant degree of
promise for the treatment or cure of numerous human diseases. It also has a record
of success in converting certain types of differentiated cells into largely undiffer-
entiated stem cells.19 Another potential alternative to ESC research involves the
creation of “nonviable embryo-like artifacts” that lack the biological status of an
organism – and hence the moral status of a human being – but nevertheless pro-
vide a source for deriving functional ESCs (Hurlbut in PCB, 2002, pp. 274–6;
PCB, 2004, pp. 90–3).While the creation of such “pseudo-embryos” can be con-
strued as “unnatural,” it would not necessarily constitute a violation of the natural
law so long as what is created is truly a mere biological entity that lacks an active
potentiality for developing into an actually thinking rational human being if only
provided a suitable nutritive environment.Though such an entity would be alive
and thereby have a degree of intrinsic goodness akin to other living beings, its
goodness would nonetheless be of a significantly lesser degree than that of the
human beings who may benefit from the therapeutic research conducted utilizing
the ESCs derived from them.
Finally, reproductive cloning is morally problematic, because it severs the natural
bond that exists between genetically related parents and offspring.Though repro-
ductive cloning may assist those for whom it is not feasible to have genetically
related children naturally – for example, infertile heterosexual couples or homosexual
couples – other avenues are open to them if they want to raise children, such as
adoption, which does not entail the birth of a child who is entirely the product of
human artifice, design, and choice.
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Introduction
In Chapter 3, I argued that Aquinas’s metaphysical understanding of human nature
entails that a human being’s death occurs when they suffer the irreversible cessation
of whole-brain functioning. This conclusion, along with Aquinas’s view of the
inherent goodness of human life, has clear implications for how we should treat
patients in a “persistent vegetative state” (PVS). Furthermore,Aquinas’s natural law
ethic requires that we treat not only PVS patients, but any terminally ill or dying
persons, in a fashion that safeguards their life while avoiding undue prolongation
of their pain and suffering. In this chapter, I will first address the metaphysical and
moral status of PVS patients and then follow with an ethical assessment of various
means by which we may strive to alleviate the pain and suffering experienced
by the terminally ill or dying. Such means include active euthanasia, palliative
treatment that may hasten death, the nonutilization of life-sustaining treatment, and
terminal sedation. Finally, I will discuss the practice of organ donation, which
involves, among other issues, the question of how and when a patient should be
declared dead.
Metaphysical and moral status of PVS patients
From 2003 to 2005, when she died, the case of Terri Schiavo (Krueger, 2003) – a
PVS patient – brought national attention to the question of whether someone who
shows no neurological or clinical signs of conscious awareness is still a “person,” or,
regardless of this daunting metaphysical question, whether life in such a state is
sufficiently valuable to warrant keeping the patient alive by artificial means such as
tube-feeding and hydration. It is important to differentiate PVS from the more
commonly known term “coma.”A comatose patient may be either temporarily or
irreversibly so, and their coma may be either pharmacologically induced – as in the
case of terminal sedation which will be discussed below – or caused by neurological
trauma. Comas caused by neurological trauma may include either damage to the
cerebral hemispheres themselves, which are correlated with conscious rational
activity, or damage to the brain’s reticular formation, which is the “on-off switch”
for wakefulness. A PVS patient shows no neurological or clinical signs of conscious
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awareness or rational activity, despite the fact that their eyes are open and they may
exhibit certain reflexive behaviors – such as tracking a moving object in front of
them – that mimic purposeful conscious activity (Jennett and Plum, 1972). PVS is
understood to be irreversible in all correctly diagnosed cases, though there have been
exceptions indicating that misdiagnosis occurs a significant number of times
(Mappes, 2003, pp. 122–5).
The ethical treatment of PVS patients can be addressed in two basic ways:
(1) Is a PVS patient still a person, or has the person died leaving merely a living
human organism? (2) Even if a PVS patient is still a person, what value does
their continued existence have without the possibility of consciousness?
The “higher-brain” concept of death described in Chapter 3 entails that a person
dies when they falls into a PVS. If the neurological structures necessary to support
conscious rational thought are irreversibly nonfunctional, there is no basis for
asserting that the patient has a rational soul or is a person. Jeff McMahan thus
asserts:
Recognition that we are embodied minds distinct from our organisms allows
us to embrace the intuition behind the revisionist higher-brain proposals –
namely, that we cease to exist when we irreversibly lose the capacity for
consciousness – while at the same time recognizing that an organism that has
suffered neocortical or cerebral death is nevertheless a living organism. For if
we are not identical with our organisms, one of us can cease to exist even if
his or her organism remains in existence and, indeed, even if it remains alive.
(2002, p. 424)
McMahan further contends, regarding the moral status of a PVS patient:
I propose that we should assign the living organism in a PVS much the same
status we now assign a dead human organism. . . a living organism in a PVS is,
in relevant respects, just like a dead body: they are both instances of the
physical remains a person leaves when he or she ceases to exist.
(2002, p. 447)
McMahan’s metaphysical view of human persons is that we are essentially “embodied
minds” – that is, a person exists and persists only insofar as their brain functions
sufficiently to generate consciousness or mental activity (McMahan, 2002, p. 68).
This view is quite distinct from the Thomistic account of human nature described
in Chapter 1. For Aquinas, a person exists (premortem) so long as their body is
informed by their rational soul, and the soul informs the body until the body can
no longer support the soul’s vegetative capacities. Rational activity is not required to
contend that a rational human being continues to exist:
It is irrelevant that the ability1 to express [conscious rational] functions is
permanently lost due to the PVS, since function does not determine personhood;
personhood is determined by essence. The proper functions of a human
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person are grounded in the essence of human personhood, and they cannot
stand alone apart from a human nature in which these critical functions are
grounded. Losing the essence of personhood does not follow from having lost
the functions one deems critical to being a person.
(Moreland and Rae, 2000, p. 332)
The “essence of human personhood” is a human being’s “nature,” defined by
Aquinas as the composite unity of a rational soul and a material body such that a
human being has the capacities for life, sensation, and conscious rational thought.
So long as a rational soul continues to inform its body, the two compose a human
being2 regardless of whether any of the soul’s definitive capacities – other than its
basic vegetative capacities – are presently actualizable in that body. A PVS patient
is a human being because their body remains informed by their rational soul.This
is due to the soul’s basic vegetative capacities still being actualized in their body,
which is exemplified by spontaneous respiration and heartbeat, as well as the ability
to metabolize food and water if provided.
Even if a PVS patient is a human being and not merely a vegetative “corpse,”
the question remains whether such a person’s life is sufficiently valuable to warrant
being maintained through artificial nutrition and hydration or other means. Grant
Gillett argues that “nothing matters” to a creature – person or animal – who is
without consciousness:
In order for something to matter to an individual, he must have or be able to
form an attitude or preference about that thing – it must figure in his thought
in some salient or significant way.That is what it is to care about something.
(1990, p. 196)
While benefits and harms may still be visited upon someone who is unconscious –
for example, the benefit of honoring their requests stated in a will or the harm, as
depicted in Quentin Tarantino’s film Kill Bill,Vol. 1 (2003), of sexually violating
their body – Gillett contends that such benefits or harms do not matter to the
person if they are unable to ever be consciously aware of them.The question thus
arises whether continued life matters to a PVS patient and it would seem that it
does not: “Therefore, where the neocortex is destroyed or permanently nonfunc-
tional, our rational moral commitment to preserving life can be withdrawn in the
case of an individual who has suffered this tragedy” (Gillett, 1990, p. 197).
But is a PVS patient’s continued biological life truly valueless because it does not
matter to them? From a Thomistic perspective, goodness is inherent in all forms of
existence, though the level of goodness is relative to the different levels of being
Aquinas defines – inanimate, vegetative, sensitive, and rational3 – as well as to the
degree that an individual being’s definitive capacities are actualized.One could thus
argue that a PVS patient’s existence is not “as good” as when they were a more
fully actualized human being. Nevertheless, the inherent fundamental goodness of
their basic existence as a rational being and a living organism persists even when
they are unable to actualize their rational and sensitive capacities.
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Holmes Rolston III calls attention to the inherent value of a human being’s
biological existence, even when it no longer subserves conscious rational activity:
After the struggle for personal self-possession has been lost, one ought further
to respect, albeit in a different ethical relationship, the continuing struggle for
biological self-possession.This is not a self-deceived rationalizing about crude
vitalistic processes. It is rather the recognition of dignity across the whole of
life . . .whatever is biologically vital also carries ethical value.When the subjec-
tive life is gone, the remaining objective life is admittedly incomplete, but does
it follow that it is valueless? When the patient was yet self-aware, he counted
these biological processes among his goods and interests . . .Now exactly the
same kind of natural good here continues, diminished in degree in his debil-
itated condition. Somatically, objectively, he still fights for life and health. From
the patient’s perspective, if we can still judge such a thing on the basis of his
continuing life efforts, the former goodness has not been neutralized by no
longer having a subjective owner. So then we who care for him have to ask
ourselves what duty is still owed to this objective side of life.
(1982, p. 342)
Rolston here reflects the Thomistic view that not only does vegetative existence
have a certain degree of goodness in itself, but also the persistent vegetative
existence of a human being has a sufficient degree of goodness to warrant being
supported within reasonable limits.The primary concern now is what constitutes
the reasonable limits of support and care to be provided to a PVS patient, or to a
fully conscious terminally ill patient who has reached the end of what medicine
can do to cure them or alleviate the debilitating symptoms of their condition.
In what follows, I will discuss the relevant limits and various forms of support
and care.
Euthanasia4
The topic of euthanasia includes several dimensions.The most controversial is what
is termed “active euthanasia,” which includes both the outright killing of a patient
and the acts of “physician-assisted suicide” performed by Dr Jack Kevorkian. More
accepted, but not without its own issues, is “passive euthanasia,” which includes
various acts such as the nonutilization of life-sustaining treatment, administration
of palliative treatment that may hasten a patient’s death, and terminal sedation.
Though some philosophers and bioethicists have disputed it (Rachels, 1975;
Kuhse, 1998), the American Medical Association’s (AMA) Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs affirms the moral distinction between the two forms of euthanasia:
active euthanasia is contrary to the ethical practice of medicine, whereas the
nonutilization of life-sustaining treatment or palliative treatment that may hasten
death are permissible within medical practice (AMA, 1992). I will argue that the
Thomistic ethical perspective agrees with the AMA’s assessment.
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Active euthanasia
The term “active euthanasia” refers to several forms of so-called “mercy killing”:
suicide, assisted suicide, and homicide.5 Since each form of active euthanasia
involves suicide in some analogous sense of the term – that is, all such actions begin
with a patient’s expressed or presumed wish to die – what Aquinas says regarding
suicide in general will apply to all forms of active euthanasia, except those in which
a patient is killed against their wish to live and thereby this constitutes murder.
Aquinas states that “one sins more gravely who kills himself, than who kills
another” (ST, Ia-IIae.73.9.ad 2) and gives a “triple indictment” against suicide (ST,
IIa-IIae.64.5). I will consider here only two of Aquinas’s indictments which are
based on natural law.6
Natural inclination to live
Aquinas begins by stating,“Everything naturally loves itself,” and asserts that suicide
violates the natural law because “everything [which loves itself ] naturally conserves
itself in being and resists corruptions so far as it can” (ST, IIa-IIae.64.5). Since
everything naturally seeks to maintain its own existence and avoid any type of
corruption, suicide violates that principle of natural law, for it is the termination
of a human being’s natural mode of existence.7
A human being’s “love” for themselves involves the fulfillment of their natural
inclinations shared with all other human beings. Human beings are biological
organisms. As noted in Chapter 1, Aquinas does not hold a form of Platonic
substance dualism, in which a human being is identified with an immaterial soul
that merely uses a body as its instrument. Rather,Aquinas holds that human beings
are substances composed of both physical matter and an immaterial soul that
organizes the matter into an individual living organism of the genus “animal” and
the species “human.”
This account of human nature directly impacts Aquinas’s natural law ethic and
his understanding of human natural desire.Aquinas holds that the first, fundamen-
tal precept of natural law is that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided”
(ST, Ia-IIae.94.2). He characterizes the “good” as whatever is fulfilling to a being’s
nature insofar as it satisfies its natural inclinations. Since part of what constitutes
human nature is to be a living biological organism, life is a “good” and interference
with a human being’s life would be an “evil.”Therefore, suicide, which interferes
with one’s nature as a living biological organism, violates the first principle of
natural law. This conclusion is not merely a moral injunction, but also reflects a
fundamental anthropological fact: human beings, as living organisms, have a natural
inclination to live.
David Novak, in elucidating Aquinas’s indictment of suicide, considers the
objection that the evident desire of some persons to cease living indicates that
Aquinas is mistaken in asserting that all human beings have a natural inclination to
live. Novak counters this objection by first showing the objective nature of Aquinas’s
account of natural law and how Aquinas’s assertion that life is a fundamental good
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is derived from his understanding of human nature, as described earlier. Novak
then contends, “The suicidal person is not suicidal because his natural inclination
is not to persist in being, rather, he is suicidal because he has circumvented the
natural inclination already present” (Novak, 1975, p. 49).A suicidal person does not
fail to have a natural inclination to live, but has a competing desire to end their
present state of suffering. Death is not desired by a suicidal person for its own sake,
but as a means to end their suffering: “One who contemplates suicide does not
will non-existence or evil but only the termination of his troubled existence; what
is the real object of his natural appetite is a good – untroubled existence” (Gustafson,
1944, p. 25). For many persons, though, especially the terminally ill, “untroubled
existence” is not an attainable goal.As a result, they must choose between troubled
existence and death. For Aquinas, human life is an inherent fundamental good; a
person’s troubled existence retains its value even when tainted by suffering.
Lisa Sowle Cahill argues, however, that the inherent goodness of a human
being’s life is but one of many goods that constitute the fulfillment of human
nature, and notes Aquinas’s recognition that certain specific goods must be violated
“to respect and safeguard the integrity and welfare of the whole human being”
(Cahill, 1977, p. 49).The subordination of the goodness of a human being’s parts
to the overall goodness of the whole person is known as the “principle of totality,”
which I will discuss in more detail below with respect to organ donation.
Aquinas states:
Now every part is directed toward the whole as imperfect toward perfect.And
thus every part is naturally for the sake of the whole.And on account of this
we see that if cutting off some member provides for the health of the whole
human body, because it is rotten and corruptive to the other members, it is
laudable and healthy to have it cut off.
(ST, IIa-IIae.64.2; cf. ST, IIa-IIae.65.1; SCG, III.112)
Cahill argues:
Since the distinctive and controlling element of human nature is the personal
self or spirit [i.e., rational soul], then according to the principle of totality, the
body which is a “part” may in some cases be sacrificed for the good of the
“whole” body-soul entity.
(1977, p. 61)
The prolonged and meaningless physical deterioration of a permanently com-
atose individual can be construed as an insult to his or her total personhood.
In such a case, as well as that of the dying person, [active] euthanasia may be
present as a viable moral option. Once a patient is in the terminal stage of a
fatal illness or is permanently comatose, it may become evident that his or her
life is past the point of possible restoration to a quality which would support
significant pursuit of the highest human values.
(1977, p. 59)
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Cahill’s rationale for supporting active euthanasia as “a viable moral option” is
echoed by almost every advocate of euthanasia whose primary concern is the
“quality of life” a terminally ill or comatose patient may experience.
Cahill purports that her case is presented from a Thomistic perspective, so it is
appropriate to evaluate her argument from the same viewpoint. While Aquinas
does indeed hold the principle of totality, the example he gives to elucidate the
principle in the preceeding passage is not analogous to a case of “cutting off ” a
human being’s ill body to fulfill some higher rational or spiritual good or to
safeguard their the human being’s overall personal integrity.Aquinas asserts that it is
wrong for one to mutilate their body for the sake of their spiritual well-being (ST,
IIa-IIae.65.1.ad 3) or to commit suicide to avoid sin (ST, IIa-IIae.64.5.ad 3;
Colbert, 1978, p. 191). Furthermore, the two cases are not analogous because the
example Aquinas gives is of a human being’s “integral” part being removed for the
sake of preserving the whole body; integral parts are “components that add to the
quantity of the material whole they compose, in the way that a roof is part of a
house and a head is part of a body” (Stump, 2003, p. 209). A human body, on the
other hand, is not an integral part of a human being, but a “metaphysical” part that
is fundamentally constitutive of a human being’s substantial nature along with their
rational soul (Stump, 2003, p. 42). As William E. May contends, “Bodily life is, in
fact, intrinsic to the human person and not merely a possession of the person”
(May, 1998, p. 48).
It is thus a mischaracterization to construe euthanasia as merely the “cutting off”
of one’s body as one would sever a gangrenous limb to preserve one’s overall health
and well-being.Without their bodies, though human beings may continue to exist
composed of their souls alone, their existence will be quite deficient because many of
their capacities – vegetative and sensitive – will not be actualizable and they will not
be able to gain knowledge in the natural way through sensation (Eberl, 2000b, 2004).
Cahill argues that the goodness of a human being’s bodily life may be sacrificed
to prevent “an insult to his or her total personhood.” John Kavanaugh counters this
“admission that human vulnerability, our very condition as embodied, is degraded
and undignified”:
The response of an individual or a community that values the intrinsic dignity
of persons, however, is not to kill the sufferer or eliminate the wounded but
to alleviate the suffering and affirm the sufferer’s goodness, regardless of the
deprivation, the loss, or the presumed shame of human frailty . . .What is
required of us is to live and act in a way that entails acknowledging that no
pain or dying or “degenerate” condition robs us of our intrinsic dignity.The
direct choice to kill damaged persons betrays that truth.
(2001, p. 137)
A human being’s intrinsic goodness persists despite whatever condition their body
or soul may be in. Hence, the goodness of “the whole human being” is in fact
violated through active euthanasia:“Thus an attack on the body and bodily life of
a human person is an attack on the person” (May, 1998, p. 48).
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Communitarianism and suicide
Aquinas’s second injunction against suicide is derived from his intellectual ancestor,
Aristotle:“Every part, as such, is of the whole. Now every human being is part of
the community; and so, as such, is of the community. Hence, in the case that he
kills himself, he causes injury to the community” (ST, IIa-IIae.64.5).8 All human
beings are interrelated in variously defined political communities.We also belong
to one overall human community, which transcends nation, race, and gender bound-
aries.As a result of this conception of human nature as essentially “communitarian,”
Aquinas holds that each individual human being is responsible not only to them-
selves, but also to every other member of the human community. Suicide is thus
not a purely private action, which has implications only for the suicidal agent:
While Aquinas does not believe that society is sovereign over the individual,
he does believe that individual decisions cannot be properly made in even so
personal a matter as suicide without reference to the interests of other persons
in the State.
(Beauchamp, 1989, p. 192)
Robert Wennberg criticizes the claim that suicide is a sin against the human
community. Wennberg interprets Aquinas’s argument as asserting, “To commit
suicide is to rob the community of one of its contributing members” (Wennberg,
1989, p. 68).Wennberg suggests that this assertion
is not applicable to those contemplated cases of suicide-euthanasia in which
the individual is in the latter stages of a terminal illness and therefore not in a
position to make a contribution to society – indeed, may actually be a drain
on its resources.
(1989, p. 69)
Wennberg’s interpretation does not agree with my own mentioned earlier. I made
no reference to an individual’s contribution to society. Aquinas would object to
such a purely utilitarian analysis.Aquinas’s appeal to the community is meant to call
to mind the fact that no individual human being exists in isolation.A grave deci-
sion, such as suicide, is not an individual’s decision alone.The whole community
has a say in such serious types of conduct by its citizens. With respect to this
particular point, suicide (or active euthanasia) does not appear to be summarily
ruled out. It may be that the community feels that individuals should have the right
to self-termination. If so, then, at least with respect to this particular indictment,
suicide may be morally permissible given the community’s consent. Community
consent, however, or political decision is not sufficient to constitute what Aquinas
considers “just law.” Society may pass unjust laws that violate the objective princi-
ples of natural law (ST, Ia-IIae.95.2) – for example, laws that permit slavery or
that do not provide for a liberal education. An individual is subservient to the
community in which they live, but the community is subservient to the natural law.
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An individual must be obedient to particular laws of their community only when
those laws are just – that is, when they do not violate the natural law. Since a law
permitting suicide would constitute a violation of the natural law, no community
has the right to pass such a law, and no individual in a community that passes such
a law is under obligation or permission to adhere to it.
Novak stresses this point by indicating Aquinas’s twofold view of responsibility
between a person and the community in which they live: “The person owes the
community loyalty and service in return for the just distribution of society’s goods
he has received” (Novak, 1975, p. 66).The set of “goods” a community owes to its
members is what counts toward the fulfillment of their nature – that is, satisfies
their natural inclinations. Such goods include not only the fundamental good of
life, but also various other goods that need to be cultivated within a person so that
they may live to the fullest extent of their nature. Novak cites certain virtues as
examples:“In a true communion of persons one can see a need for even the help-
less and infirm. Their very presence enables us to practice the human virtues of
benevolence and generosity” (Novak, 1975, p. 66). Even a “helpless and infirmed”
member of the community can remain a contributing member by assisting others
in the cultivation of fulfilling goods, while at the same time preserving the funda-
mental good of their own existence. Every community owes its members the
capacity to be of such service to others and to be served by others in return. It
would thus violate a community’s basic duty to its citizens if it permitted some to
view themselves as useless, noncontributing members, for such would not be the
truth of the matter.
Clinical attitude toward the dying
Due to a human being’s nature as a soul-body unity, who experiences both physical
and psychological suffering when stricken with a terminal illness and approaching
death, the appropriate clinical attitude toward patients in such a condition includes
the alleviation of suffering at both levels according to the limits of medical practice,
but without violation of a human being’s natural inclination to live. Human beings
have a natural inclination toward bodily health so that they may fulfill their proper
functions: “Health indeed is esteemed as a kind of virtue” (ST, Ia-IIae.71.1.ad 3).
Given that illness and its attendant suffering go against the natural inclination
toward health and proper functioning, as well as a human being’s natural inclination
toward pleasant sensual experiences and psychological “peace of mind,” a number
of means to alleviate suffering besides active euthanasia follow from the natural law.
Such means include the administration of palliative treatment, even when it may
hasten death, and the nonutilization of life-sustaining measures that unduly prolong
a patient’s experience of suffering and their process of dying – I will discuss in this
chapter how these actions may be warranted and morally justified.At the same time,
while a patient continues to suffer until the point at which they naturally expire, all
available means of psychological and spiritual counseling should be made available to
them, and a suitable environment provided for prolonged contact with family and
friends. Several models of palliative and hospice care already reflect these ideals.
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In caring for a suffering or dying person, it is important for the patient and their
caregivers not to deny that suffering and death are unavoidable facets of human
life.Though suffering and death are undesirable for their own sake, and thus can
be justifiably avoided or delayed, when unavoidable or impending, they may
provide a means by which certain benefits may be realized. Aquinas does not see
bodily suffering as the greatest evil to be avoided at all costs. Rather, he holds
that at least some pain is “from something apparently evil, which is truly good”
(ST, Ia-IIae.39.4). Hence, such pain “cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be
worse to be entirely alienated from what is truly good” (ST, Ia-IIae.39.4). But the
value of pain is relative to its usefulness for producing some good:
Someone’s suffering adversity would not be pleasing to God except for the
sake of some good coming from the adversity.And so although adversity is in
itself bitter and gives rise to sadness, it should nonetheless be agreeable [to us]
when we consider its usefulness, on account of which it is pleasing to
God. . .For in his reason a person rejoices over the taking of bitter medicine
because of the hope of health, even though in his senses he is troubled.
(In Job, I.20–1; trans. Stump)
It is important to note that placing such value on suffering does not entail that one
should seek suffering for its own sake.This would violate the first precept of natural
law. Bodily pain is an evil because it interferes with the body’s natural functioning;
such evil should be avoided. Any good that comes from suffering does not make
suffering good in itself:
On Aquinas’s view suffering is good not simpliciter but only secundum quid.That
is, suffering is not good in itself but only conditionally, insofar as it is a means
to an end. “The evils which are in this world,” Aquinas says, “aren’t to be
desired for their own sake but insofar as they are ordered to some good” [In I
Cor, XV.ii.925; trans. Stump]. In itself suffering is a bad thing; it acquires
positive value only when it contributes to spiritual well-being.
(Stump, 1999, pp. 201–2)
Aquinas’s natural law ethic thus warrants the alleviation of suffering and supports
palliative medicine. Care for the body also follows from Aquinas’s contention that
we should love our bodies (ST, IIa-IIae.25.5).
The overarching principle at work in the aforementioned considerations is that
of nature and the natural law which follows from a consideration of, specifically,
human nature. Goodness, with respect to the body, is the body’s health and relief
from suffering, which allows it to fulfill its proper functioning.This goodness is to
be promoted by any means which do not themselves violate the natural law. I thus
conclude that Aquinas supports palliative medicine and any medical treatment that
promotes the body’s health and relief from suffering, so long as such treatment does
not violate the natural law. Since active euthanasia, as a form of suicide, is a
violation of the natural law, it cannot be justified even as a means of alleviating
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suffering.When bodily suffering is unavoidably forced upon us, we can take what
steps we can to lessen or eliminate it. But if suffering is part of the natural course
of one’s life, meaning that the only way to end the suffering is to end one’s life,
then it must be endured as it is now constitutive of one’s existence. Due to the
potential value of a human being’s experience of suffering and impending death,
Aquinas exhorts us to respect the fundamental natural inclination to live and not
deny this inclination only for the sake of satisfying our other natural inclinations
not to experience suffering and death.
Passive euthanasia
As alternatives to active euthanasia, two types of cases come to the fore at this
point. One is a form of passive euthanasia, or “letting die,” that involves the non-
utilization9 of life-sustaining treatment for a terminally ill patient. If the overarching
principle at work in Aquinas’s ethic is that of noninterference with one’s nature,
then if one’s natural state is that of bodily decay toward death, interference with
that natural course is not warranted. Hence, the utilization of artificial means to
sustain a living body, which would otherwise be dead, is not required and may even
be wrong on Aquinas’s account. Since passive euthanasia is not suicide, nor homi-
cide, it is not summarily dismissed as is active euthanasia. Furthermore, since passive
euthanasia is, by definition, the allowance of nature to take its course without
interference, it seems to be not only permissible according to natural law, but also
demanded.
One must be careful, though, to keep in mind that Aquinas’s natural law ethic is
not a call for universal, absolute respect for the natural course of things. Rather,
Aquinas is exhorting us to use a being’s defined nature to determine what is
“good” or “evil” for that type of being. Since it is constitutive of human nature to
be living, then any action that sustains and promotes life is “good.” Understood in
this sense, passive euthanasia would not be consistent with the natural law. Rather,
any possible means to sustain life would be warranted. On this construal of natural
law, hooking a body up to respirators and other life-sustaining machines is
apparently mandated. Nevertheless, as James Colbert, Jr notes, “To suggest that
recognizing an absolute value in life in a Thomistic sense, would require that one
use all imaginable means to conserve life, is a caricature” (Colbert, 1978, p. 196).
I will return to this issue later.
The other type of case, which I will discuss first, involves the administration of
palliative treatment that has the foreseen concomitant – that is, unavoidable –
consequence of hastening a patient’s death. I will discuss only the limited topic of
palliative treatment – that is, the administration of analgesic medication – as opposed
to the more expansive topic of palliative care, which is “the active total care
of patients whose disease is not responsive to curative treatment” and involves
“control of pain, of other symptoms, and of psychological, social and spiritual
problems” (World Health Organization, 1990, p. 11). I will also limit my discussion
to palliative treatment for patients who are terminally ill and have reached the limit
of medicine’s ability to cure them of their affliction.
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Administration of palliative treatment and terminal sedation
The goal of palliative treatment is not only to minimize a patient’s experience of
pain, but also, by making the patient as comfortable as possible, to allow them to
carry out whatever activities they are able to perform that contribute to the flour-
ishing of their remaining life – conversing and emotionally sharing with family and
friends, putting their final affairs in order, and preparing spiritually for death:
Given that not even an approximation to health can be achieved, one aims to
secure as tolerable a state of the organism as possible so that conscious living (with
family and friends and others) may continue. Thus palliative medicine, in
deploying techniques of pain control, is focused, just like other forms of medi-
cine, on the organic component of our aptitude to share in other human goods.
(Gormally, 1994, p. 134)
The most effective forms of palliative treatment, used in cases of the most severe
pain, may have the concomitant negative effect of hastening a terminally ill
patient’s death. Hence, in order to judge the provision of such treatment to be
morally permissible, Aquinas must hold some form of the Principle of Double
Effect (PDE) – as I argue he does in Chapter 1 – since he is explicitly against active
euthanasia.To be morally permissible, the forms of palliative treatment considered
here must be distinguished as an act in which a patient’s death is not directly
intended (Cavanaugh, 1996).
An example would be a case in which a patient with end-stage lung cancer
requires analgesic medication to control the intense suffering they endure with
each successive breath.The only effective medication – usually an opiate such as
morphine – has the known consequence of causing respiratory suppression, and
this effect is even more acute in this case due to the patient being in the end stage
of lung cancer. If administered, this medication will not only ease the patient’s
suffering, but also likely cut short the length of time that they are able to continue
to respire, and hence to live. Recent development of nonopiate analgesic medica-
tions, as well as “antagonist” drugs – for example, Narcan – that can counteract the
respiratory suppressant effect of morphine, limit the number of cases in which the
administration of effective palliative treatment will actually hasten a patient’s death
(Barry and Maher, 1990, pp. 129–36). Nevertheless, James Bernat observes that,
“Occasionally a patient’s pulmonary failure is so severe that the small respiratory
suppressant effect may become clinically significant. In these cases, it is conceivable
that the high-dose opiates necessary to control pain or dyspnea might accelerate
death” (Bernat, 2001, p. 977).
Another example is what is generally termed “terminal sedation.” In some cases,
a patient’s condition is so severe that the only effective means of alleviating their
suffering is to render them unconscious:
In cases of intolerable and refractory suffering, adequate relief can be obtained
only by sedating the patients, often into unconsciousness, so that they no
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longer are able to feel their pain or other suffering.Although the frequency of
intolerable and refractory symptoms is uncertain, studies have found their
existence in 10–50% of terminally ill patients referred for palliative care.
(Orentlicher, 1997, p. 955; cf. Cherny 
and Portenoy, 1994, p. 32)
The use of terminal sedation is sometimes a necessary means of providing effective
palliative treatment for terminally ill patients:
One report has suggested that more than 50% of patients with terminal cancer
have physical suffering during the last days of their life controlled, as such, only
by sedation.Another report shows that 40% of all dying patients in the United
States die in pain. Recently, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) found that any-
where from 40% to 80% of patients with terminal illness report that their
treatment for pain is inadequate and prolongs the very agony of death.
(Smith, 1998, p. 382)
Reported reasons for using sedation include pain (12%), anguish (14%),
respiratory distress (12%), agitation/delirium/confusion/hallucinations (12%),
fear/panic/anxiety/terror (10%), emotional/psychological/spiritual distress
(10%), restlessness (10%), seizures/twitching (4%), and nausea/vomiting/
retching (2%). Nevertheless, delirium appears to be the most common
indication for terminal sedation.
(Lanuke et al., 2003, p. 279)
To determine the moral permissibility of terminal sedation, it is first necessary
to elaborate upon the nature of the act, its intended end, and the value of the
intended end.
Terminal sedation involves the use of a high dose of sedatives that renders a
patient unconscious: “Narcotics (e.g. morphine), benzodiazepine sedative drugs
(e.g.Valium), barbiturates (e.g. amobarbital) and/or major tranquilizing drugs (e.g.
Haldol or Thorazine) are used to sedate the patient” (Orentlicher, 1997, p. 955;
cf.Truog et al., 1992, p. 1678; Cherny and Portenoy, 1994, p. 35).The intended end
of terminal sedation is to relieve patients’ suffering either through removal of their
conscious experience of pain, or by hastening their death as the sedatives typically
used result in side-effects such as respiratory depression and hypotension. Herein
lies the controversial nature of terminal sedation, for either intention may be at
work in such acts. If the physician administering the sedative has the latter inten-
tion, then the act of terminal sedation is a form of active euthanasia. Sedation is a
means whereby the patient’s hastened death is not merely foreseen, but is willfully
caused:
In terminal sedation, not only is the patient’s death clearly foreseen, it is in fact
the end point of what is being done. Clearly (and however it may be cloaked
by the use of language), the intent here is more than just the clear goal of
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relieving pain and suffering. Because the goal of relieving pain and suffering
adequately can be attained only by obtunding the patient until death ensues,
the patient’s death becomes the end point and, therefore, one of the intended
goals.These goals do not differ from those of physician-assisted suicide or, for
that matter, voluntary euthanasia.
(Loewy, 2001, p. 331)
On the other hand, a physician may have the intention of merely suppressing the
patient’s consciousness so that they will not experience pain that cannot be
alleviated by other means:
Although proponents of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia contend that
terminal sedation is covert physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia, the
concept of sedating pharmacotherapy is based on informed consent and the
principle of double effect. Double effect acknowledges that the intent and
desired effect of treatment is mitigation of symptoms rather than cessation of
life, even though life may be shortened. However, prior to initiation of
sedation, clinicians must ascertain the need for sedating therapy, including the
presence of a terminal disease with impending death, exhaustion of all other
palliative treatments, agreement by patient and family members of the need
for sedation, and a current do-not-resuscitate order.
(Rousseau, 1996, p. 1785)
As noted in the preceding passage, the moral justification of an act of terminal
sedation with the intention of merely alleviating suffering, and not hastening
death, requires the applicability of PDE. I will demonstrate how PDE morally
justifies the use of terminal sedation given the proper intention merely to alleviate
suffering with the foreseen, but not directly intended, consequence of hastening a
patient’s death.
A further complication is that terminal sedation is sometimes exercised with the
stated intention of merely alleviating suffering, but concurrent with the sedative’s
administration is the withdrawal of all life-sustaining treatment, including artificial
nutrition and hydration (Quill and Byock, 2000).Therefore, a complete ethical assess-
ment of terminal sedation must include an evaluation of the moral permissibility of
withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration, which I provide later in this section.
In order for the administration of palliative medication or terminal sedation to
be justified, a physician must directly intend only to alleviate their patient’s suffer-
ing.The physician must not directly intend that the treatment cause or hasten the
patient’s death as a means of alleviating their suffering.The former intention may
be demonstrated by administering only enough of the medication to ease the
patient’s suffering effectively.Administrating more medication than is known to be
minimally necessary to be effective would demonstrate a direct intention not only
to ease suffering, but also to cause the patient’s death.10
Furthermore, the proper application of Aquinas’s form of PDE requires that the
foreseen negative consequence is merely “risked” and not certain to occur
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(Cavanaugh, 1997, pp. 116–19; Sullivan, 2000, p. 437). Robert Barry and James
Maher thus conclude:
The use of certainly lethal doses of analgesia would be wrong because they
would be the means by which death would occur even if it was judged to be
the only means available of relieving the patient’s pain. If one gave a certainly
lethal dose of painkillers to a patient, the hastening of death or shortening of
life would be equivalent to causing death . . .The use of an analgesic that
would be more lethal than therapeutic would make it the moral and physical
direct cause of death.
(1990, p. 139)
Any action that involves the direct intention of the patient’s death would not
be justified according to the Thomistic account of PDE described in Chapter 1.
One could argue that the patient’s death is not directly intended in this case
because the overall purpose is to alleviate their suffering. Such an argument, how-
ever, conflates the “object” of an action – what is done – with its “end” – why is
it done.Although the end – alleviation of suffering – is a good worth pursuing, the
act that is willfully done to achieve this end is not good – causing the patient’s
death. Even if one could successfully argue that death is not directly intended by
this action, it is nevertheless the means by which the patient’s suffering is alleviated
and thereby fails to fulfill the conditions of PDE.
Palliative treatment that merely increases the risk of a terminally ill patient’s
death, or hastens death without a direct intention to do so, is morally justified:
If hastening death only implies a relatively minor increase in the probability
of death or a minor reduction of the defenses of the body when there are
other highly lethal threats already present, then it would seem that use of
this form of analgesia would be permissible, as the good of alleviation of pain
would compensate for the increased risk of death.This is a common occur-
rence in medicine, as virtually all medications increase one’s risk of death.
(Barry and Maher, 1990, p. 140)
Aquinas’s account of the morality of human action allows an agent to directly
intend a good end, while at the same time allowing for foreseen concomitant
negative consequences. A physician may directly intend to alleviate their patient’s
suffering with the foreseen consequence of increasing the risk of the patient’s
death:
Indirectly life-shortening analgesia would be in accord with the principle of
double effect if the intention was only to relieve pain, if the analgesia were
not per se lethal, and if the pain was so severe and intractable that it was
proportionate to death itself.
(Barry and Maher, 1990, p. 137;
cf. Pellegrino, 1998, p. 1521)
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This does not entail, however, that the physician, or any moral agent in such
double-effect cases, is in no way responsible for their actions.The foreseen negative
consequence is not completely removed from the physician’s intention.
Nevertheless, there is a window of opportunity for the physician to justify why
they performed the directly intended action and thereby allowed the concomitant
negative consequence to occur. Such justification would include the fact that,
because it is not directly intended, the foreseen concomitant consequence does not
render “evil” the good action of administering palliative treatment for the sake of
alleviating suffering.
In cases of terminal sedation, a physician directly intends to alleviate their
patient’s suffering by the only effective means possible: rendering the patient
unconscious. Once sedated, the patient will not regain consciousness again, unless
the sedation is ceased and the patient is allowed to awaken and experience their
suffering. Terminal sedation, understood as an act of rendering a patient uncon-
scious until death naturally ensues with the foreseen side-effect of death being
hastened, is clearly justified by appeal to PDE so long as no other means are
available to alleviate the patient’s intractable suffering effectively:
Analyses of the morality of sedation in patients who are imminently dying,
using the principle of double effect, conclude that it is morally permissible
when there is no better alternative. Sedating a patient for palliative care is
moral.The death of the patient may be a foreseen consequence but is not the
intended consequence; only relief of pain or other symptoms is intended.The
relief of pain does not require the death of the patient to be effective.The act
is performed for a proportionately serious reason, namely to prevent suffering.
(Bernat, 2001, p. 978; cf. Mount, 1996, pp. 34–5; Orentlicher,
1997, p. 957; Pellegrino, 1998, p. 1521; Sulmasy and 
Pellegrino, 1999, p. 547; Krakauer et al., 2000, p. 60;
Gauthier, 2001, p. 45;Williams, 2001, p. 50; Jansen and 
Sulmasy, 2002, p. 847; Lanuke et al., 2003, p. 280)
Terminal sedation does not necessarily involve a physician directly intending that
their patient’s death be hastened. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 3, Aquinas
does not equate permanent unconsciousness with death, nor does he deny the
intrinsic goodness of life itself. Death does not ensue until the body’s integrated
organic functioning ceases. Rendering a patient unconscious does not entail
intending their death; the lack of this intention may be evidenced by the sedative
being titrated to render the patient unconscious effectively, but not unduly hasten
their death (Truog in Krakauer et al., 2000, p. 59). A direct intention to hasten
death, though, may underlie some acts of terminal sedation; thus rendering the act
morally impermissible in such cases.
The value of intending to alleviate a patient’s intractable suffering through
terminal sedation is sufficiently obvious: relief of suffering. But the value of a
patient’s continued conscious existence is also worth noting.While Aquinas would
consider it impermissible to inhibit a person’s conscious rational activity for no
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good reason, there may be a sufficiently good reason to do so when a person’s
experience of pain is so severe as to inhibit their conscious rational activity already.
While a person’s conscious rational activity is a good worth promoting, an arguably
proportionate good is relief from intense and intractable pain.
As mentioned earlier, an important corollary of terminal sedation is the
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) because many cases of
terminal sedation involve the latter as well.Though a number of authors recognize
the justification of terminal sedation by PDE, some also warn that PDE does not
justify the additional act of withdrawing ANH after unconsciousness has been
induced:
The principle of double effect, however, only justifies the sedation part of
terminal sedation. We cannot justify the withdrawal of food and water
component of terminal sedation, because that step does nothing to relieve the
patient’s suffering, but rather serves only to bring on the patient’s death.
(Orentlicher, 1997, p. 957)
Whereas the goal of administering barbiturates to induce sleep to relieve
suffering is good and beneficial to the patient, on no interpretation can the
additional step of withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration be considered
a necessary condition of relieving pain . . .Accordingly withdrawing food and
water from a terminally sedated patient cannot be justified under the principle
of double effect. It must and should always be confined to excluding situations
involving withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration.
(Williams, 2001, pp. 51–2)
David Orentlicher argues that terminal sedation accompanied by withdrawal of
ANH implicates the physician in having a direct intention of hastening the
patient’s death (Orentlicher, 1997, p. 959). Two forms of terminal sedation must
therefore be distinguished: (1) terminal sedation simpliciter, which involves only the
titrated administration of analgesic medication to the point that a patient loses
consciousness and is maintained in an unconscious state until death naturally
ensues; and (2) terminal sedation accompanied by the withdrawal of ANH. (1) is
clearly justified by appeal to PDE; but determining the moral permissibility of
(2) requires a detailed ethical analysis of the withholding or withdrawal of artificial
life support, including nutrition and hydration.
Nonutilization of life-sustaining treatment
Since Aquinas holds a form of PDE, then not only may palliative treatment and
terminal sedation be justified actions, but the nonutilization of life-sustaining
treatment may also be justified provided that the patient’s death is not directly
intended, but only that their suffering not be prolonged. In this case, the object of
the action is the nonutilization of life-sustaining treatment.The directly intended
end is not to prolong the patient’s suffering; death is a foreseen concomitant
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consequence. One may question this description by asserting that, in this case, the
patient’s death is the direct means by which the end of not prolonging their suf-
fering is achieved. I disagree and contend that the direct means of not prolonging
the patient’s suffering is by not employing measures to sustain their life indefinitely.
The nonutilization of life-sustaining treatment does not cause the patient’s
death.Their death is due to the natural course of whatever disease or injury they
suffer. This is truly a case of “passive” euthanasia, in which a patient’s natural
condition is allowed to be the cause of death.
Sustaining biological existence is a “good,” however, as well as not prolonging
suffering:“Human bodily life is a great good. It is a good of the person and intrinsic
to the person and is not a mere instrumental good or good for the person”
(May, 1990, p. 81; cf. May et al., 1987, p. 204; May, 1998, p. 48).When only one of
these goods can be pursued to the exclusion of the other, the paramount moral
requirement is that “evil” not be perpetrated in the pursuance of either one.The
questionable element is that the nonutilization of life-sustaining treatment has the
concomitant consequence of not preventing the patient’s death. Nevertheless, since
Aquinas holds PDE and it is applicable to this type of case, the nonutilization of
life-sustaining treatment may be morally permissible.
It is important, though, to consider the type of life-sustaining treatment that may
be provided and the type of patient to whom it is being provided in determining
if its nonutilization is permissible. I will discuss three relevant cases: nonutilization
of artificial respiration for a whole-brain dead patient; nonutilization of ANH for
a PVS patient; and nonutilization of ANH for a terminally ill patient whose death
is imminent.
The nonutilization of artificial respiration for a whole-brain dead patient is a
paradigm case of morally permissible passive euthanasia. First of all, such an action
is not technically an act of “euthanasia” because a whole-brain dead patient is
indeed dead. The nonutilization of artificial respiration merely brings about the
total cessation of persistent, but not integrated, biological processes; the human
organism has already ceased to exist. Second, as Patrick Hopkins notes, “The
principle here is that a patient being artificially sustained is not being sustained in
the kind of way that necessarily morally prohibits interrupting their physical
processes, even if death may result” (Hopkins, 1997, p. 33).
Normally, interrupting the physical process of a person’s respiration – for
example, by strangling or suffocating them – would be morally impermissible
because one is interfering with that person’s “natural” vital metabolic processes.
In the case at hand, though, one is interfering with something “artificial” that
replaces one of a person’s vital metabolic processes in order to sustain the rest.This
characterization of the case involves, as Hopkins describes:
thinking of the patient on a respirator as an artificially sustained being. Once
the patient’s breathing is artificial, once his or her vital processes are artificially
maintained, once his or her very existence is perceived as a novel phenomenon,
then certain alterations of physiological processes become merely the removal
of artificial interventions.
(1997, p. 33)
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Hopkins challenges this characterization and contends:
The problem with the connection between passive euthanasia (or “acts of
omission”) and machines is that the age-old distinction between nature and
artifice obscures the actual functional relevance of particular machines to
particular bodies. What is often ignored is the constitutive function the
machine plays in the coherence of the actual person.
(1997, p. 33)
Hopkins considers the withdrawal of artificial respiration to constitute direct
interference with a patient’s vital metabolic processes:
But the problem in the respirator case is that the machine we are going to
remove is the pulmonary system of the sick patient (or more precisely, is
an integral part of that system).That machine breathes for the patient; it is a
basic functional component of her pulmonary system, just like lungs are
a basic functional component of the pulmonary system of a healthy person.
(1997, p. 34)
The basis for Hopkins’s contention is the lack, he argues, of a morally relevant dif-
ference between an artificial respirator and a pair of lungs; the only difference
between them, he asserts, is the material out of which they are constructed and this
hardly constitutes a morally relevant difference (Hopkins, 1997, pp. 34–5). He thus
concludes,“Only if one assumes that there is a metaphysical, essential, and intrinsic
moral difference between machines and natural bodily organs can one claim
that turning off a machine is merely an omission, merely a passive act” (Hopkins,
1997, p. 35).
Is there a morally relevant difference between natural organs and artifacts? As
noted in Chapter 3,Aquinas holds that there is. Natural substances and artifacts are
distinct grades of being (In DA, II.1).This ontological difference in their respective
essences precludes an artifact becoming a “proper part” of a natural substance; an
artifact cannot be informed by a natural substance’s substantial form, especially an
artifact that has its power source and locus of control outside the body. This
conclusion is at odds with Hopkins’s characterization of artificial respirators as onto-
logically similar to the lungs that constitute a person’s body.While it is true that an
artificial respirator can functionally “mimic” my own lungs, such functional similar-
ity does not make that artifact mine in the sense that it is now part of my body. Part
of the rationale underlying this assertion is that such an artifact is functionally dis-
connected from me because it is not coordinated by my brainstem. My natural res-
piratory and cardiac systems are coordinated by electrical signals sent from my
brainstem, and this makes them constitutive of me.Thus, while interfering with my
natural pulmonary or cardiac functioning does something directly to me, removing
an artificial respirator only does something directly to an object external to me that
consequently has an effect on me. Of course, if I am whole-brain dead, then my
death does not result from the respirator’s withdrawal since I am already dead.
There may be cases, however, in which a patient is not whole-brain dead, but is
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nonetheless irreversibly dependent on a respirator. In this case, the respirator’s
nonutilization has the negative effect of bringing about the patient’s death.Thus, for
such an act to be morally permissible, it must be justified by PDE. This would
require that the directly intended end of not utilizing the respirator is not to bring
about the patient’s death, but merely to avoid prolonging their suffering.11
If the nonutilization of artificial respiration is morally justifiable by appeal to PDE,
then would the nonutilization of artificial nutrition and hydration be justified as well?
According to J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae, the two actions are morally equivalent:
In cases in which it is morally appropriate to remove a ventilator, it is similarly
appropriate to withdraw medically provided nutrition and hydration, for
withdrawing medically provided nutrition and hydration is not starving some-
one to death any more than removing a ventilator is suffocating someone. In
both cases the underlying disease or injury, not the removal of the treatment,
is the cause of death.
(2000, p. 338)
In cases of whole-brain dead patients, the nonutilization of ANH is clearly justified
because the patient is already dead and ANH sustains only individual biological
processes that no longer constitute an integrated organism. Controversial cases of
not utilizing ANH typically involve PVS patients who are not whole-brain dead.
It could be argued that, for such patients, the nonutilization of ANH or artificial
respiration (if necessary) is justifiable by appeal to PDE so long as the directly
intended end is merely not to prolong their suffering. Fred Rosner, however, notes:
Patients in a coma or a persistent vegetative state are not suffering.Their families,
friends, care givers, and society may suffer emotionally and financially. But it is
wrong to relieve the suffering of others by shortening the life of the patient.
(1993, p. 1894)
If PVS patients are incapable of suffering, then what good is being served by their
life not being prolonged? May and others argue that there is a fundamental good
that is served by utilizing ANH for a PVS patient:“Human life itself ” (May et al.,
1987, p. 210).
Aquinas asserts:
It is prescribed that a human being sustains his body, for otherwise he murders
himself...Therefore,one is bound to nourish his body, and we are bound likewise
with respect to all other things without which the body cannot live.
(In II Thes, III.2)
This passage can be interpreted to support the provision of ANH just as we are
required to provide food and water to any hungry or thirsty person in need. A
more widely applicable interpretation, however, would seem to follow because
Aquinas requires the provision of “all other things without which the body cannot
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live.” This implies that we ought to provide artificial respiration and any other
medical treatments, such as radiation and chemotherapy for cancer patients,
without which their bodies cannot live. Aquinas recognizes, though, that what he
has asserted does not entail an absolutely binding obligation:
It is inherent in everyone by nature that he loves his own life and whatever is
ordered toward it, but in due measure, such that these things are loved not as
if the end were determined in them, but insofar as they are to be used for the
sake of his final end.
(ST, IIa-IIae.126.1)
Hence, the use of ANH is not necessarily warranted in all cases. For example, when
a terminally ill patient is facing imminent death, such that any effort to prolong their
life would be futile (Miles, 1992; Zucker and Zucker, 1997;Atkinson, 2000; Bailey,
2003; Cantor et al., 2003; Nelson, 2003), or such that their body cannot metabolize
what is being provided, ANH is no longer medically or morally indicated (May
et al., 1987, p. 209;Gormally, 1999, p. 265).The use of ANH is not warranted in such
cases because the patient’s impending death is hardly affected by its provision.
A PVS patient may not be facing imminent death, but the provision of ANH
may nonetheless be futile because it will not improve the prognosis for recovery of
conscious rational thought. Kevin O’Rourke and Patrick Norris note Aquinas’s
distinction between a “human act” (actus humanus), which follows from a person’s
intellect and will, and an “act of a human” (actus hominis), which is an autonomic
reflex or absent-minded action that does not follow from one’s intellect and will
(ST, Ia-IIae.1.1).They further note Aquinas’s assertion that the purpose of a human
being’s life – the “final end” to which Aquinas refers in the preceding passage – is
achieved only through the intentional human acts that follow from intellect and
will (ST, Ia-IIae.5.1).They thus conclude:
People who are not able to perform acts of cognitive-affective function
because of some pathology are not less human, but the moral mandate to help
them prolong their lives is no longer present because they will never again
perform human acts, that is, acts proceeding directly from the intellect and
will. Clearly people in this condition . . .may not be directly put to death nor
mistreated in any way, but life support that keeps them alive need not be
continued because it does not offer them any hope of benefit.
(2001, p. 210; cf. Eberl, 2005c)
While a PVS patient’s biological life has an inherent fundamental value, as May and
others contend, its value relative to the patient’s pursuit of ends that are consciously
willed has been mitigated by their irreversibly unconscious condition.The patient
still lives and is a person, and so one may not directly intend to end their life or
mistreat them, but measures to prolong their life that are futile – in terms of failing
to provide for some measure of recovery – or disproportionately burdensome12 are
not morally mandated.
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In some cases, a patient has lost the swallowing reflex, which is a fatal pathology
indicating the body’s refusal of further nutrition so that death may naturally occur
(O’Rourke, 1989).The provision of ANH, however, may induce this fatal pathology
by allowing the esophageal muscles to atrophy.13 If ANH is medically necessary to
maintain a patient’s life, then inducing this fatal pathology is justified by PDE as a
foreseen concomitant consequence.14 Once this pathology is present, the futile pro-
vision of ANH is no longer warranted as the body is preparing itself for death.
Withdrawal of ANH in such a case, while hastening the patient’s death, is justified
by PDE because the direct intention is not to prolong their already protracted
process of dying; the fundamental value of their continued bodily existence is con-
trasted by their body’s own natural refusal of further nutrition. Even if the patient is
not consciously suffering, the medical futility of providing ANH and the evidence
that the patient’s body is naturally preparing itself for death contraindicates further
provision of ANH. Therefore, in the case of Terri Schiavo, if she were correctly
diagnosed as a PVS patient and no longer had the swallowing reflex – and thus
would not have benefited from hand-feeding – then the withdrawal of ANH was
justified by PDE and the futility of continued treatment that would not have
improved her condition and may have unduly prolonged her dying process.
Organ donation
Organ donation is an important end-of-life issue that has significant consequences
for both donors and potential recipients. According to the United Network for
Organ Sharing (UNOS), as of October 1, 2004, there are 87,012 patients on the
transplant waitlist. UNOS also reports that there have been 13,226 transplants per-
formed between January and June 2004 utilizing organs from 6,935 donors.15
There is obviously a large gap between the amount of transplants occurring and
the number of patients in need.The US Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network and the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients published in their
2003 Annual Report that more than 6,000 patients died while awaiting a transplant
that year.16
It is not difficult to conceive of organ donation being an inherently good action
from Aquinas’s natural law perspective. First, organ donation promotes human life as
its directly intended end. Second, participation in this form of communal giving can
be arguably derived as a secondary natural law principle, based on humanity’s inher-
ently social nature and our natural inclination to promote the common good.Amitai
Etzioni describes the goal of the “communitarian approach” to organ donation:
The essence of the communitarian approach is that it seeks to make organ dona-
tion an act people engage in because they consider it their social responsibility,
something a good person does, akin to volunteering, contributing to a cause,
not parking in handicap spaces, recycling, not washing one’s car when there is
a water shortage, and so on.
(2003, p. 5; cf. Nelson, 2001)
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It would be a mistake, though, to conceive of organ donation as a mandate of nat-
ural law without considering some issues that arise given Aquinas’s metaphysical
view of human nature, as well as the fundamental good of the donor’s life in
addition to the lives of any potential organ recipients. Some of the particular issues
that I will address are religious objections to organ donation based on belief in
postmortem bodily resurrection, Aquinas’s view of a human being’s bodily
integrity and when it is justifiable to violate such integrity in cases of “living”
donation, and finally procurement of organs utilizing “non-heart-beating donor”
protocols.
Organ donation and belief in bodily resurrection
Some religious believers object to organ donation due to their belief that human
beings will enjoy a bodily existence postmortem, which comes about through the
resurrection of the body that had been lain down in death. For orthodox Jews and
fundamentalist Christians, this belief entails that all the body’s parts must be present
in order for human beings to be resurrected in their physical entirety:
The traditional rabbinic belief in bodily resurrection is, for some Jews, the
source of an important objection to organ donation. They believe that the
body must be buried with all its parts so that they will all be there when it
comes time for resurrection.
(Dorff, 1996, p. 179)
As the Pauline notion of the resurrection suggests, there is a grand economy in
the universal matter of bodies.All the parts must be accounted for. Even when
an organ is fatally diseased or not functioning, it cannot be thrown away.
(Barkan, 1996, p. 243)
Robert Veatch contends, though, that “fundamentalist Christians who really
understand their church’s doctrine should not have a problem with organ dona-
tion as far as belief in a resurrection of the body is concerned” (Veatch, 2000, p. 7).
The understanding of the Christian belief in bodily resurrection to which
Veatch refers is found within Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human nature.
Aquinas defines a human being’s death as the separation of their rational soul from
the body it informs (Eberl, 2000b, p. 216).17 He contends that a human being’s
rational soul does not perish with its body, but persists as a separate immaterial
thing that still composes a human being, albeit incompletely (Eberl, 2004,
pp. 339–41). But a rational soul cannot persist forever in a state of separation from
its body, for this condition is “unnatural” for it (CT, 151; SCG, IV.79; Eberl, 2000b,
pp. 216–17). Aquinas thus concludes that a rational soul’s reunion with the same
body it informed premortem is mandated by natural necessity (CT, 153). He argues
that the resurrected body’s identity is effected through its being informed by the
same soul that had previously informed it; the resurrected body is the same as the
Issues at the end of human life 117
body that had died because it has the same substantial form (ST, Supp.79.2; Eberl,
2004, pp. 357–8).
A human being’s resurrected body,Aquinas contends, need not be reconstituted
from the exact same material particles that constituted the body premortem.
Aquinas recognizes that the material constituents of a human being’s body are
constantly in flux throughout their life (SCG, IV.81; ST, Ia.119.1; Chandlish,
1968); bodies undergo cellular decay, and food is transformed by digestion into raw
material to generate new cells and other bodily components.This does not render
a human being’s identity problematic because the same substantial form persists
and functions as the “blueprint” for its body (Stump, 2003, p. 46; Eberl, 2004,
pp. 353–9).Therefore, since a human being’s rational soul persists between death
and resurrection and will inform the resurrected body, it is inconsequential what
matter composes the resurrected body. Regardless of where such matter originates,
it is made to compose this human being’s body because it is informed by its soul
(Stump, 1995, p. 517; Eberl, 2000b, pp. 223–4; Eberl, 2004, pp. 357–8).
Therefore, religious believers in postmortem bodily resurrection need not
oppose organ donation on that basis. Aquinas offers a clear and coherent
metaphysical account of human nature that preserves a human being’s identity after
death by virtue of the soul alone; the matter that composes a human being
premortem plays no essential, identity-preserving role either before or after death.
If one donates their organs, it does not follow that they will fail to have those
organs as parts of their resurrected body; any matter informed by their soul will be
formed such that it has all the requisite organs functioning perfectly.
Living donation and the principle of totality
Another major issue that arises in regard to organ donation from a Thomistic
perspective involves what scholars term the “principle of totality” (PT), which
refers to the relationship between a human body’s parts and the body as a whole.
Aquinas formulates PT as follows:
Since a member is part of the whole human body, it exists for the sake of the
whole . . .Hence, the disposition of a human body’s member is as it is advan-
tageous for the whole. Now a human body’s member is itself useful for the
good of the whole body, but it may happen accidentally that it is harmful, as
when a decayed member is corruptive of the whole body. If therefore a
member were healthy and remaining in its natural disposition, it cannot be cut
off without being detrimental to the whole human being.
(ST, IIa-IIae.65.1; cf. ST, IIa-IIae.64.2; SCG, III.112)
Aquinas holds that a healthy organ or limb cannot be excised from the body unless
it were to become detrimental to the body’s overall health, and even then only as
a last resort:“A member is not to be cut off for the sake of the bodily health of the
whole except when nothing can aid the whole otherwise” (ST, IIa-IIae.65.1.ad 3).
Some interpreters of Aquinas and moral theologians hold that PT precludes
“living” organ donation – that is, donation of a kidney or a lobe of the liver by a
118 Issues at the end of human life
living donor as opposed to procurement from a cadaver (Ramsey, 1970,
pp. 165–97; Gaffney, 1976). Others contend that living organ donation does not
violate PT (McCormick, 1975; Lamb, 1990, p. 105; Cherry, 2000; DuBois, 2002a,
pp. 435–6;). I agree with the latter position for several reasons. First, the functional
integrity of the donor’s body as a whole is not threatened by donating a kidney or
a lobe of their liver:
Because kidneys are paired and the body can function with one healthy
kidney, the removal of a kidney does not seriously impair an essential function.
Likewise, removal of a lobe of the liver typically does not impair function,
largely because the surgically reduced liver amazingly regenerates to nearly its
full size, doubling its mass in only seven days.
(DuBois, 2002a, p. 436)
Second, although there is an associated risk of death by becoming a living organ
donor due, for example, to complications from the transplant procedure or early
failure of the remaining kidney, such risk can be justified by appeal to PDE.
Nobody involved in a living donation procedure directly intends the donor’s
death, nor is their death a means toward the end of saving the recipient’s life.The
increased risk of death for the donor is a foreseen concomitant consequence of
living donation, but is merely foreseen and not directly intended.
Finally, there is a positive reason supporting living donation based on the
relationship between individual human beings and their communities. David Lamb
contends:
A “total” human being is essentially social, and when removed from a social
environment psychological, and possibly physiological, dysfunction can be
predicted.As a social being, it can be argued that the principle of totality must
include a capacity to co-operate with others, respond to their needs, and
receive help . . .Given that self-destruction is not an inevitable consequence of
kidney donation, it would appear that the risks entailed and modest dysfunc-
tion are compatible with the principle of totality, especially when threats to
social and psychological totality are apparent, such as the potential loss of a
caring and loved relative.
(Lamb, 1990, p. 105)
Living donation, as an act of “charity” (Cherry, 2000, p. 180), can thus be understood
as consistent with, if not directly following from, humanity’s fundamentally social
nature.
Perhaps the moral mandate, however, is even stronger than just an exhortation
to perform a charitable act. In formulating PT, Aquinas describes an apparent
subordination of the good of a human being’s whole body to the good of the
community:
But as the whole of a human being is ordained to the end of the whole
community of which he is a part [ST, IIa-IIae.61.1, IIa-IIae.64.2, 5], it may
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happen that cutting off a member, though it may tend toward the detriment
of the whole body, may nevertheless be ordained toward the good of the
community.
(ST, IIa-IIae.65.1)
This passage appears to be quite problematic because it seems to allow for the
community to require than an individual donate their kidney or lobe of their liver
if a matching recipient is located. Mark Cherry counters:
Persons exist neither for the sake of others nor for the sake of society. Citizens
may have certain duties to society, but this is quite different from asserting that
they are parts of a quasi social organism in the same sense as the kidney is part
of the body.
(Cherry, 2000, p. 179; cf. Kelly, 1960, p. 247)
Cherry is right to warn against any extreme form of instrumentalization or
subordination of individual human beings to their communities. Certainly any
legislative mandate to be a living donor would go too far; as Aquinas affirms, not
every type of virtuous act is to be enforced by human law (ST, Ia-IIae.96.4.ad 1).
Nevertheless, human beings have a fundamentally social nature and, to fulfill this
aspect of human nature,Aquinas appeals to the virtue of charity. Charity has for its
object first and foremost, according to Aquinas, God; but charity extends also to
love of one’s neighbor (ST, IIa-IIae.25.1). Pertinent to the issue of living organ
donation, Aquinas exhorts that, despite PT, a person should bear bodily injury
for their friend’s sake (ST, IIa-IIae.26.4.ad 2) and that one ought to love one’s
neighbor out of charity more than one’s own body (ST, IIa-IIae.26.5). He is
careful, though, not to imply that such a moral obligation is absolute or should be
externally forced upon someone:
Every human being is intent on the care of his own body, but not every
human being is intent on the care of his neighbor’s welfare, except perhaps in
an emergency. And so it is not necessitated by charity that a human being
offers his own body for his neighbor’s welfare, except in a case where he is
bound to care for his neighbor’s welfare. But if someone voluntarily offers
himself for that purpose, it pertains to the perfection of charity.
(ST, IIa-IIae.26.5.ad 3)
Therefore, an act of living donation is most properly construed as an act of charity
and is morally permissible despite the apparent conflict with PT. I thus agree with
Cherry when he argues:
(1) Persons are charitable beings and (2) such charity is good. Moreover, (3)
the good of being charitable is often more important than the good of pre-
serving the wholeness of the body. However, (4) directly intending to kill one-
self is forbidden (e.g., donating one’s heart while still living).Therefore: often
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charity is sufficient to defeat the prima facie moral impermissibility of removing
healthy human body parts, as long as this is not part of an act that intends
directly to kill oneself.
(2000, p. 180)
The dead donor rule and non-heart-beating donation
The overriding principle in the donation of vital human organs – for example,
heart, lungs, whole liver, or both kidneys – is what is known as the “dead donor
rule” (DDR). DDR states quite simply that organ procurement should never kill
a patient and may begin only after the donor has been declared dead (Robertson,
2000; DuBois, 2002a, p. 418). Given the conclusion reached in Chapter 3 regarding
the proper Thomistic concept and criterion of death, it is clear that vital organs
cannot be procured from a PVS patient. It also would not be permissible to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from PVS patients for the directly intended end
of procuring their vital organs after they expire (Hoffenberg et al., 1997).
I concluded in Chapter 3 that the optimal criterion by which to declare a
patient dead is the whole-brain criterion.This criterion has the pragmatic advantage
of allowing a patient’s vital metabolic functions to be maintained artificially so that
their organs are perfused with oxygenated blood and do not suffer the effects of
warm ischemia.This allows multiple organs to be procured, as well as greater time
to elapse between the declaration of death and organ procurement, which permits
more time for families to arrive at a decision regarding donation, for transplant
teams to organize, and for UNOS to find compatible recipients. Using the whole-
brain criterion to declare a patient dead so that, among other things, their organs
may be procured is not immune to criticism (Truog and Robinson, 2003).18
Nevertheless, it has been widely accepted as the medical standard for declaring
death and, as argued in Chapter 3, offers the best contemporary interpretation of
the Thomistic view of human death.
Recently, a new debate has arisen regarding the procurement of vital organs
from non-heart-beating (NHB) donors, so-called because death is declared in such
cases by the traditional criterion of irreversible cessation of heartbeat and respira-
tion, as opposed to the whole-brain criterion. The practice of procuring vital
organs from NHB donors began at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center,
but has since spread both nationally and internationally, and has the potential to
significantly increase the supply of vital organs for transplant (Institute of
Medicine, 2000, p. 7). This practice has been ethically evaluated from various
perspectives, but primarily in terms of whether it adheres to DDR given that
NHB donors typically have not suffered cessation of whole-brain functioning
(Arnold and Youngner, 1993; Youngner and Arnold, 1993; Arnold et al., 1995;
Campbell and Weber, 1995; DeVita et al., 1995; Spielman and McCarthy, 1995).
Non-heart-beating donation is basically characterized as follows:
The patient who becomes a non-heart-beating organ donor cannot sustain
life without continued medical intervention.When this medical intervention
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is stopped [or not utilized], cardiac and respiratory functions cease, death is
declared, and organs are removed.The process must be carried out rapidly in
order to remove organs before they become unsuitable for transplantation.
(Institute of Medicine, 2000, p. 8)
As noted in this passage, time is of the essence in NHB donation because the
cessation of cardiac functioning entails that the organs are no longer perfused with
oxygenated blood and are soon subject to functional deterioration due to warm
ischemia.
Non-heart-beating donation may be either “controlled” or “uncontrolled”
(Institute of Medicine, 2000, pp. 8–9, 1997, pp. 23–6). In uncontrolled cases, a
patient suffers spontaneous cardiac arrest and death is declared sometime after the
decision has been made to cease or not employ resuscitative efforts. In controlled
cases, a decision is made to withdraw artificial life support from a patient, and then
a separate decision is made to do so in a way that allows the patient’s vital organs
to be donated: the ventilator is turned off in an operating room after the patient
has been prepped for organ procurement. Hence, there are four categories of NHB
donors:
(1) patients who elect to have life-supporting therapy withdrawn and may
become organ donors following death; (2) patients who suffer cardiac arrest
and have a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order; (3) patients who suffer cardiac
arrest and are refractory to resuscitative efforts; and (4) patients who are
pronounced dead using neurologic criteria, but suffer cardiac arrest prior to
organ procurement.
(DeVita in Arnold et al., 1995, p. 34)
Patients in category (4) do not present an ethical challenge because they have
already been declared dead by the whole-brain criterion. The issue regarding
patients in the other categories is whether death is declared too quickly after the
cessation of cardiac functioning, before anoxia has resulted in irreversible neuro-
logical damage. In other words, if a patient in cardiac arrest can be resuscitated and
maintain whole-brain functioning, then are they actually dead if organ procure-
ment occurs within two, five, or ten minutes – which a number of NHB donation
protocols stipulate as a sufficient “wait time” – after the heart stops beating?
In Thomistic terms, are the rational soul’s vegetative capacities still present and
actualizable – if resuscitative measures are used – in a patient whose heart has
ceased functioning only two to ten minutes ago?
More specifically, the questions at hand are as follows: Is it legitimate to use the
circulatory/respiratory criterion to determine death without establishing death
using the whole-brain criterion as well? What standard of “irreversibility” should be
adopted in determining the loss of cardiac functioning? How much time should
be allotted between the cessation of cardiac functioning and organ procurement?
The answers to the first two questions inform the answer to the third.
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Jerry Menikoff and James Bernat both raise the following concern regarding the
determination of death by the traditional criterion alone:
At the time that the individual is declared dead, it is quite possible that sub-
stantial portions of that person’s brain (including the higher brain, responsible
for thoughts and emotions) have not yet permanently ceased to function. If
one, for example, were to restart pulmonary and cardiac function in that
person, the brain (including the higher brain) might then be brought back to
some degree of function.
(Menikoff, 2002, p. 14)
It is not clear that patients are dead within the first few minutes of apnea and
asystole. It takes considerably longer than a few minutes for the brain and
other organs to be destroyed from cessation of circulation and lack of oxygen.
Moreover, it takes longer than this time for the cessation of heartbeat and
breathing to be unequivocally irreversible, a prerequisite for death. As proof
of this assertion, if cardiopulmonary resuscitation were performed within the
first few minutes of cardiorespiratory arrest, it is likely that some of the pur-
portedly “dead” patients could be successfully resuscitated to spontaneous
heartbeat and some intact brain function.
(Bernat, 1998, p. 20)
James DuBois notes:
From a regulatory perspective, it is not necessary to establish that non-heart-
beating donors would meet brain-based criteria for determining death . . .
Nevertheless, from an ontological or metaphysical perspective, we can still ask
whether it is possible for a person to be dead before his or her brain has died.
Given the centrality of the role the brain plays in human life . . . it is difficult
to see how a person with a living brain could be dead
(2002b, pp. 34–5; cf. DuBois, 2002a, pp. 430–1)
In its report, Defining Death: Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Definition of
Death, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research affirms two formulations of the whole-brain
concept of death.The first defines death as the irreversible cessation of an organism’s
“integrated functions” (President’s Commission, 1981, p. 37) and contends that loss
of cardiopulmonary functioning and loss of whole-brain functioning are equally
suitable criteria for declaring death. The second recognizes the brain as the
“primary organ” that is both “the sponsor of consciousness” and “the complex
organizer and regulator of bodily functions” (President’s Commission, 1981, p. 34).
This view asserts that the loss of whole-brain functioning is the primary criterion
for declaring death and affirms the loss of cardiopulmonary functioning as a
practical surrogate (President’s Commission, 1981, p. 37).
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The second formulation is more consistent with the Thomistic account of death
described in Chapter 3, in which the brain is identified as the primary organ of the
mature human body through which the soul exercises its capacities in the body’s
various parts. If the second formulation is thus adopted, it follows that NHB
donation protocols should allow sufficient time for the brain to irreversibly cease
functioning before declaring death. Menikoff asserts:
It would indeed be disingenuous to claim that X [loss of cardiopulmonary
functioning] is being used as a surrogate for Y [loss of whole-brain functioning]
while interpreting the statute to allow reliance on X at a time when one is
certain that Y has not yet occurred.
(1998, p. 160)
But how long should one wait to ensure that irreversible cessation of whole-brain
functioning has occurred? The original Pittsburgh protocol requires only two
minutes of asystole for death to be declared.The Institute of Medicine, in its study
of NHB donation protocols, calls for a five-minute waiting period before procure-
ment begins (Institute of Medicine, 1997, p. 59, 2000, p. 22). Five minutes, however,
may be “too short a period to cause sufficient ischemic damage to the brain to ensure
that patients would meet brain death criteria. Probably ten to fifteen minutes would
be required” (DuBois, 2002a, p. 430; cf. Lynn in Arnold and Youngner, 1993, p. 175;
Menikoff, 1998, p. 161; Zamperetti et al., 2003, p. 183). But waiting so long after the
heart has stopped beating to procure vital organs is problematic because damage to
the organs from warm ischemia may render them unsuitable for transplant; unless, as
DuBois notes, available premortem interventions to preserve the organs are used.The
issue of whether such interventions may justifiably be employed, insofar as they may
hasten the donor’s death, will be addressed below.
The final key concept that requires discussion is “irreversibility.” In agreement with
the Institute of Medicine’s study regarding NHB donation protocols, DuBois claims
that the heart’s inability to “auto-resuscitate” is sufficient to declare cardiac function
irreversible in cases where a patient has a “do-not-resuscitate” order or has otherwise
refused further medical intervention (Institute of Medicine, 1997, pp. 58–9, 2000,
pp. 24–5; DuBois, 2002a, pp. 431–2, 2002b, pp. 32–3). DuBois is quite correct that it
would be “unethical and illegal” to resuscitate such patients. But the fact that patients
should not be resuscitated does not entail that they have lost the capacity to be resus-
citated and have their vegetative functions restored. DuBois admits this and refers to
reported cases of “near-death experiences” to illustrate the possibility that one may
be “clinically dead” once auto-resuscitation is no longer possible, and he uses the
Thomistic language of the soul leaving the body at that point. If resuscitative meas-
ures are then employed and spontaneous heartbeat and respiration resumes, DuBois
characterizes what occurs as “reanimation” – the soul returning to the body, its
departure having been reversed (DuBois, 1999, p. 129, 2002b, p. 33).
DuBois offers a metaphysically complicated picture of the soul’s separation from
the body at death that does not cohere with the Thomistic understanding of the
soul as the body’s “substantial form.” As articulated throughout this volume,
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a human rational soul is the principle of all the operations proper to human beings
that are actualized in their bodies: rational, sensitive, and vegetative. Furthermore,
a rational soul continues to inform its body until the capacity for vegetative oper-
ations is no longer actualizable in that body. While a patient whose spontaneous
heartbeat and respiratory activity has ceased is no longer actualizing their soul’s
vegetative capacities, such capacities are evidently present so long as spontaneous
heartbeat and respiration may be resumed.19 To describe the soul as leaving and
then being called back to the body by external resuscitation is significantly more
complex than understanding the soul to remain in the body as its substantial form
until its vegetative capacities are no longer actualizable at all in that body; the
clinical sign of this is the loss of spontaneous heartbeat and respiration where resus-
citation efforts would be futile. As Menikoff notes, “Irreversibility is a statement
about the physical state of our world and our ability to alter it” (Menikoff, 1998,
p. 158), not a statement about what we elect to alter.
There are further problems that arise from “basing the determination of death
on moral judgments rather than ontological arguments or ‘objective’ biological
phenomena” (Youngner et al., 1999, p. 16). One of which is that biologically
identical cases may end up being treated differently. A patient who has a DNR
order and is a candidate for being a NHB donor will be declared dead sooner than
a patient in cardiac arrest who wants to be resuscitated; and the same patient will
be declared dead later than a patient who simply has a DNR order and is not a
candidate for being a NHB donor (Youngner et al., 1999, p. 17). I thus agree with
Nereo Zamperetti and his colleagues, who argue that “the fact that one is bound
to die without active intervention does not mean that one is dead” and that those
who advocate waiting only two to five minutes after cardiac arrest to declare death
in NHB donation cases “mistake the ‘prognosis of death’ for the ‘diagnosis of
death’ ” (Zamperetti et al., 2003, p. 183).
As mentioned earlier, some interventions may be undertaken to prepare a NHB
donor’s vital organs so that more time may be allowed to pass between cardiac
arrest and the declaration of death:
Anticoagulants (e.g., heparin) and vasodilators (e.g., phentolamine) are
sometimes given to a donor shortly before the person’s death in order to
“improve” the quality of the donated organs.These drugs are not beneficial to
the patient, however, and in fact may be harmful. In some circumstances, they
may even hasten the death of the patient.
(Menikoff, 2002, p. 18)
The Institute of Medicine’s 1997 report discusses the possibility of such
pharmacological interventions being justified by PDE, just as the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment in NHB donation cases is justifiable by PDE in other cases
of terminally ill patients (Childress in Arnold and Youngner, 1993). The report
concludes that justifying the premortem use of such drugs “is a heavy burden
for the principle of double effect, and there is no consensus about whether the
principle can bear it” (Institute of Medicine, 1997, p. 52).
Issues at the end of human life 125
Veatch, on the other hand, demonstrates how this action can be justified by PDE:
It seems obvious that if the drug is given, the purpose is not to hasten the
patient’s death. It is not the quicker death that preserves the organs . . . the
purpose of administering the heparin or phentolamine is not to get the donor
dead more quickly.
(2000, p. 219)
The first conditions of PDE are satisfied because the patient’s death is not directly
intended as the end, nor is their death the means by which the directly intended
end – the preservation of viable organs – is brought about. Furthermore, it is
arguable that the positive effect of procuring viable vital organs for transplant,which
will likely save numerous lives, outweighs the negative effect of the patient’s death
being hastened. Of course, for Aquinas, the inherent fundamental value of the
donor’s life is incommensurable with the sum total of any number of other lives.
Hence, it is always wrong to act from a direct intention to end the donor’s life. In
NHB donation, however, a decision is previously made to withhold (uncontrolled)
or withdraw (controlled) life-sustaining treatment based on the futility of providing
such treatment or in compliance with a patient’s DNR order; this decision is justi-
fied by PDE.The donor’s death, caused by their underlying illness or injury, is immi-
nent and risking the side-effect of hastening their death through the use of heparin
or phentolamine is not equivalent to negating the value of the donor’s life (Veatch,
2000, pp. 219–20; cf. DuBois, 2002a, pp. 432–4, 2002b, pp. 37–8).
I thus conclude that organ donation is a morally virtuous act that is strongly sup-
ported by the Thomistic natural law ethic, even if it is not morally or legally man-
dated. Neither the religious belief in postmortem bodily resurrection, nor the
concern for preserving the integrity of a human being’s body as a whole, preclude
donating one’s organs in either living or cadaveric cases. Finally, organ procurement
from NHB donors is prima facie morally permissible provided that a sufficient wait-
ing time – at least ten to fifteen minutes – is allowed to pass between the onset of
cardiac asystole and the declaration of death to ensure that neurological function has
been irreversibly lost.While such a significant waiting period seems to contradict
the pragmatic value of using NHB donation protocols to procure viable organs, the
morally legitimate use of pharmacological preserving agents to maintain maximum
organ viability, prior to death being declared, alleviates this concern.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that PVS patients are persons despite the irreversible
loss of consciousness. They thus merit care that does not involve the direct
intention to terminate their inherently valuable life. Nevertheless, in cases of PVS
and other terminally ill patients, the prolongation of a life defined by intractable
suffering, or in which further medical treatment would be futile in staving off
imminent death or in restoring conscious rational activity, is not warranted.
Aquinas’s adherence to PDE allows for various actions to be morally permissible
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that have the foreseen concomitant consequence of risking a terminally ill or PVS
patient’s death being hastened. These actions include the administration of
palliative treatment, such as titrated morphine or terminal sedation, as well as the
nonutilization of life-sustaining treatment, such as artificial respiration and ANH.
Not all of these options, however, are permissible in every case. For example,
withdrawal of ANH is not permissible in cases of terminally ill, but conscious,
patients whose death is not imminent.
Finally, with respect to organ donation, there is an unequivocally inherent good
in donating one’s organs.This good can be satisfied either as a living donor – in
which a kidney or lobe of the liver is donated – or as a cadaver once death has
been properly declared. Death should be declared either by using the whole-brain
criterion, or by waiting a sufficient amount of time after the onset of cardiac
asystole to ensure that both the brain and the heart have irreversibly ceased
functioning and cannot be restored through resuscitative efforts.These are the only
clinical means of demonstrating that the donor’s rational soul has ceased to inform
their body and thereby satisfying DDR.
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Introduction
1 This condemnation was later annulled by Tempier’s successor, Stephen Bourret, on
February 14, 1325.
2 A brief note regarding pronoun use: For the sake of fidelity to the Latin of Aquinas’s
texts, I use masculine pronouns in all my translations; however, because Aquinas’s
thought is generally as relevant today as it was in the thirteenth century, I use the
gender-neutral plural pronouns throughout the volume to highlight Aquinas’s audience
being gender-inclusive. In fact, whereas Aquinas is generally considered to have a
negative view of the nature of women in comparison to men – following Aristotle and
the predominant attitude among his contemporaries – he actually contends that women
are not of an inferior nature to men and have an equal status to men as rational beings,
as persons created in the imago Dei (ST, Ia.93.6.ad 2, Ia.93.4.ad 1; for further correctives
on Aquinas’s view of women, see Nolan, 2000; Finnis, 1998, pp. 171–6).This is not to
say, though, that Aquinas would be a “feminist” by contemporary standards or that all his
views regarding women are relevant, or palatable, today.
1 Aquinas’s account of human nature and natural law theory
1 This section is derived from Eberl (2004).
2 I use the terms “mind” and “intellect” interchangeably.The former term, though, does
not precisely correspond to Aquinas’s understanding of the latter.As will be shown, the
mind includes certain capacities, such as the estimative capacity, that are distinct from
the intellective capacity to understand universal concepts. Hence, the intellect is but one
capacity of the mind. Contemporary philosophers, however, often understand the
concept of mind in a fashion similar to Aquinas’s concept of intellect and thus I propose
the interchangeability of these terms.
3 Aquinas recognizes different types of beings as persons. In addition to human beings,
Aquinas claims that angels are persons and that God exists as three distinct persons. Since
my interest here is solely with human persons, I will not entertain any further discussion
of such other types of persons.
4 Following Aristotle, Aquinas defines a “rational soul” as a soul that has the relevant
capacities for life, sensation, and rational thought and as the type of soul proper to the
human species.A “sensitive soul,” on the other hand, has the relevant capacities for only
life and sensation, and is the type of soul proper to all nonhuman species of the animal
genus. A “vegetative soul” has the relevant capacities for life alone and is proper to all
nonanimal living organisms (Aristotle, 1984, 414a30–415a14).
5 Examples of things that Aquinas counts as unum simpliciter are elemental substances,
certain mixtures of elemental substances, immaterial substances, and living organisms
(Pasnau, 2002, p. 88).
Notes
6 Aquinas states that two things that are joined by a “contact of power” [contactus 
virtutis] – that is, one thing is the efficient cause of change in the other – do not result
in an unqualified unity (SCG, II.56).
7 The qualifier,“typically,” is used here due to Aquinas’s understanding of the Incarnation
of Christ, in which the unified substantial existence of both human and divine natures
precludes a new ontological entity having come into existence when Christ’s soul
assumed a human body (CT, 211).
8 The purpose of phantasms is to be available for the mind to use in abstracting the uni-
versal, intelligible forms of perceived things. Phantasms are thus between the immediate
mental impression of an object perceived by sensation and the rational understanding of
that object’s nature as abstracted from any individuating characteristics (Kretzmann,
1999, pp. 350–64; Pasnau, 2002, pp. 278–95).
9 “Reduction” of a human being to their animal nature entails that they are nothing “over
and above” their material body. As will be shown, Aquinas argues that a human being’s
essential rational capacities entail that they are more than their body alone.
10 For detailed explanations of Aquinas’s account of rational cognition, see Kretzmann,
(1999, pp. 350–68); Pasnau (2002, chs 9–10); Stump (2003, ch. 8).
11 This is not to say that there are no clear bioethical implications of Aquinas’s virtue
theory, but I will leave the elucidation of his virtue theory and such implications for
another occasion.
12 A number of recent scholars – most notably, Grisez (1965); Finnis (1980, 1998),
Hittinger (1987); McInerny (1993, 1997); and Lisska (1996) – have offered various
contemporary interpretations of Aquinas’s natural law theory, though not all in
agreement with one another. I will not adjudicate the interpretive debates among these
scholars in this chapter.
13 For an account of the continued development of natural law theory beyond Aquinas,
see Rommen (1948, pp. 57–109, 135–58). For an analysis of natural law theory in
comparison to the antithetical legal positivist theory, see Henle (1993) and Rommen
(1948, ch. 6).
14 My intention here is to endorse Aquinas’s general natural law principles, but not to
underwrite all of his explicit applications of such principles. I apply these principles for
my own purposes in Chapters 4 and 5.
15 Aquinas does not hold that every principle of divine law reflects the natural law. Some
are revealed and ought to be followed because they pertain to an article of faith – for
example, the commandment not to make any graven image or to take God’s name in
vain (ST, Ia-IIae.100.1).
16 The only exceptions are those principles of divine law that pertain to articles of 
faith.
17 This section is derived from Eberl (2003).
18 This is illustrated in an example from ST, Ia-IIae.73.8, in which Aquinas contends that
a person who takes a shortcut through a field in order to commit fornication, which
results in their knowingly injuring the crops growing in the field, aggravates their sin of
fornication, even though they did not directly intend to injure the crops.
19 I discuss the moral permissibility of abortion and the use of abortifacient contraceptives
in Chapter 4.
2 The beginning of a human person’s life
1 Since Aquinas holds that all human beings are persons, I will use the terms “human
being” and “person” interchangeably.
2 Completion of the fertilization process is at “syngamy,” when the 23 chromosomes con-
tributed by each of the parental gametes are fused into a unique 46-chromosome
combination. The terms “fertilization,” “conception,” and “syngamy” may be used
interchangeably for the most part.
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3 This is Aquinas’s definition of “person,” which applies to, among other types of beings,
a body informed by a rational soul (ST, Ia.29.1); see Chapter 1.
4 This section is derived from Eberl (2005b).
5 See Chapter 1, p. 5.
6 See Chapter 1, note 4.
7 See Chapter 1, pp. 7–8.
8 Aquinas, following Aristotle, understands conception to involve male semen acting upon
female menstrual blood to form an embryo (ST, Ia.118.1.ad 4; Aristotle, 1984,
736a24–737b6). Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas had knowledge of sperm, ova, and DNA.
9 Since Aquinas holds that rational operations do not require the use of a bodily organ
(QDA, II), the requisite “organic complexity” here is that which allows for the
operations of sensation and imagination to generate phantasms of perceived objects from
which the intellect can abstract intelligible forms.
10 Aquinas contends, following Aristotle, that a developing embryo is first informed by a
rational soul at the time of “quickening,” which occurs 40 days after conception if it is
male and 90 days after conception if it is female (In Sent, III.3.v.2; Aristotle, 1984,
583b3–5).
11 Unlike vegetative and sensitive souls, which naturally inform properly organized matter,
Aquinas holds that God directly creates each human being’s rational soul (QDP, III.9;
SCG, II.86–7; ST, Ia.90.2, Ia.118.2; CT, 93). Nevertheless, he also contends that God
does not create a rational soul unless an appropriate body exists for it to inform; for a
rational soul has its natural perfection only by informing such a body to compose a
human being (ST, Ia.90.4).
12 Aquinas claims that a rational soul includes sensitive and vegetative capacities, and that
the sensitive and vegetative souls that had previously informed a developing embryo are
annihilated once a rational soul is created. He does so to counter the claim by some of
his contemporaries that there are three souls – vegetative, sensitive, and rational – existing
at the same time in a fully developed human being.
13 This section is derived from Eberl (2005b).
14 See Chapter 1, p. 9.
15 For further discussion of the “formative power” transmitted by semen to guide
embryonic development, and its conceptual relationship to DNA, see Eberl 
(2005b).
16 This contention may sound as if I am concluding that an embryo’s genetic identity is
sufficient evidence of its having an active potentiality for rational thought and thus being
a person.As will be explained below when discussing Ashley’s account, however, genetic
identity is not sufficient evidence of an embryo’s being a person. Donceel rightly notes
that, if such were the case, then hydatidiform moles – masses of placental tissue with the
same genetic identity as an embryo – would also count as persons (Donceel, 1970, p. 96).
Hence, it is not the case that merely possessing human DNA is sufficient for something
to be a person.
17 Aristotle defines four causes of any being. The “material cause” is the matter that
composes it, that out of which it is produced.The “formal cause” is the substantial or
accidental form that defines it as the type of thing it is.The “efficient cause” is the agent
or activity that instantiates the form in the matter, that which produces the thing.The
“final cause” is the end or purpose for which the thing is produced (Aristotle, 1984,
194b24–195a3).
18 For further discussion of Pasnau’s view, see Haldane and Lee (2003a), and the subsequent
responses by Pasnau (2003) and Haldane and Lee (2003b).
19 An “epigenetic primordium” is that from which a particular tissue, organ, or organ
system will naturally develop if unimpeded.The tissue, organ, or organ system does not
exist actually, but virtually, in its epigenetic primordium insofar as a developmental
continuity can be traced from one to the other.
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20 The cells in this conglomeration are individual living substances, each informed by a
vegetative soul (Eberl, 2000a, pp. 151–2).
21 “Totipotentiality” refers to a preimplantation embryo’s cells, each having the capacity to
divide and form any tissue or organ of a human body, or even a whole other body.
22 “Pluripotentiality,” as opposed to totipotentiality, refers to a cell’s having the capacity to
divide and form a range of tissues or perhaps even an organ, but not any tissue, organ,
or an entire human body.
23 An ovarian teratoma is a growth that arises from an ovum parthenogenetically – that is,
without fertilization by a sperm cell. A teratoma, after cleaving spontaneously from an
unfertilized ovum, “progresses to form a morula and a blastocyst; then it becomes
disorganized and develops into a tumor composed of well-differentiated cells and
tissues” (Suarez, 1990, p. 628).
24 Unlike the substantial form of, say, a flatworm, which may be divisible if the worm’s body
is divided into two distinct living worms (QDSC, IV.ad 19; QDP, III.12.ad 5;
In M, VII.16.1635; In DA, II.4), Aquinas argues that a human being’s rational soul is
indivisible, simple, and one (QDP,V.10.ad 6; SCG, II.86; QDSC, IV.ad 9; QDA, X.ad 15).
25 This way of construing the twinning phenomenon makes it the case that the proximate
progenitor of one of the twins, B or C, is A; whereas the proximate progenitor of A and
the other twin is A’s mother and father. This conclusion may be technically true, but
unproblematic because, for all practical purposes and due to the epistemic uncertainty
regarding which of the twins is identical to A, A’ s mother and father can be considered
as the parents of both B and C.
26 I do not see any possible epistemic criteria for determining which of the twins, B or C,
has the same substantial form as A and which is the new organism generated by a new
substantial form informing matter that previously composed A. Epistemic uncertainty
regarding which twin is identical with A, however, does not preclude the metaphysical
claim that one of the twins is identical with A while the other is not.
27 Practically, this is not how cloning would be carried out today. The process rather
involves “somatic cell nuclear transfer,” which refers to the nucleus of one of an adult
human being’s undifferentiated cells, say, from their bone marrow, being extracted and
infused in an enucleated ovum. Induced parthenogenetic reproduction of the ovum
could then result in a genetically identical organism. The metaphysical implication,
though, of a portion of an individual organism’s matter being removed and used to
produce a being with the same genetic identity, but a distinct substantial form, remains
the same as the theoretical process Lee describes.
28 Aquinas, following Aristotle, understands the primary organ to be the heart;
though contemporary science understands it to be the brain. For further discussion, see
Chapter 3.
29 A hydatidiform mole, as described earlier, is a mass of placental tissue with the same
genetic identity as an embryo. What separates a hydatidiform mole and a developing
embryo is that the former can never, despite its intrinsic genetic structure and even if it
is placed in a supportive uterine environment, develop into an organism with a func-
tioning cerebral cortex; the latter can.
30 A zygote’s “unilateral” development into a mature human being presumes that it has a
supportive uterine environment and no external factors impede its development.
31 For similar arguments for this conclusion, see Gerber (1966), Heaney (1992), Johnson
(1995), De Koninck (1999), Bracken (2001), Mirkes (2001),
32 This point is discussed further in Chapter 3.
3 The end of a human person’s life
1 This chapter, except for the section entitled “Circulatory/respiratory criterion,” is
derived from Eberl (2005a).
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2 My concern here is with the concept of death for human beings only. I will not address
any proposed concept of death for nonhuman organisms.
3 Originally, this criterion was linked with the cessation of cardiopulmonary functioning,
though such functioning can now be artificially stimulated or replaced.
4 The whole-brain criterion has received legislative approval in several nations, including
the United States (President’s Commission, 1981). In addition, it has received moral
approval from the Roman Catholic Church (White, et al., 1992; John Paul II, 2001).
5 For Aquinas’s assertion of (3), see QDSC, IV; In DA, II.1.
6 This passage elucidates the second sense of “to live” stated in the previous passage.
7 By “individual contrary parts,”Aquinas is referring to a human body’s diverse organs and
the basic elements constituting them.
8 Aquinas considers such “defects” to be the result of original sin and not from the fact
simpliciter of a human being’s natural embodiment (ST, Supp.75.1.ad 5).
9 It is clear in both this passage and the preceding one that Aquinas is referring to a rational
soul, as opposed to a vegetative or sensitive soul. For only a rational soul is incorruptible,
as the soul is described in the preceding passage, and Aquinas does not entertain any
discussion of vegetative or sensitive souls until QDA, XI, which comes after this passage.
10 Once again, the context of this passage – in ST, Ia.76, which concerns the union of a
rational soul to a body – makes it clear that Aquinas is not referring to either a vegetative
or a sensitive soul.
11 Shewmon no longer holds this position.As will be explained later, after briefly advocating
the whole-brain criterion (Shewmon, 1992), he now argues for a return to the circulatory/
respiratory criterion for establishing when death occurs (Shewmon, 1997, 1998a, 2001).
12 See Chapter 2, p. 25.
13 See Chapter 1, pp. 7–8.
14 The loss of higher-brain functioning does not preclude a rational soul from continuing
to engage in rational activity, but this would require the soul to have separated from its
body and thus for death to have occurred; see Eberl (2005c).
15 Similar interpretations of Aquinas are argued by Eike-Henner Kluge (Kluge, 1981) and
Robert Pasnau (Pasnau, 2002, p. 124). For a critique, see Eberl (2005a, pp. 36–9).
16 The story of Patricia White Bull was reported by The Associated Press and appeared in,
among other publications, the Saint Louis Post Dispatch, January 5, 2000, A4; see
Kavanaugh (2001, p. 68, n. 25).
17 See Chapter 2, pp. 34–5.
18 See Chapter 2, pp. 27–8.
19 While the essential form of artificial life support that precludes a patient having the
capacity for vital metabolic functions is a mechanical ventilator or a cardiopulmonary
bypass machine, additional supportive treatment may need to be provided, such as
the use of vasopressive drugs and other pharmaceuticals, to maintain the homeostatic
conditions of body temperature, fluid and electrolyte balance, etc.
20 The term “whole-brain functioning” does not refer to the functioning of every part of the
brain, but of the set of critical neural systems – defined by Bernat – present in the cere-
bral cortex, cerebellum, and brainstem that constitute the brain’s role as an “integrator”
for its body. All three components must be irreversibly nonfunctional in order for the
brain as a whole, and thus the patient, to be considered dead.There is, however, general
recognition that random electrical activity may persist in a brain that is nonetheless dead.
21 Shewmon provides a detailed analysis of 56 cases of whole-brain dead patients with
prolonged survival and persistence of these apparently somatically integrative functions
(Shewmon, 1998b).
22 Cases of whole-brain dead adults with prolonged somatic survival have been reported,
but with more medical complications than the cases of young children Shewmon cites,
thereby indicating that integrative unity was not maintained despite persistent, artificially
stimulated, cardiac functioning (Parisi et al., 1982).
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23 This conclusion, though, remains merely apparent, because it is inconclusive whether the
random electrical signals that may persist in a “dead” brain – and are usually discounted
as being correlated with any integrative functioning – are indeed not constitutive of
somatic integrative unity. The possibility that they are may mandate a revision to the
clinical criteria for establishing whole-brain death; requiring the cessation of all
electrical activity in any brain structure. I am willing, though, to take the standard
understanding of whole-brain death and Shewmon’s description of these cases as
adequate for now.
24 While, for Aquinas, an artificial conductor joining the brainstem to the rest of the body
would not be a proper part of the patient, because it is not suitable for being informed
by their rational soul; it nevertheless can function as a “facilitator” to bring about
functional unity of the brainstem with the rest of the body. The artificial conductor
would be akin to a pacemaker in that it assists integrative functioning rather than
replacing such functioning, as in the case of a mechanical ventilator or cardiopulmonary
bypass machine.
4 Issues at the beginning of human life: abortion,
embryonic stem cell research, and cloning
1 For Aquinas, the existence of any human being entails the existence of a person (ST,
IIIa.16.12.ad 1). Hence, I use the terms “human being” and “person” interchangeably.
2 I will not address here the moral permissibility of utilizing nonabortifacient
contraceptives. For an analysis of this issue from a Thomistic natural law perspective, see
Rhonheimer (2000, pp. 109–38). Even if the general use of nonabortifacient
contraceptives is morally questionable, though, it is recognized – by even the most ardent
pro-life advocates – that a rape victim may protect herself from a resultant pregnancy by
nonabortifacient means (Ashley and O’Rourke, 1997, p. 305; Ford, 2002, pp. 94–5).
3 For discussions of the role of “risk” in Aquinas’s formulation of PDE, see Sullivan (2000,
p. 437) and Cavanaugh (1997, pp. 116–19).
4 For further information, visit http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics3.asp.
5 An ESC “line” is a self-renewing cluster of ESCs that have been derived from the ICM
of an embryo and are cultured on mouse embryonic fibroblast feeder layers (Thomson,
2001, pp. 17–20).
6 See Chapter 2. Ford’s argument on twinning in particular has been utilized on several
occasions to support ESC research (Robertson, 1999, p. 117; Eberl, 2000a; Lanza et al.,
2000; Shannon, 2001, p. 178; Green, 2002, p. 22; McCartney, 2002, pp. 604–8).
7 Michael Burke illuminated to me another distinction in potentiality that Peters fails to
note: “strong” versus “weak.” A somatic cell is potentially a human being, in the strong
sense, only if it could come to be a human being while preserving its numerical iden-
tity – that is, it remains the same substance identical with itself throughout its develop-
ment from a cell to a fully actualized human being.A change, however, from a somatic
cell to a human being does not appear to be an identity-preserving transformation.
Aquinas denies that a vegetative substance – a somatic cell – can change into a rational
substance – a human being – and remain the same substance, because vegetative and
rational substances are of distinct species with quite different substantial forms.The only
sense in which a somatic cell is plausibly a potential human being is in the weak sense
that it provides the “makings” of a human being; and such weak potentiality clearly does
not confer a right to life.
8 Aquinas would thus support the use of animals for food or medical research when it is
unavoidably necessary for human survival, but would presumably not support the testing
of cosmetic products on animals since such testing is potentially harmful to them
and does not serve a human good that is essential for our survival or flourishing as
rational beings.
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9 Geron Corporation is a primary locus of ESC research and was one of the first bodies
to announce the establishment of human ESC culture lines on November 5, 1998.
10 I am grateful to John Tilley for raising this objection to me in correspondence.
11 For a critique of this facet of consequentialism, see Williams and Smart (1973, pp. 98ff ).
12 An analogous example is provided by Gene Hackman’s character in Michael Apted’s film
Extreme Measures (1996), who performs illicit experiments on homeless persons by severing
their spinal cords and then attempting to grow neural tissue to reestablish the connection.
13 Advanced Cell Technology utilized SCNT with 17 enucleated ova. Three cloned
embryos were produced that developed up to the six-cell stage.
14 My concern here is with only the moral permissibility of human cloning.Therefore, any
references to cloning, or the creation of embryos for reproductive or research purposes,
should be understood to include the modifier “human.” The permissibility of nonhuman
cloning merits its own discussion, but I will not address it here.
15 Although (4) is sometimes cited as a reason for wishing to engage in reproductive
cloning, it is usually recognized as an impractical reason to clone, because, first, the
replication of a genotype does not entail the replication of an individual human being,
and second, the phenotypic expression of, say, an innate talent for music, has as much to
do with environmental influences as it does with one’s genotype.
16 See the discussion of the metaphysics of twinning in Chapter 2, pp. 37–9.
17 A somatic cell that has been separated from a human being’s body is not a proper part
of them as it is no longer informed by their rational soul; it has its own substantial form.
Such a cell, though, could not be considered to have the same potentiality as a cloned
embryo either, because it is not totipotential. External intervention is required to
enucleate the cell and implant its nucleus into an enucleated ovum in order for a human
being to be produced from it. This process, as I argued above, alters the cell’s meta-
physical identity.Therefore, there are no grounds for asserting that a somatic cell which
has been separated from its body and may be enucleated for the purpose of generating
a cloned human being has in itself an active potentiality to become a fully actualized
human being.
18 Aquinas does not refer to human females here since women bear their children and thus
their biological relationship to their children is not subject to question, at least prior to
the advent of surrogate motherhood practices and IVF utilizing donated gametes.
19 A large number of recent studies regarding the derivation and potential therapeutic use
of ASCs – with mixed, but promising results – are cited by David A. Prentice (Prentice
in PCB, 2004, pp. 309–46).
5 Issues at the end of human life: PVS patients, euthanasia, and 
organ donation
1 By “ability” here, I take Moreland and Rae to intend something akin to Pasnau’s concept
of a “capacity in hand” discussed in Chapter 2, p. 27.As noted in that chapter, there is a
level of active potentiality that precedes a capacity in hand to actually perform some
operation. It is arguable that a PVS patient continues to have this preceding level of
active potentiality for rational thought because their body is informed by a rational soul –
as evidenced by continued vegetative operations – despite their inability to ever actualize
that potentiality unless they experience postmortem bodily resurrection.
2 I use the terms “human being” and “person” interchangeably since, for Aquinas, all
human beings are persons; see Chapter 2, p. 23.
3 Aquinas also claims that there are “immaterial” beings: God and angels.
4 This section is derived from Eberl (2003).
5 A patient may kill themselves; kill themselves with the medical assistance of a physician
or some other person; or be killed by another in accordance with either the patient’s
134 Notes
expressed wish to die, or what the homicidal agent determines would be in the patient’s
best interest in cases where the patient is unconscious or unable to communicate their
wishes effectively.
6 Aquinas’s third indictment is based on God’s sovereignty over human life, which is a
theological premise that falls outside the scope of my focus in this volume; see Eberl (2003).
7 Aquinas holds that human beings are capable of postmortem existence in a disembodied
state, but this form of existence would be atypical and deficient because a human being
cannot actualize all of their proper capacities without their physical body; see Eberl
(2000b, 2004).
8 The reference to Aristotle, from his Nicomachean Ethics, is as follows: “Now if someone
murders himself because of anger, he does so willingly, in violation of correct reason,
when the law forbids it; hence he does injustice. But injustice to whom? Surely to the
city, not to himself, since he suffers it willingly, and no one willingly suffers injustice”
(Aristotle, 1984, 1138a10–12).
9 I use the term “nonutilization” to refer to either the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment, thus making no ethical distinction between the two types of
acts – either both are permissible or both are impermissible (AMA, 1992, p. 2233;
Bernat, 2001, p. 971).
10 Terminal sedation can be considered the upper limit of permissibility. Any further
palliative medication administered after the patient has been rendered unconscious is
unnecessary unless hastening their death is directly intended.
11 This explains why, in an example Hopkins raises, it would be murder to “to blow out
the computer chip in a person’s pacemaker with an electromagnetic pulse” (Hopkins,
1997, p. 35). Such an act would not be justified by PDE because the agent’s direct
intention is the person’s death; not by interfering with their cardiac system, as Hopkins
would put it, but by interfering with an object upon which their cardiac system depends
to function normally.
12 The judgment that some forms of treatment may not be morally mandated because they
are “disproportionately burdensome” is based on the distinction between “ordinary” and
“extraordinary” care that was developed by Roman Catholic moral theologians and
philosophers beginning in the sixteenth century (Cronin, 1989). This distinction has
since been adopted in magisterial Catholic teachings (Pius XII, 1958; Sacred
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1980), and its moral significance was
recognized by the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (President’s Commission, 1983, p. 88). Since
Aquinas does not explicitly recognize or employ this distinction, I have refrained from
using it in the present ethical analysis; see Eberl (2005c).
13 I am grateful to James DuBois for raising this point with me.
14 The provision of ANH would not be justified if the patient may benefit from hand-
feeding – usually in cases of dementia as opposed to PVS. If the patient is capable of
reflexive swallowing once food is manually provided, then this – admittedly resource-
consuming (Mitchell et al., 2004) – form of care should be provided to avoid introducing
the fatal pathology of loss of the swallowing reflex (Li, 2002). I am grateful to Fr. John
Kavanaugh for comments regarding the value of hand-feeding.
15 This information can be found at http://www.unos.org (accessed October 1, 2004).
16 This report can be found at http://www.optn.org/AR2003/default.htm (accessed
October 1, 2004).
17 See Chapter 3, pp. 43–5.
18 A significant criticism of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School that
first proposed the whole-brain criterion (Ad Hoc Committee, 1968) is that the prag-
matic concern over organ donation was their primary motivation in re-defining death.
Gary Belkin, however, convincingly demonstrates that this was not the case (Belkin,
2003).
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19 Note that this case is different from one in which heartbeat and respiratory activity is
replaced by an artificial respirator or cardiopulmonary bypass machine. Such replace-
ment would not preserve a human being’s proper vegetative capacities, as discussed in
Chapter 3, pp. 51–3. The external intervention relevant here is no more than what is
necessary to restore spontaneous heartbeat and respiration.
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reason 2, 10–11, 13–15, 20, 22, 87–8, 93,
104; practical 13–16; see also conscious
rational thought; intellect; mind
reduction 8, 46, 72
religion 1–4, 15, 117–18, 126; see also God;
theology
reproduction 1, 39 n.27, 68–70, 79, 87, 91;
see also cloning, reproductive
respiration 49, 51, 53, 55, 57–9, 112, 121,
124–5; artificial 112–15, 125 n.19, 127;
spontaneous 47, 58, 97, 125 n.19; see also
artificial life-support; circulation;
heartbeat; ventilator
responsibility 19–20, 103, 116; moral 63,
77, 93; parental 15
resurrection 84, 96 n.1, 117–18, 126
right to life 23, 66, 68 n.7, 69–70
risk 64–5, 79–80, 92, 108–9, 119, 126–7
Roman Catholic Church 2, 4, 21–2,
115 n.12
scandal 75–7
Schiavo,Terri 95, 116; see also artificial
nutrition and hydration; persistent
vegetative state
sensation 6, 24–5, 28, 83–4, 97, 101
sense organs 7–8, 26, 48
sense-perception 5, 7–8, 25
154 Index
sexual intercourse 1, 14–15, 90
Shewmon, D.Alan 46–7, 53–60
sin 19–20, 75, 77, 99, 101–2; see also evil
society 14–15, 77, 80, 91, 93, 102–3,
114, 120; see also community
somatic cell 39 n.27, 68, 78–9, 81, 86;
see also cloning; somatic cell nuclear
transfer
soul: rational 3–9, 23–9, 31, 33–4, 37–49,
51–4, 57, 59–61, 66, 82–6, 96–7, 100–1,
117–18, 122, 125, 127; sensitive 25, 40,
47–8; vegetative 25, 40, 47–8, 60;
see also form, substantial; organization,
principle of
sperm 23, 28, 38, 41, 67, 69–70, 78, 81–2,
92; see also conception; fertilization;
ovum/a
spinal cord 31, 60, 79; see also high cervical
cord transection
stem cell research: adult (ASC) 77–8, 94;
embryonic (ESC) 3, 23, 62, 65–9,
71–80, 88–90, 94
substance: elemental 34; immaterial 4, 34;
individual 4, 24–5, 31–4, 37, 39, 40, 58;
material 5, 7; natural 30–1, 51–2, 58,
71, 113; organic 41, 52; rational 48,
68 n.7, 71; see also artifact 
substantial change 28, 47, 70
suffering 71–2, 95, 100–1, 103–12, 114,
116, 126; see also pain; palliative
treatment





terminal sedation 95, 98, 106–8,
110–11, 127
terminally ill patients 23, 95, 98, 100–1,
105–7, 109, 112, 115, 125–7
theology 1–2, 16, 21–2, 43; see also God;
religion
Thomism/Thomistic 1–4, 15–16, 21, 23,
26, 39, 42–3, 45–7, 49–50, 53–4, 57, 60,
62, 65–7, 71, 83–4, 86, 88, 90, 96–8, 101,
105, 109, 118, 121–2, 124, 126
totality, principle of (PT) 100–1, 118–20
totipotentiality 31–5, 37, 39–40, 67, 78, 81,
86 n.17; see also pluripotentiality
trophoblast 32–3, 68
twinning 31–3, 37–40, 67, 79, 82; see also
identical twins
unconsciousness 83–4, 97, 106–7,
108 n.10, 110–11, 115; see also persistent
vegetative state; terminal sedation
unity: aggregate 5, 34, 51; formal 5;
functional 5, 35, 50–1, 60; integrative
50, 52–6, 58–60; intrinsic 5, 51; organic
34–7, 40, 43–4, 54, 60; substantial 31–2,
34–5, 37, 39–40, 42, 53, 58–60; unum
simpliciter 5, 34–5, 37, 51–2, 58
upbringing see education
uterus 29, 31–3, 36–8, 55, 63–4, 66–70, 78,
82, 84–5; see also implantation
utilitarianism 21, 102
value 2, 3, 17, 21, 23, 53, 62–3, 70–2, 87–9,
91, 93, 96–8, 100–1, 104–5, 107, 110,
115–16, 126; see also dignity; good/ness
ventilator 52, 53 n.19, 55–6, 58, 60 n.24,
114, 122; see also artificial life-support,
respiration: artificial
virtue 9–11, 88, 103, 120; see also charity;
natural law, relationship to virtue,
prudence
vital metabolic functions 43, 45, 47, 49,
51–4, 57–60, 85, 121; see also circulation;
heartbeat; respiration
woman 65, 69–70, 78, 84–5; pregnant 21,
55, 57, 63–4, 75
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